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Winter 1979–80

Fred I. Greenstein — Eisenhower as an Activist President

Richard F. Elmore — Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions

Robert Jervis — Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter

Roberta S. Sigel
John V. Reynolds — Generational Differences and the Women's Movement

Robert Struble, Jr. — House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation

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Book Reviews

Title Page and Index to Volume 94

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

FRED I. GREENSTEIN, in an analysis based on recently opened archives, takes sharp issue with the conventional view of Dwight Eisenhower as a passive, unskilled president. According to Greenstein, Eisenhower was an active president who succeeded, albeit much of the time covertly, in putting his personal stamp on public policy.

RICHARD F. ELMORE describes an approach to designing policy implementation that takes as its point of departure the ultimate outcome of the policy and then "maps backward" to establish what intervening steps are necessary to bring it about. He argues that "backward mapping" is a superior strategy to "forward mapping," which begins planning implementation from the top down.

ROBERT JERVIS examines the current debate over the capability of American nuclear weapons. He argues that the implicit assumption behind the call for adding warheads to develop a strategy of "flexible response" including a counterforce capability is wrong. Jervis concludes that the real issue is not the number of warheads to be developed but the resolve and willingness to use them.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL and JOHN V. REYNOLDS examine the dispositions of sets of similarly educated mothers and daughters toward the contemporary women's movement. The authors find that generational differences matter less on legal and economic objectives for women and more on social, cultural, and sexual questions.

ROBERT STRUBLE, JR., analyzes the nineteenth-century principle of rotation in office as manifested in incumbent withdrawals from the House of Representatives and in electoral defeats. He finds that the waning of that principle was produced by the professionalization of Congress.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON critically reviews General Sir John Hackett's novel, *The Third World War*. Though a fictional account of the origins and outbreak in 1985 of a nuclear World War III, the book is based on projections from current military assessments. According to Thompson, the book's weakness in foreign-policy analysis results from its overestimation of military factors to the neglect of the intangibles of politics and diplomacy and from its failure to perceive revolutionary nationalist forces.

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Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence

FRED I. GREENSTEIN

The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower is commonly thought to be devoid of interest to those who seek insight into the range of feasible ways to conduct the presidency in the era since the responsibilities and demands of that office mushroomed under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Most of the scholarly and serious journalistic commentators on Eisenhower as president have characterized him as an aging hero who reigned more than he ruled and who lacked the energy, motivation, and political skill to have a significant impact on events.[1] If Eisenhower was an exemplar, to their minds, it was in the negative sense of showing how one ought *not* to be president.

In recent years, however, there has been a slowly but steadily rising tide of Eisenhower revisionism. Some of the new interest in Eisenhower stems from nostalgia for the alleged placid, uncomplicated nature of the 1950s. Other interest derives from "postliberal" attraction to the kinds of policies he espoused—for example, curbs on defense spending, mildly incremental approaches to expanding welfare policies, and efforts to hold down inflation. A third category of revisionism, which might be called "instrumental revisionism," arises from reas-

[1] To varying degrees, each of the following works written in the 1950s expresses this view: Marquis Childs, *Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General and the President* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958); Richard Rovere, *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years* (New York: Farrar, 1956); and Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).

FRED I. GREENSTEIN is Henry Luce Professor of Politics, Law, and Society at Princeton University. He has authored or coauthored *Children and Politics, Personality and Politics, The Dynamics of American Politics, Handbook of Political Science,* and *The Evolution of the Modern Presidency: A Bibliographical Survey.* Professor Greenstein currently is writing a book on Dwight Eisenhower's presidential leadership under the auspices of the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

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sessments of Eisenhower's performance as a political practitioner. In view of the debacles of his successors, the conduct in office of the only post-Twenty-second Amendment president to be elected to and complete two terms (and with continuingly high levels of public support at that) seems worthy of reconsideration on that ground alone.

Instrumental revisionist reexamination of Eisenhower's performance has to date been largely deductive. The two writers who have argued most forcefully that Eisenhower was not inept but instead a skilled politician who practiced the art of ruling in a deceptively veiled fashion are journalists who have relied heavily on close readings of the published record.[2] Both have ingeniously reconstructed what seems to them the logic of Eisenhower's actions in various widely publicized events. They also have drawn on passages from writings of his contemporaries, such as the following by Richard Nixon in his 1962 memoir:

> [Eisenhower] was a far more complex and devious man than most people realized, and in the best sense of these words. Not shackled to a one-track mind, he always applied two, three or four lines of reasoning to a single problem and he usually preferred the indirect approach where it would serve him better than the direct attack on a problem.[3]

The observations on Eisenhower's presidential style adduced in this article differ from those of previous instrumental revisionists in that they are inductive rather than deductive. They are based mainly on one of the many newly available primary sources on his presidency, namely the collection of several thousand documents in the Whitman File at the Eisenhower Library.[4] This archival trove, which is named after Eisenhower's personal secretary, Ann Whitman, was opened for scholarly perusal in the mid-1970s. The Whitman File provides far more thorough documentation of Eisenhower's day-to-day activities than has been preserved for other presidencies, including: daily lists of the president's appointments; detailed minutes of formal meetings such as those of the cabinet, National Security Council (NSC), and legislative leaders; extensive notes and

[2] Murray Kempton, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower," *Esquire* (September 1967): 108; and Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1969). For reviews of scholarly literature reevaluating Eisenhower's leadership, see Victor De Santis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," *Review of Politics* 38 (April 1976): 190–207; and Gary W. Reichard, "Eisenhower as President: The Changing View," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 77 (Summer 1978): 265–81.

[3] Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 161.

[4] The archival sources drawn upon in this article and abbreviations used in citations of them follow. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (Ann Whitman Diary Series [AWD]; DDE Diaries Series [DDE]; Name Series [NS]; Press Conference Series [PC]); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Personal Diary, 1935–1966, Eisenhower Library (PD); James Hagerty, Personal Diary, 1954–1956, Eisenhower Library (HD); Bernard Shanley, Personal Diaries, 1953–1957, Eisenhower Library (SD); and John Foster Dulles, Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. (DP). On the uses of archival sources, see Fred I. Greenstein, "A Tory Theory of the Presidency: Eisenhower's Leadership Reexamined" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1979), pp. 59–60, n. 3.

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numerous transcripts of informal meetings between the president and other political figures; transcripts or summaries of his face-to-face and telephone conversations; texts of pre-press conference briefings; and many observations by Mrs. Whitman of comings and goings in the White House, of offhand remarks by the president, and even of fluctuations in his mood and temper.

The Whitman File also contains Eisenhower's copious comments on and interpolations in the numerous drafts of his speeches; his memoranda and notes to colleagues; an extraordinary number of "personal and confidential" letters he dictated to correspondents; and his private diary, which reaches back to Eisenhower's service in the 1930s as aide to General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines and extends forward into his late retirement years. The Eisenhower presidency is further illuminated by the unpublished diaries and oral histories of his personal associates, many of whom are now more disposed to be interviewed than would have been the case shortly after the end of his administration.

The conclusions I draw from an extensive reading of the archival materials are more consistent with the inferences of the instrumental revisionists than with the traditional lore deprecating Eisenhower's leadership skills and efforts. Eisenhower was politically astute and informed, actively engaged in putting his personal stamp on public policy, and applied a carefully thought-out conception of leadership to the conduct of his presidency.

The Nature and Style of Eisenhower's Activism

The term activism is commonly used to refer to three presidential attributes that in fact may vary independently of one another: sheer extent of activity; commitment to use the office so as to have an impact on public policy; and actual success in affecting policy. Despite the widespread belief that Eisenhower was not an activist president in any of these respects, he worked hard and both intended to and did have an impact on policy. Moreover, as will be illustrated throughout this essay, his activism has not been evident to many observers of his presidency due to the "low-profile" nature of his leadership style. I shall begin by considering the extent of activity of this president who often was portrayed as being more attentive to golf than to government.

Extent of Activity

The extent of Eisenhower's activity can be assessed by examining the lists of his appointments and meetings for each official day. The lists for some days can be supplemented by taking account of the prodigious amount of correspondence he dictated and other paper work he engaged in along with his numerous telephone conversations. Furthermore, oral histories and interviews with people who worked with him provide information on Eisenhower's activities during the time not covered by the appointment lists—between appointments and before and after his official day.

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The appointment list for October 13, 1960,[5] which falls at about the median in number of appointments, is quite instructive, because in addition to demonstrating the sheer extent of his activity, it suggests the distinctive nature and style of certain aspects of Eisenhower's activism. The conventional view of him as an inactive president is manifestly inaccurate. He arrived at his office at 8:12 A.M., but his work had begun much earlier. Before leaving the White House residential quarters, Eisenhower often held 7:30 meetings over breakfast. On many days, moreover, he chatted with his closest confidant, his brother Milton, who regularly spent three-day weekends living in Washington and using an office in the Executive Office Building.[6] And by the time Milton Eisenhower, Press Secretary James Hagerty, and the staff members who each morning briefed President Eisenhower on intelligence matters saw him, he had closely read several newspapers—papers to which he paid particular attention were the *New York Times*, *New York Herald-Tribune*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

The October 13 log lists seventeen meetings during the morning and afternoon, ranging from brief exchanges with his appointments secretary to the weekly meeting of the National Security Council. The first part of the log continues from 8:12 A.M. to 5:13 P.M., with a forty-five minute preluncheon break for the rest and exercise prescribed by Eisenhower's doctors. Ordinarily, his work day would have continued for perhaps another hour, and there probably would have been a predinner hour session of informal business conducted over cocktails in the official residence. This last hour was when Eisenhower met with his major friendly adversaries, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, and it often was an occasion for reflective discussion with John Foster Dulles or Milton Eisenhower.[7]

But on this evening, Head of State ceremonies were scheduled. President and Mrs. Eisenhower attended a dinner given for them by King Frederick and Queen Ingrid of Denmark at the Danish embassy, along with a performance of the Danish Royal Ballet (with reception of guests during the intermission). The

[5] AWD.

[6] Dwight and Milton Eisenhower had been politically close ever since the 1920s, when Dwight was assigned to the War Department and Milton had already launched his long career as a civil servant.

In chapter 18 of his memoirs, Milton describes their relationship during his brother's presidency and reviews and evaluates the various 1950s journalistic reports on his political role, including claims that Milton was the grey eminence of the Eisenhower presidency. Milton arranged during his tenure as president of Pennsylvania State and then The Johns Hopkins Universities to work an intensive four-day week in order to spend the remaining three days in Washington. He had a direct phone to his brother in his university offices. The precise range of their communications remains undisclosed, but it appears that Milton had more to do with issues than tactics and that in addition to having certain explicitly designated responsibilities, he was a sounding board. He did not dominate his brother, however. The St. Lawrence Seaway, the decision to run again in 1956, and the choice of strategy in response to McCarthy are examples of policies or decisions in which Dwight's actions did not follow Milton's views. See Milton Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 338, 343–46, 317.

[7] See John Osborne, "Gabbing with [Bryce] Harlow," *The New Republic* 135, 13 May 1978, p. 10.

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Eisenhowers dropped off the king and queen at Blair House at 11:32 P.M. and arrived at the Executive Mansion at 11:37 P.M.[8]

If Eisenhower typically was as busy as the log of activities on October 13, 1960, suggests, how did the misimpression of his lassitude arise? For one thing, the administration did not release to the press full lists of Eisenhower's meetings. For another, it was not deemed appropriate that some of the meetings be announced—indeed this was the case with three of those held on the day under consideration, which were listed as officially "off-the-record." The nature of these meetings helps to alter the impression of Eisenhower as a passive, apolitical president who "delegated away" authority to make decisions on major issues.

The first of these three off-the-record meetings was with business leaders working with a group called "Vote Getters for Nixon and Lodge." (The 1960 presidential campaign, of course, was well under way.) The second and considerably longer meeting also pertained to the election. It was an hour-and-a-half luncheon attended by forty-eight dignitaries of the Republican Finance Group. Among those present were the current and immediately preceding GOP chairmen and a panoply of major figures in industry and finance—men with such names as Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., Laurence S. Rockefeller, Lamont du Pont Copeland, and Paul Mellon.

These GOP fund-raising activities were part of Eisenhower's continued efforts to broaden, unify, strengthen, and modify the Republican party, notwithstanding his simultaneous efforts to convey the impression of nonpartisanship. But, even when his party-related labors were not so conspicuously open to polemical assertions about GOP business ties and wealthy fat cats as were these two gatherings, Eisenhower avoided publicizing the extent of his participation in party leadership. There was, moreover, a deliberate method in his practice of not publicizing these endeavors. First, visible partisanship was eschewed, for it would interfere with Eisenhower's attempts to muster the bipartisan congressional coalitions necessary to pass his programs. Second, his efforts were directed toward strengthening the support of centrist groups in the party; these efforts, if widely publicized, would tend to provoke factional conflict within the GOP, between the right wing and the center. Finally, Eisenhower comported himself in a manner consistent with his view that the presidency as an institution, and hence he personally, should be perceived as representing the entire American population, not just one party. This hidden rationale for not publicizing an important array

[8] Eisenhower's work did not invariably end at bedtime. Bryce Harlow describes the following exercise in late-night legislative liaison. "One evening in 1958, around midnight, Speaker Sam Rayburn telephoned me about an urgent requirement on an important bill then in intense controversy in the House of Representatives. He needed a Presidential decision at once but President Eisenhower had retired for the night. I told him to stand by, went to the President's rooms, had him awakened, explained the problem, got his decision, and reported back to the Speaker, all within 20 minutes" ("Text of Harlow's Keynote Address at Nashville Symposium," *Center House Bulletin* 4 [Winter 1974]: 7). (This is the parent publication of *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.)

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of his goals and actions is a distinguishing mark of Eisenhower's style of presidential activism. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see why unpublicized activism was misinterpreted as presidential passivism.[9]

Whether Eisenhower "delegated away" powers he himself should have exercised is a question that meetings like the third off-the-record meeting of October 13, 1960, shed light on. This was a fifty-five-minute session with a variety of high national security and foreign-policy officials (for example, the secretaries of state and defense and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency) which immediately preceded the official meeting of the National Security Council. It falls into a class of decision-making conferences that have been described by Douglas Kinnard, who drew on the minutes of the regular pre-NSC meeting conference.[10] The NSC meetings and administrative machinery were at that time being criticized by Washington insiders such as Senators Henry Jackson and John F. Kennedy for being an unimaginative bureaucratic setting in which routine presentation of turgid position papers occurred.[11] Kinnard has shown, however, that the preliminary sessions were occasions for genuine policy debate and policymaking. Indeed these sessions had a give-and-take quality quite like that recommended by scholars who call for the avoidance of "groupthink" in policy deliberations.[12] (The official NSC meetings also were occasions for discussion, but their main function was that of "spreading the word," that is, promulgating administration policy to those who were to execute it.) Not only in pre-NSC conferences and cabinet meetings but also in general, Eisenhower favored discussions that were preceded by careful staff work, but in which contending advocates were brought together and asked to argue vigorously for their policy options. Eisenhower usually reserved comment until the other participants had spoken. Then he—not his subordinates—made the final choices, which were followed by systematic attention by staff aides to insure implementation.

[9] Eisenhower's activism also tends not to be noted because the policies he sought to advance were in general conservative. As Erwin C. Hargrove suggests, most commentators on American politics have politically liberal basic assumptions that lead them to confuse advocacy of governmental activism by a leader with the leader's own level of activity. See Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Revisionist Views of the Presidency," *American Journal of Political Science* 17 (November 1973): 819–35. But clearly one can be active in pursuit of conservative policies.

[10] See Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), and idem., "President Eisenhower and the Defense Budget," *Journal of Politics* 39 (August 1977): 596–623.

[11] See, for example, Henry M. Jackson, ed., *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level* (New York: Praeger, 1965). This is a commercial reprint of U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1961.

[12] See Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); and Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Foreign Policy," I.M. Destler, "Comment: Multiple Advocacy: Some 'Limits and Costs,' " and "Rejoinder by the Author," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September 1972): 751–95.

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Delegation of Authority

Decision making by the president after vigorous debate among advisers was not a product of the so-called new Eisenhower of 1959–60; rather, this procedure was followed throughout his first six years in office as well. During those years, Eisenhower still had in his employ Sherman Adams and John Foster Dulles, to each of whom he is commonly believed to have abdicted fundamental policy-making powers. Eisenhower did strongly hold that the ability to delegate power and to utilize staff support was a necessary condition for effective leadership of large, complex organizations. As far back as 1942, immediately on assuming command of Allied forces in the European theater of World War II, he stressed in a briefing to his aides that they were "free to solve their own problems wherever possible and not to get in the habit of passing the buck up."[13] But his delegation practices were informed by a well-developed sense of whom he could entrust with what amount of decision-making power and of the need to be vigilant about possible failures by line and staff officials to adhere to their chief's policies.

Eisenhower did entrust important responsibilities to Adams and Dulles. He prized the service of both men, but he was not awed by them. In his view, both were overly gruff and insensitive to their abrasive effect on others, but these shortcomings were more than compensated for by the high quality and prodigious quantity of their work. In numerous private diary entries Eisenhower made from time to time (much like the performance evaluations of military associates he made in World War II and immediately thereafter as chief of staff of the army), he registered judgments on their deficiencies as well as on their strengths. For example, in a note Eisenhower dictated to himself summing up accomplishments and disappointments in his first year as president, he said of Adams: "Honesty, directness, and efficiency have begun to win friends among people who initially were prone to curse him because he had no time for flattery or cajolery, or even pleasantries over the telephone."[14] With respect to Dulles, Eisenhower wrote this assessment: "He is well informed and [on matters of foreign affairs] at least is deserving, I think, of his reputation as a 'wise' man. . . . But he is not particularly persuasive in presentation and, at times, seems to have a curious lack of understanding as to how his words and manner may affect another personality."[15]

The evidence required for close, if not definitive, analysis of the Eisenhower-Dulles and Eisenhower-Adams relationships is now accessible. It includes not only the Eisenhower Library sources enumerated above, but also the several hundred oral histories in the Columbia University Eisenhower Administration collection, the papers and oral histories in the Princeton University John Foster Dulles collection, and Adams's papers in the library of Dartmouth College.

Richard Immerman has reported preliminary findings of a study of how

[13] PD, 25 June 1942.
[14] DDE, 18 January 1954.
[15] PD, 14 May 1953.

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Eisenhower and Dulles worked together.[16] The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that their relationship was collaborative. The two men agreed in their basic policy goals as well as their assessments of the political realities of the time and the strategies appropriate to deal with them, although they differed from time to time on matters of tactics. Their common beliefs and perceptions were reinforced by daily contact—direct meetings when Dulles was in Washington, electronic communication when he was traveling. Eisenhower, it should be noted, conferred with and issued policy instructions to members of the foreign-policy community besides Dulles. He used Dulles partly as roving emissary, partly as official foreign-policy spokesman, and partly in his "wise man" capacity as a participant in a continuing dialogue on general and specific facets of foreign policy.

Eisenhower and Dulles practiced a division of labor resembling that of a client with his attorney—a client who has firm overall purposes and an attorney who is expected to help him devise ways to accomplish those purposes and to argue his case. The public impression that emanated from the quite different personal styles of these men—Dulles the austere cold warrior, Eisenhower the warm champion of peace—contributed to a further division of labor. Dulles was assigned the "get tough" side of foreign-policy enunciation, thus placating the fervently anti-Communist wing of the Republican party. Meanwhile, amiable Ike made gestures toward peace and international humanitarianism—for example, Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, and summitry at Geneva.

As a cabinet official, Dulles was in the formal line of policymaking command. Adams, albeit "*The* Assistant to the President" and the first staff member listed in the *Government Organization Manual*, nonetheless was a staff aide. Formally, therefore, he was not a policymaker, but of course it is well known that important staff aides invariably have an impact on policy. In the popular lore of the 1950s, Adams was thought to be the man who made the domestic policy decisions that the apolitical Eisenhower then ratified. This view is well summarized in the following passage from an essay published in 1958.

> Eisenhower . . . rarely meets his staff. Sherman Adams does it for him. The President insists that conflicts be resolved before they reach his desk; he wants only to hear the consensus, not the discussion, of the staff. He will not be bothered with a lot of paper work. He expects communications to him to be in the form of neatly drafted, one-page memos—which is probably one reason why he often shows little insight into the complex issues of the day. Eisenhower likes best a paper that ends, "OK, SA"; this he can initial "DDE": such is his confidence in Adams and his staff.[17]

How does the lore square with the reality of the Eisenhower-Adams relationship? In a word, poorly. While Adams did conduct daily staff meetings, their

[16] See Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1 (Fall 1979), in press.

[17] Marion D. Irish, "The Organization Man in the Presidency," *Journal of Politics* 20 (May 1958): 269.

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purpose was not to shape administration policy but to disseminate it. Although Eisenhower allowed Adams's role to evolve (as Adams put it, the president "never specifically defined my responsibilities or outlined their limits"),[18] he guided Adams in much the fashion he had guided his military staff deputies. Adams was encouraged to be present at as many of Eisenhower's meetings as possible, but since Adams himself made countless phone calls daily and conducted numerous "fire fighting" meetings in his office, he simply could not be present at all of them. Even when he missed Eisenhower's meetings, Adams could learn what had transpired, because they were usually summarized by a staff aide in a memorandum for record. Attending meetings and reading summaries served to attune Adams to Eisenhower's decisions and thinking.

Adams was expected to be so well aware of Eisenhower's views that he could make decisions consistent with them. And it was incumbent upon him to know enough to be able to keep out of the Oval Office problems and people the president wanted dealt with by aides. Adams learned what he was to do and not to do not only through osmosis but also more directly. Frequently Eisenhower wrote notes to him or called him into his office to indicate an action that was needed or a policy that should be implemented. If Adams felt he could not act for the president, he was expected to step into the latter's office for a decision.

Was Adams an all-powerful gatekeeper who controlled the flow of information to Eisenhower and who presented him with briefly worded consensus policy recommendations for his ratification? The evidence is decidedly to the contrary. All cabinet members could see Eisenhower individually, if they considered it necessary, and were encouraged to speak freely at cabinet meetings. The weekly meetings with legislative leaders were another source of information to the president, as were a number of senior White House aides besides Adams. Furthermore, Eisenhower, not Adams, had selected the most important members of the staff Adams nominally headed, and several of these men had direct access to Eisenhower without "clearing with Sherm."

In addition to the regular meetings with the cabinet and legislative leaders, the newspaper reading, conversations with his brother Milton, and intelligence briefings, Eisenhower had many other ways of seeking and receiving information. He read an extraordinary volume of official documents and maintained a voluminous "personal and confidential" correspondence with his extensive network of friends in the business and military communities and in other walks of life. His periodic stag dinners with carefully selected national figures were still another source of knowledge. Finally, it is instructive to note that although Adams had the impression that Eisenhower rarely used the telephone,[19] the telephone logs for some days contain as many as a dozen calls in which Eisenhower sought information, gave instructions, rallied support, and made policy decisions.

[18] Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 50.
[19] Ibid., p. 73.

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Adams, in short, was an expediter of the president's policies and a like-minded agent, not a prime policy mover—this notwithstanding the not uncommon view that "O.K., S.A." was tantamount to adoption of a given course of action by "D.D.E." In this connection, the matter of "O.K., S.A." sheds light on a way that Adams's services had some of the same effect for Eisenhower as did Dulles's. The major policy papers and correspondence that went to the president did *not* bear this inscription. Rather, it was largely to be found on recommendations for minor patronage positions. Apart from being time consuming, such decisions are a notorious source of recrimination. It was much to Eisenhower's advantage that Adams take the blame for the bulk of them. (Eisenhower was able to benefit from those he informally arranged and then instructed Adams to implement.) More broadly, Adams's reputation as "abominable no man," like Dulles's as grim cold warrior, preserved Eisenhower's ability to appear as a benevolent national and international leader.

Stephen Hess has described Eisenhower's general approach to delegation of authority as one that "artfully constructed . . . an elaborate maze of buffer zones." Hess adds that "Eisenhower gave himself considerable freedom of action by giving his subordinates considerable latitude to act."[20] It should be emphasized that Eisenhower's buffering practices did not consist exclusively of allowing subordinates to carry out the more controversial components of administration policy. But the division of labor in which the subordinate protected the president's ability to be perceived as being above the fray was in some instances a conscious strategy. For example, Press Secretary James Hagerty (one of the staff members who had regular, direct access to the president) once reminisced:

> President Eisenhower would say, "Do it this way." I would say, "If I go to that press conference and say what you want me to say, I would get hell." With that, he would smile, get up and walk around the desk, pat me on the back and say, "My boy, better you than me."[21]

The uses by Eisenhower and subordinates of this type of strategy are better described as acts of "pseudo-delegation" than of true delegation. In these cases the policy was Eisenhower's, but in its promulgation Eisenhower's hand was hidden. There is much further evidence of a variety of ways in which Eisenhower practiced what I shall designate as "hidden hand leadership."

Hidden Hand Leadership

Covert or hidden hand leadership is an alternative political tactic to seeking to enhance one's professional reputation. Neustadt, it will be recalled, argues that the principal sources of presidential influence are the president's "professional

[20] Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 65.

[21] Quoted in Gordon Hoxie, ed., *The White House: Organization and Operations* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1971), p. 4.

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reputation" among other politicians as a skilled leader, his prestige with the general public, and his use of formal powers.[22] Eisenhower was prepared to sacrifice the first for the second. Further, he preferred informal to formal means of influence.

One type of hidden hand leadership Eisenhower practiced involved working through intermediaries. An example is provided by the following rough notes summarizing a telephone conversation in which Eisenhower charged Treasury Secretary Humphrey with the task of urging Eisenhower's friend, the Texas oil millionaire, Sid Richardson, to persuade Lyndon Johnson to be more cooperative.

> Called Secy. Humphrey—asking him to speak to Sid Richardson (who was really the angel for Johnson when he came in). Ask him what it is that Tex wants. We help out in drought, take tidelands matter on their side, & tax bill. But question is, how much influence has Sid got with Johnson? He tells Sid he's supporting us, then comes up here & disproves it (yesterday for instance). Perhaps Sid could get him into right channel, or threaten to get Shivers into primary & beat him for Senate. Humphrey says this is exactly the time to do it, too; & if he talks to Sid, it can't be said that DDE is taking advantage of long-time friendship. DDE admits Sid himself has helped us; but can't let Johnson do as he pleases. He nagged George on Bricker, now on this one. If Sid is friend of fine conservative govt., he'd better pull away from Johnson. Humphrey said Johnson's alibi to Sid this time was, "They wait until we are committed; then they come after us." But we just can't tell them things in advance—they always give it to the press. Sid understands rough language; Humphrey can use it, & will![23]

Another element of Eisenhower's deliberately unpublicized kind of activism consisted of exploitation of his putative lack of political skill. This is illustrated by an episode described in his private diary in which he took the blame for a diplomatic error on the part of Secretary of State Dulles. The diary entry was stimulated by a meeting with the retiring ambassador to the Court of St. James, "my good friend, Walter Gifford."[24]

While Eisenhower was still at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), he had learned of Gifford's plan to retire as soon as the next administration was in office. "With this knowledge, I of course was interested in the task of selecting a completely acceptable and useful successor. We started this job shortly after election in early November and it was not long before we determined that all things considered Winthrop Aldrich would be our best bet. This selection was made on the most confidential basis, but to our consternation it was soon public knowledge." Because Dulles felt the situation embarrassing and in need of public announcement, Eisenhower authorized this, but "put in my word of caution that Walter Gifford would have to be protected in every possible way."

[22] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, rev. ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 4.
[23] DDE, Phone Calls, January–May 1954, March 19.
[24] PD, 13 February 1953.

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In the haste to act quickly, Gifford's planned resignation and Aldrich's intended appointment were announced promptly, without clearing the matter with the British. Eisenhower continues:

> This upset the British government very badly—and I must say most understandably. As Anthony Eden pointed out in his informal protest to Walter Gifford, this meant that Britain was being subjected to pretty rough treatment when there was no effort made to get the usual "agreement." He said that with this precedent, any small nation could pursue the same tactics and if Britain should protest, they could argue that since the United States had done this and Britain had accepted it, no real objection could be made. To guard against any such development as this, I am going to advise Anthony, when I see him next month, to lay the blame for this whole unfortunate occurrence squarely on me. He will have the logical explanation that my lack of formal experience in the political world was the reason for the blunder. Actually, I was the one who cautioned against anything like this happening, but manifestly I can take the blame without hurting anything or anybody, whereas if the Secretary of State would have to shoulder it his position would be badly damaged.[25]

Perhaps the most striking example of hidden hand leadership, at least in domestic politics, was Eisenhower's extensive behind-the-scenes participation in the sequence of events that culminated in the Senate's censure of Joseph McCarthy in December 1954. Working most closely with Press Secretary Hagerty, Eisenhower conducted a virtual day-to-day campaign via the media and congressional allies to end McCarthy's political effectiveness. The overall strategy was to avoid *direct mention* of McCarthy in the president's public statements, lest McCarthy win sympathy as a spunky David battling against the presidential Goliath. Instead Eisenhower systematically condemned the *types* of actions in which McCarthy engaged.

Hagerty arranged with sympathetic newspaper reporters, publishers, and broadcasters for coverage that underscored the president's implicit condemnation of McCarthy. In addition, an arrangement was made whereby an administration spokesman rather than McCarthy received network air-time on an occasion when Adlai Stevenson castigated the Republican party for McCarthyism. Finally, much attention was given to persuading congressional leaders to conduct the hearings evaluating McCarthy's conduct in a fashion that would vitiate McCarthy's usual means of defending himself against counterattack. Eisenhower's orchestration of the covert aspects of the events that led to McCarthy's censure even now have not been documented in the published literature on the period.[26]

[25] Ibid.

[26] Notations in the Whitman Files and a personal diary that Press Secretary Hagerty kept for several years beginning in January 1954 provide the main evidence for this account. For a detailed narrative, see Robert Wright, "Ike and Joe: Eisenhower's White House and the Demise of Joseph McCarthy" (Senior thesis, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1979). The most authoritative published works on McCarthy are Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph McCarthy and the Senate* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970) and Richard M. Fried, *Men Against McCarthy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

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Rhetorical and Cognitive Style

Eisenhower's published discourse was a principal source of the many deprecations of his fitness for presidential leadership. His unpublished discourse—both writings and transcripts of discussions—leads to an impression quite different from that conveyed by the published record. Eisenhower's critics derided his apparent inability to think and express himself clearly along with his seeming lack of knowledge. The evidence that gave rise to their view was the fuzzy and tangled prose in his answers at press conferences; his frequent professions of ignorance in response to reporters' questions about issues one would expect any self-respecting president to discuss knowledgeably; and the middle-brow, middle-America rhetoric of a large portion of his speeches.

Three kinds of evidence in the Whitman File make necessary a reevaluation of Eisenhower's level of knowledge and his rhetorical and cognitive styles: the transcripts of Eisenhower's conversations and conferences; his markups and insertions in the numerous drafts through which all of his major speeches went; and his personal correspondence. These sources reveal a skilled, sophisticated use of language on Eisenhower's part and extend my description of the nature and style of his activism.

Conversations and Conferences

A large number of the papers preserved in the Whitman File are transcripts or paraphrases of Eisenhower's conversations and conferences dealing with specifics of policy, in numerous instances matters that many people believed Eisenhower was neither interested in nor attentive to. An example is a transcribed paraphrase of a meeting with the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, in which the president requested a shift of emphasis in a passage of a draft of the 1959 Annual Economic Report. This document reveals the man who allegedly read only simplified one-page memos both reading and commenting upon a good many pages of complex subject matter.

> The President called Dr. Saulnier in and said that he had read the first two chapters of the proposed economic report. He liked them, but felt there was one very definite omission. He felt that in these two chapters there would be some account of the history of the weakness of the automobile market. He thinks it very important to say what caused this weakness—and he listed the causes as (1) lack of statesmanship in the search for market and (2) overextension in the use of credit terms. This latter had the effect of encouraging buying and unusual wage demands.[27]

The transcripts of conversations and conferences also include minutes of prepress conference briefings. Some of these explain one verbal regularity that led president-watchers to take it for granted that Eisenhower was poorly informed—his frequent statements in press conferences that he was unfamiliar

[27] Memorandum for Files, DDE, 24 December 1958.

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with an issue. Eisenhower made such claims when he preferred not to discuss a matter. For example, in the July 31, 1957, briefing, Eisenhower was reminded that Egyptian President Nasser had made a series of speeches criticizing the United States and that the "Egyptians are trying to say [these speeches] have disturbed us."[28] Eisenhower replied that if asked about Nasser's speeches he would state that he had not read them, whereas in fact hypothetical questions and answers on the topic were present in that session's briefing papers. It turned out, as was often the case with topics discussed in the preliminary conferences, that no journalist asked a question about Nasser's speeches.[29]

Numerous similar assertions of Eisenhower's intention to deny knowledge of a sticky issue about which he was informed, or to say that he had not kept up with the technicalities of a matter, can be found in the pre-press conference transcripts. These assertions are borne out by abundant examples of follow-through. Virtually all of Eisenhower's press conferences include remarks such as "Well, this is the first I have heard about that," "You cannot expect me to know the legal complexities of that issue," and so on.[30] No doubt all presidents have feigned ignorance or "stonewalled" occasionally, but out-and-out denials of knowledge are far more common in Eisenhower's press conferences than in those of the other modern presidents.

Insight into Eisenhower's confusing prose in press conferences is provided by the report, in his memoirs, of the following incident. In March 1955, two months after the passage of the Formosa Straits Resolution, reporters were still seeking unequivocal answers to such questions as whether, under what circumstances, and with what kinds of weapons the United States would defend the Nationalist Chinese-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu, if they were attacked from the mainland. In the March 16 conference, Eisenhower warned that in the event of a "general war" in Asia, the United States was prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons "on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes."[31] Just before the next week's conference, the State Department urgently requested, through Press Secretary James Hagerty, that the president refuse to discuss this delicate matter further.

> "Don't worry, Jim," I told him as we went out the door of my office, "if that question comes up, I'll just confuse them."
>
> One question on this subject came that morning from Joseph C. Harsch, of the *Christian Science Monitor:* "If we got into an issue with the Chinese, say, over Matsu

[28] Pre-press conference notes, PC, 31 July 1957.

[29] "The President's News Conference of July 31, 1957," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.).

[30] The texts of these conferences are contained in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower,* vols. 1953–1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.).

[31] "The President's News Conference of March 16, 1955," in ibid.

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and Quemoy, that we wanted to keep limited, do you conceive of using [atomic weapons] in that situation or not?"

I said that I could not answer that question in advance. The only thing I knew about war was two things: the most unpredictable factor in war was human nature, but the only unchanging factor in war was human nature.

"And the next thing," I said in answer to Mr. Harsch, "is that every war is going to astonish you in the way it occurred, and in the way it is carried out.

"So that for a man to predict, particularly if he has the responsibility for making the decision, to predict what he is going to use, how he is going to do it, would I think exhibit his ignorance of war; that is what I believe.

"So I think you just have to wait; and that is the kind of prayerful decision that may some day face a President."[32]

The July 17, 1957, pre-press conference briefing is illuminating on both the vagueness of his press conference statements and the nature of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship.[33] Eisenhower expressed to his staff annoyance that on the previous day the secretary of state, in his own press conference, had "wandered" into a discussion of a national security matter that Eisenhower felt should not have been commented upon at all, namely the disposition of American missiles in Europe. After checking by telephone with Dulles about precisely what had been said, Eisenhower informed his associates that if this matter were to arise in that day's press conference, "I will be evasive," as he in fact was.[34]

[32] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 478. On the deliberate vagueness in the wording of the Formosa Straits Resolution, see Eisenhower's letter to General Alfred Gruenther (DDE, 1 February 1955), in which he laid out the diversity of responses to actions bearing on the offshore islands that could be expected within the United States and on the part of the two Chinese governments, the USSR, and America's European allies. He reviewed the inevitable costs of *any* possible United States response to an attack on the islands and hence to any explicit advance declaration of intention and commented: "You probably read the Resolution that was passed by the Congress, at my request. The wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can understand why this is so" (ibid.) Eisenhower evidently felt that by keeping the resolution vague he would advance two strategic aims: avoidance of a heated controversy about the policy declaration itself and deterrence of an actual attack from the mainland by, as one adviser put it, "keeping them guessing."

[33] Pre-press conference briefing, PC, 17 July 1957.

[34] Eisenhower talked very broadly about the issue, but denied awareness of the very assertions Dulles had just summarized over the telephone:

Peter Lisagor, *Chicago Daily News*: "Mr. President, Secretary Dulles yesterday disclosed that consideration is being given to a plan for establishing nuclear stockpiles of weapons and fissionable materials for NATO powers. Now if one of our purposes in the disarmament talks is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to a fourth power, or to other powers, can you tell us what the logic is of establishing a stockpile in which 15 other nations will have nuclear weapons?"

The President: "Well, I think that it is exactly logical, because if you are going to defend yourselves against nuclear attack, then all of those people attacked ought to have the right, the opportunity, and the capability of responding in kind. . . .

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Not only Eisenhower's claims of ignorance and ambiguous language, but also his fractured syntax led 1950s observers to deprecate his professional skills and, for that matter, his intelligence. Prudential calculation and personal style conspired to produce the garbled phrases quoted in so many writings drawing on Eisenhower's press conference utterances.[35] The element of calculation is portrayed by Eisenhower in his memoirs, where he discusses the intra-administration objection to his decisions to release transcripts and later tapes on the ground that "an inadvertent misstatement in public would be a calamity." He explains that, "by consistently focusing on ideas rather than on phrasing, I was able to avoid causing the nation a serious setback through anything I said in many hours, over eight years, of intensive questioning."[36]

The element of style involved a personal trait Eisenhower was well aware of, namely his tendency in spontaneous discourse to ramble and to stop and start. This trait derived from his tendency to have more ideas than he could readily convert into orderly sentences.[37] Interestingly, in the absence of an audience waiting to seize upon controversial misstatements, he could dictate lengthy letters of noteworthy clarity. In press conferences, wary of misstatement and prone to a conversational mode of sputtering, he continually edited his discourse while talking. Overall, both the calculated and unintentional aspects of Eisenhower's press conference style had the same effect as his approach to delegation of authority: they damaged his reputation among the political cognoscenti, but protected his options as a decision maker and insulated him from blame by the wider public for controversial or potentially controversial utterances and actions.

Now I don't know what he told you about a plan. What we have just been doing is studying means and methods of making NATO effective as a defensive organization. This means they must be armed properly. Now that is all there is to that. There is no specific program laid down at this minute by which are taking place all these things that you mentioned" ("The President's News Conference of July 31, 1957," *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower* [emphasis added]).

[35] An added factor was the mechanics of how the conferences were transcribed. The definitive transcripts of his press conferences are *not* uniquely scrambled when compared, for example, with those of Kennedy's press conferences. The texts published at the time by both the White House and the *New York Times* were stenotypes that perforce were rapidly typed by a commercial transcribing firm. The official *Public Papers* transcripts, prepared by checking original texts against the recordings of the conferences, correct punctuation and other errors and in doing so produce a substantially greater proportion of sentences that can withstand parsing. The Signal Corps recordings of Eisenhower's press conferences are stored in the Eisenhower Library and can be used to reconcile discrepancies between the transcripts published at the time and those in the *Public Papers*.

[36] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 232–33.

[37] See, for example, the letter to Charles V. McAdam and accompanying Whitman note (AWD, 27 June 1959). Eisenhower dictated a letter thanking McAdam for praising the "new Eisenhower," but expressed doubt as to whether a man of his age ever makes substantial changes in his modes of thought and expression. After completing the letter, he commented to Mrs. Whitman that in fact ever since suffering a mild stroke in 1957 he had felt it necessary to take special pains to think ahead before beginning a public impromptu utterance. He added that some of the garbled quality of his extemporaneous discourse stemmed from a proclivity he had long been aware of—that of having more ideas to express than he was able to process smoothly into sentences.

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Speech Drafts

Speech writing and editing were hardly novel experiences to Eisenhower when he entered partisan politics. For a number of the interwar years he had been speech writer for none other than Douglas MacArthur. His post-V-E Day Guild Hall speech in London had received wide acclaim for its eloquence.[38] In view of this background, it should come as no surprise that as president, Eisenhower devoted great attention to his speeches. Mrs. Whitman estimates that twenty to thirty hours of the president's time, with much intervening response by speech writers, was spent on any speech of consequence.[39]

The president's comments on the first draft of his 1954 State of the Union Message, of which thirty-eight were specific and four overarching, will serve to demonstrate his markups and insertions.[40] The specific comments included two kinds of word changes and instructions to insert new paragraphs (which he dictated). The major purpose of one kind of Eisenhower's changes was to simplify language, striving to make the speeches more persuasive to the segment of the population to which he thought the Republican party ought to extend its appeal—members of normally Democratic population groups, such as white-collar workers and people who had completed high school but had not gone to college.[41] To this end, Eisenhower eliminated phrases such as "substantial reductions in size and cost of Federal government" and "attacks on deficit financing," on the ground that the "man we are trying to reach" understands usages such as "purchasing power of the dollar" and stability "in the size of his market basket." Hence it was neither an accident nor an indicator of Eisenhower's own verbal limitations that when contrasted with the high-culture rhetoric of the principal Democratic spokesman of the time, Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower's utterances seemed banal.

The second kind of change, editing with a view to perfecting diction and step-by-step progression of the exposition, probably was not necessary for rhetorical effectiveness with the general public. It was consistent with an enduring aspect of Eisenhower's cognitive style, namely intellectual precision. His demand for logical, carefully organized presentations is exemplified in the overarching recommendations concerning his 1954 message that he made to speech writer Bryce Harlow. They are the sort of recommendations one expects from experienced teachers of English composition: "Use blue pencil"; reexamine the structure of presentation by thinking through the sequence in which the paragraphs are put; "sections need to be more distinctly marked. Do not be afraid to say 'I come now to so-and-so.' . . . you cannot take the human mind

[38] See, for example, John Gunther, *Eisenhower: The Man and the Symbol* (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), p. 26.

[39] Ann Whitman to Milton Eisenhower, NS, 28 August 1956.

[40] Notes by the President on State of Union Speech, Draft no. 1, DDE, 16 December 1953.

[41] Eisenhower's appeal among these voters was so broadly based that he could have been elected as a candidate of either party. See Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 17 (Winter 1953-54): 443-460.

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from subject to subject . . . as quickly [as the present draft of this speech has attempted to do]." An illustration of the many suggestions for more precise diction is the instruction, accompanied by its rationale, to change a statement from "confidence has developed" to "constantly increasing confidence" in order to make clear that a "continuing action" is being described. (Eisenhower ranked tenth in his West Point class in English composition.)[42]

Personal Correspondence

Eisenhower's correspondence ranges from "personal and confidential" letters, many of which are quite long, to brief memoranda to aides and administration officials. In the long, confidential communications, the prose is crisp, the phrasing elaborate, and the reasoning logical and clear. It is remarkable that these highly focused letters were usually dictated in one draft that required little editing.[43]

One such communication is a four-page, single-spaced, "eyes only" memorandum dated September 21, 1953, to Walter Bedell Smith (then undersecretary of state), concerning the defection of and subsequent award of bounty to a North Korean pilot who supplied the United Nations forces with a MIG aircraft. The gist of the episode is that defectors were no longer wanted, for as a result of recent defections of pilots in Europe there was nothing more to learn technically from a MIG plane. Eisenhower's concern was with the impact of the response by the United States on world propaganda. He had gone along with his advisers' proposal and the government had paid the bounty, kept the plane (in order to justify paying the bounty), and canceled the offer.

Eisenhower agreed that the bounty had to be paid and that the offer should be canceled. But he believed that the United States also should propose to return the plane, since a propaganda victory would attend that course of action—for the United States would be able "to stand before the world as a very honorable people, maintaining that while we had not been guilty of a real violation of the Armistice, we were anxious to avoid any implication of violating the spirit."[44] The style and approach taken in the letter is more relevant in the present context than is the episode itself (a trivial way-station in the cold war).

In the memorandum, Eisenhower musters an orderly series of arguments that weigh the pros, cons, and probabilities of international propaganda gains against those of possible difficulties in justifying the action to the American people and of failing to take advantage of an opportunity to weaken the North

[42] Overall, Eisenhower graduated number 61 in a class of 164 members on 12 June 1915. Information supplied by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Superintendent, United States Military Academy.

[43] See, for example, Kevin McCann, *Eisenhower Administration Project*, New York Times Oral History Program, Columbia University Oral History Collection (Glen Rock, N.J.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1976), part III, no. 62, p. 91.

[44] Memorandum to Walter Bedell Smith, DDE, 21 September 1953.

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Korean Air Force. In systematic progression, he considers fall-back positions the policymakers might take, depending upon anticipated responses to their initial actions. For example, if there is domestic criticism, he suggests that it be asserted that since the plane was inspected before it was returned, the United States was able to learn whether any recent changes in MIG design have been made.[45] (Incidentally, several days after his memorandum was dispatched, the United States did offer to return the plane.)

Unlike the fairly long memoranda such as the one to Bedell Smith, much of Eisenhower's correspondence to aides and administration officials is quite brief, conveying suggestions or information rather than elaborate arguments. For instance, Eisenhower's comments on and proposed changes in drafts of his aides' letters and speeches were often phrased as polite suggestions or ideas he wanted his colleagues to consider, rather than as commands. Nonetheless, they appear to have been understood as directions, not suggestions. The passage that follows, an attempt to soften the dour tone of a Dulles speech draft, exemplifies the correspondence under consideration here.

> I have read the draft of your talk to the CIO and I must say that, in general, I enthusiastically approve. The suggestions that follow may have sufficient validity that you will want to consider them briefly:
>
> I. On page 6, at the point marked, I suggest that it might be well to expand your idea a little bit, somewhat as follows: "Based upon this clear understanding, the present Administration believes that the formulation and execution of a clear, positive, and effective American foreign policy are impossible except as it is presented against a background of American prosperity, well-being, and opportunity that extends from the most to the least fortunate among us. Specifically and concretely, this Administration is committed to the development of policies that will bring the greatest good to the greatest number. This means that appropriate governmental connection with our entire economy must be so adjusted as to develop and sustain a prosperous agriculture, manufacturing, and services, and above all such an equitable distribution of the resulting products that 160 million people will constitute always the finest advertisement for freedom." [Eisenhower makes four other suggestions and concludes], if any of the above suggestions prove helpful, I shall be pleased. If not, throw them away with a clear conscience.[46]

Dulles revised the speech, incorporating Eisenhower's five proposed changes.

[45] Jeffrey Hart has submitted this letter to the content analysis procedure called cognitive mapping, through which the clarity, complexity, and other structural aspects of a political leader's discourse about cause and effect relations are graphically depicted. Compared with documents produced by Franklin Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson in similar off-the-record circumstances, Eisenhower's cognitive map is tighter, more complex, and more sophisticated than Wilson's and compares favorably with FDR's (Hart, "Cognitive Maps of Presidential Documents" [Paper presented at the American Psychological Association, Toronto, 29 August 1978] and personal communication with Professor Hart). On the procedure used by Hart, see Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[46] Memorandum for the Secretary of State, DDE, 16 September 1953.

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The first sentence of the suggestion quoted above is adopted almost verbatim and the remainder is paraphrased.[47]

Eisenhower the Man: His Feelings and Convictions

A provisional sketch of certain of Eisenhower's personal qualities, notably his manner of expressing feelings and convictions, will help to provide interpretive "glue" for connecting the traits and patterns of action described thus far. I say "provisional" because Eisenhower's psychological makeup is difficult to analyze, much less to pigeonhole: he did not reveal as consistently patterned a set of traits as did some other presidents.[48]

One thing is clear from the primary source evidence: Eisenhower was neither personally nor politically a two-dimensional man, notwithstanding the joke of the 1950s that under Eisenhower the bland led the bland. The public portrayals of Eisenhower's beaming, homey manner and the impression to be gathered from the unpublished record differ markedly. The former suggests blandness, the latter, vitality and spirit. A striking demonstration of Eisenhower's spark is afforded by another personal and confidential letter—a nominally amiable but actually caustic response to a testy letter from his brother Edgar, an outspoken old-guard conservative. Ike's letter provides a glimpse of his fiery temper, the strength of his convictions, and, incidentally, his ability to write vivid as well as "clean, hard prose."[49]

Edgar had asserted in his letter that he saw little difference between his brother's policies and those of Truman. President Eisenhower's reply, in which he emphatically denied that the Fair Deal and his own policies were virtually indistinguishable but insisted on the need for moderate conservativism, abounds with passages such as the following:

> Should any political party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes that you can do these things. Among them are H. L. Hunt, . . . a few other Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician and businessman from other areas. Their number is negligible and they are stupid.[50]

Referring to a contention by Edgar that the two administrations seem not to differ in their approaches to economic controls, Dwight comments, "Nothing in your letter shows such complete ignorance." Noting that his administration had removed wage and price controls in the face of "the most dire predictions of

[47] Third Draft, Speech to the C.I.O., DP (Box 320), 18 November 1953.

[48] For thought-provoking sketches of Eisenhower's emotional and cognitive style, see Richard Rhodes, "Ike: An Artist in Iron," *Harper's* 241, July 1970, pp. 70–77; and Kenneth S. Davis, *Soldier of Democracy: A Biography of Dwight Eisenhower*, 2nd. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1952).

[49] The phrase is Theodore White's from *In Search of History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 347. White covered Eisenhower at SHAPE.

[50] Edgar Eisenhower, 1 November 1954, with DDE reply, NS, 8 November 1954.

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disaster, runaway inflation, and so on and so on," he continued, "I must say that if the people of the United States do not even remember what took place, one is almost tempted to regret the agony of study, analysis and decision that was then our daily ration." Dwight went on to assure Edgar, "I am delighted to get your own honest criticism, particularly if you will only take the trouble to lay down the facts on which you reach what seem to me to be some remarkable conclusions. But the mere repetition of aphorisms and political slogans and newspaper headlines leaves me cold." Finally, he expressed regret that Edgar would not be at a planned family reunion in Abilene, where they could talk, but suggested that there was some advantage to a written exchange, since "by his method I hope to make you do a little thinking rather than devote yourself just to the winning of a noisy argument."[51]

The emphatic yet controlled tenor of these passages and the remainder of this letter prompt consideration of Eisenhower's temper. Lyndon Johnson shared Eisenhower's propensity to fly into towering, red-faced rages, but whereas Johnson's ire turned to bullying his subordinates and he seemed to luxuriate in his grudges, Eisenhower's blowups came on like summer thunderstorms and as rapidly were followed by balmy good humor. This good humor was expressed in warm, charming face-to-face relations, as was FDR's. Behind the personal charm of both men, moreover, there existed a detachment that permitted freedom of maneuver in such relations. Undoubtedly his detachment and ability to control public expression of feelings helped Eisenhower deliberately to simulate anger on occasion, in order to terminate a disagreement he felt was not worth negotiating through to a conclusion. Vernon A. ("Dick") Walters, who served as Eisenhower's translator in NATO negotiations, recounts such a feigned outburst.

> We stopped in Italy to see Defense Minister Pacciardi. He had insisted that the Greek and Turkish forces be under an Italian commander. Both, however, had told Eisenhower that this was out of the question. During the discussion Eisenhower suddenly appeared to misunderstand something that Pacciardi had just said and I had translated. Pacciardi, after a few feeble attempts to explain that he had been misunderstood, gave in and accepted a U.S. commander for the Greek and Turkish sector of NATO. I was greatly crestfallen as it appeared to Pacciardi that I had mistranslated what he had said and that this had provoked Eisenhower's anger. . . . The matter of the command settled, we returned to Naples airport and took off for Paris. I was sitting in the forward cabin feeling quite glum when General Eisenhower came forward, tapped me on the shoulder and said, "Dick, if I sometimes appear to misunderstand what you say, it is just that I need a hook on which to hang my anger." He added with a grin, "It worked too."[52]

Despite the fact that at times he could turn the controlled expression of his ire into a political asset, Eisenhower felt his temper was a special curse. (He gave his

[51] Ibid.

[52] Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), p. 226.

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mother credit for teaching him to control it, a feat that some of his associates believed no one had accomplished!)[53] Eisenhower's method of curbing expression of anger was *sup*pression, not *re*pression. In this respect he contrasts sharply with Richard Nixon, who seemed to drive his aggressive impulses wholly out of consciousness, only to have them reemerge in the form of a curdled meanness of spirit.[54]

Eisenhower's desire to restrain his combative impulses probably contributed to his well-known team approach to leadership and to his preference for "hidden hand" over confrontational leadership. As Eisenhower noted in a stock-taking letter to Henry Luce written late in the final year of his second term: "If my own ideas and practices [on leadership] have sprung from weakness, I do not know. But they were and are deliberate or, rather, natural to me. . . . (I should add that one of my problems has been to control my temper—a temper that I have had to battle all my life!)"[55]

Lessons of Eisenhower's Leadership

By the end of the 1970s, eight men had served in the presidency that expanded so greatly during Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. Not only Roosevelt, but also Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter in various ways have exercised executive leadership within the constraints and opportunities provided by their environment in seeking to ride the presidential tiger.

On reexamination, Eisenhower's approach to presidential leadership emerges as distinctive and consciously thought-out, rather than an unfortunate example of artless drift and unthinking application of military organizational principles to civilian leadership. When carefully explicated, this approach promises to add significantly to the repertoire of assumptions about how the expanded modern presidency can be conducted.

Here are some of the elements in Eisenhower's presidential leadership style that constitute possible options for future presidents. The list, which draws together and elaborates upon themes already discussed or alluded to, is not exhaustive.

Approach to delegation. In his August 8, 1960, letter to Henry Luce taking stock of his "deliberate" leadership "ideas and practices," Eisenhower observed

[53] Special Counsel Bernard Shanley commented, "I thought to myself what a poor job she had done" (Preface, SD, p. 8).

[54] Such psychological inferences are inevitably tentative. For an expansion and defense of my assertion about Nixon, see Greenstein, "A President is Forced to Resign: Watergate, White House Organization and Nixon's Personality," in *American Politics in the 1970s*, ed. Allan Sindler (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), pp. 50–98.

[55] Letter to Henry Luce, DDE, 8 August 1960. It should be noted that in the letter, the last of the three sentences quoted precedes the first two.

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that "the government of the United States has become too big, too complex, and too pervasive in its influence on all our lives for one individual to pretend to direct the details of its important and critical programming. Competent assistants are mandatory; without them the Executive Branch would bog down."[56]

Eisenhower's delegations of responsibility were substantial. But they were designed to avoid abdication of power, notably by making certain so far as possible that the "competent assistants" were cognizant of their chief's policy goals. Relevant as his stress on delegation was to mid-century governance, it is even more germane to presidential leadership in the far more complex and pervasive government of the final decades of the century.[57]

Teamwork. Eisenhower's emphasis on teamwork is illustrated in this article by the descriptions of the rallying functions of NSC meetings and of Eisenhower's way of keeping Dulles and Adams on his wavelength. Morale also was a factor in fostering the voluntary cooperation of subordinates. He wrote in his 1960 letter to Luce:

> To command the loyalties and dedication and best efforts of capable and outstanding individuals requires patience, understanding, a readiness to delegate, and an acceptance of responsibility for any honest errors—real or apparent—those associates and subordinates might make. . . . Principal subordinates must have confidence that they and their positions are widely respected, and the chief must do his part in assuring that this is so.[58]

Eisenhower by all testimony was remarkably successful in commanding the loyalty of his governmental subordinates. As a consequence, he did not in fact invariably have to accept the blame for their "real or apparent" errors; in many cases they were willing lightning rods.

Hidden hand leadership. In his private assertions and actions, Eisenhower consistently preferred results to publicity when strategic and tactical maneuvering was required. He deliberately cultivated the impression that he was not involved even in the most successful of the maneuvers in which he directly participated. Presidents like Kennedy (for example, in the campaign early in his administration to expand the House Rules Committee and his assault on the steel industry) and Johnson (for example, in his highly visible mediation of the railroad strike, early in 1964) deliberately sought to enhance their professional reputations as political operators. Eisenhower seems to have had neither a need nor a desire to do so. He employed his skills to achieve his ends by inconspicuous means and was aware that a reputation as a tough political operator could be in-

[56] Ibid.

[57] For a much expanded discussion of Eisenhower's views of delegation and other aspects of his presidential leadership, see Greenstein, "A Tory Theory of the Presidency: Eisenhower's Leadership Reexamined."

[58] Letter to Henry Luce, DDE, 8 August 1960.

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consistent with acquiring and maintaining another source of presidential influence, namely public prestige.

Dignity of the Presidency. Eisenhower concluded his letter to Luce by discussing

> the matter of maintaining a respectable image of American life before the world. Among the qualities that the American government must exhibit is dignity. In turn the principal governmental spokesman must strive to display it. In war and in peace I've had no respect for the desk-pounder, and have despised the loud and slick talker.[59]

In the 1950s there was no lack of public confidence in and respect for the presidency. The literature of the time, in fact, undoubtedly took as perennial a support for the presidency that Eisenhower helped mold and that since has become seriously eroded.[60] Eisenhower's status as a long-time public hero (more books had been published on him by 1952 than have been published thereafter) is not transferable to future presidents. But there may be lessons to be learned from the means through which Eisenhower avoided the potential erosion of support that even a national icon would have experienced if his performance in office had seemed disastrous to the general public. Presumably such an approach would involve a greater emphasis on confidential efforts to accomplish practical results and resistance to the temptation to flaunt one's political virtuosity.

Attempts to magnify the president's ceremonial role are unlikely to bear fruit in the 1980s. Certainly Nixon's attempts to add to the pomp of the presidency added only pompousness. Rather than remystification, Eisenhower's practices suggest a particular kind of demystification hinted at in his letter to Luce. Because no "one individual" can "direct the details" of all "important and critical programming" facing the government, presidents may find it profitable not to put their prestige on the line as readily as most of the post-Eisenhower presidents have. This is not a counsel for lowering expectations about what can and should be achieved by public policy; it is, however, a possible (if not easily executed) approach for avoiding raising expectations about what the president as an individual actor can ever accomplish in this centrifugal political system.

Other presidents will not be able to imitate Eisenhower slavishly, even if they wish to. Not only do few men become chief executive with so great a reservoir of public esteem, but also many will consider it necessary to seek more substantial and hence more controversial policy innovations than Eisenhower deemed desirable. Whether one likes what Ike liked or not,[61] aspects of the distinctive

[59] Ibid.

[60] On this matter, compare Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review* 54 (December 1960): 934–43 with Greenstein, "What the President Means to Americans: Presidential 'Choice' Between Elections," in *Choosing the President*, ed. James David Barber (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 121–47.

[61] Here are a few examples, chosen deliberately for their diversity, of what "Ike liked," or at any rate presided over: the close of a major Asian military conflict; seven-and-a-half years of peace; a reduced arms budget; limits on public-sector expenditures in the interest of warding off inflation;

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approach to conducting the presidency he devised will bear examination as future options.*

and the cold war coups in Iran and Guatemala, both of which involved CIA covert operations. On Iran and Guatemala see Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and Guatemala, 1954: A Cold War Strategy for the Americas" (Ph.D. Diss., Boston College, 1978); and Richard Cottom, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964).

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Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions

RICHARD F. ELMORE

Students of implementation repeatedly argue that implementation problems should be considered when policies are made. Better policies would result, we are told, if policymakers would think about whether their decisions could be implemented before they settle on a course of action. The argument is often made in an accusatory way, as if policymakers were somehow deficient for not routinely and systematically thinking about implementation problems. Yet when one looks to the implementation literature for guidance, there is not much to be found.

Implementation research is long on description and short on prescription. Most implementation research is case studies. This fact, by itself, is neither good nor bad. But it does present special problems when it comes to translating research into useful guidance for policymakers. Cases, if they are well written, focus on a particular sequence of events and a specific set of causes and consequences. When drawing conclusions from their data, case writers are characteristically and honestly cautious. They are typically careful not to generalize more than a step or two beyond their data, and they do that very apologetically. Thus, when we look to the most influential implementation studies for guidance about how to anticipate implementation problems, we find advice that is desultory and strategically vague.[1]

[1] Pressman and Wildavsky conclude that the "length and unpredictability" of implementation processes should lead policymakers to consider "more direct means" (Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron

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Vague advice is better than none at all. But one wonders whether this is the best that implementation researchers have to offer. Wringing more out of the literature, however, requires a brand of risk taking that academics and policy analysts typically find uncomfortable. It requires offering *a logically ordered sequence of questions* that policymakers can ask, prior to making a policy decision, that will provide prescriptions for action. The problem with this approach, as opposed to, for example, cataloguing the fragmentary advice that falls out of case studies, is that one can err in a variety of ways: in interpreting the literature, in determining the logic that ties the questions together, or in choosing the questions. It is this fear of erring, I suspect, that has resulted in a failure of nerve among implementation researchers. The important issue is not whether the framework of analysis is "right" or "wrong," but whether it is sufficiently clear to be controvertible. It is less important to agree on a single framework for analyzing implementation problems than it is to be clear about the consequences of adopting one framework over another.

The essential argument of this article is that there are at least two clearly distinguishable approaches to implementation analysis: *forward mapping* and *backward mapping*.[2] Forward mapping is the strategy that comes most readily to mind when one thinks about how a policymaker might try to affect the implementation process. It begins at the top of the process, with as clear a statement as possible of the policymaker's intent, and proceeds through a sequence of increasingly more specific steps to define what is expected of implementors at each level. At the bottom of the process, one states, again with as much precision as possible, what a satisfactory outcome would be, measured in terms of the original statement of intent. Forward mapping of a federal policy might begin with a statement of congressional intent. It would then outline federal agency regulations and administrative actions consistent with that intent. It would elaborate a division of responsibilities between central and regional offices of the federal government (or among federal, state, and local ad-

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Wildavsky, *Implementation* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973], pp. 143–44). Bardach advises policymakers to base policies on explicit theories, to prefer marketlike mechanisms to bureaucratic ones, to forecast problems by using scenarios, and to "fix" implementation problems with political intervention (Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game* [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977], pp. 250–83). Berman and McLaughlin suggest policymakers should pay more attention "to all stages of the local change process," provide "adaptive implementation assistance," and improve "the capacity of school districts to manage change" (Paul Berman and Milbrey McLaughlin, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change* [Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1978], vol. VIII, pp. 35–43). Weatherly and Lipsky conclude that policymakers should attend more closely to the behavior of street-level bureaucrats, rewarding behaviors that are consistent with policy and penalizing those that are not (Richard Weatherly and Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform," *Harvard Educational Review* 47 [May 1977]: 196).

[2] I am indebted to Mark Moore of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for introducing me to the notion of "backward mapping," though he should not be held accountable for my version of it.

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ministrators) such that each implementing unit had a clearly defined mission. It would then state an outcome, usually in terms of an observable effect on a target population, consistent with the initial purpose of the policymakers.

Numerous variations of this approach are possible. One need not map only administrative actions and organizational arrangements. If political feasibility is a problem, one can describe the major political actors and the agreements necessary among them at each level. If the implementation of the policy depends on the adoption of some form of technology (for example, emission controls, medical equipment, or plant construction), one can describe the state of technology necessary at each stage. The analysis may also be elaborated by describing a number of alternative streams of action under varying assumptions about organizational, political, and technological factors.

The details of forward mapping are less important for our purposes than the underlying logic. It begins with an objective, it elaborates an increasingly specific set of steps for achieving that objective, and it states an outcome against which success or failure can be measured. It is consistent with the standard framework of policy analysis and with conventional techniques of management science and decision analysis (program evaluation and review technique [PERT] and critical path method [CPM]). Insofar as implementation analysis is treated at all in textbooks on policy analysis, it is treated as forward mapping.[3]

What the textbooks do not discuss, however, are the weaknesses of forward mapping and its severe limitations as an analytic technique. The most serious problem with forward mapping is its implicit and unquestioned assumption that *policymakers control the organizational, political, and technological processes that affect implementation*. The notion that policymakers exercise—or ought to exercise—some kind of direct and determinant control over policy implementation might be called the "noble lie" of conventional public administration and policy analysis. Administrators legitimate their discretionary decisions by saying that their authority is delegated and controlled by elected and appointed policymakers. Policy analysts justify their existence by arguing that informed, rational choices by policymakers are necessary to guide and control administrators. Neither administrators nor policy analysts are very comfortable with the possibility that most of what happens in the implementation process cannot be explained by the intentions and directions of policymakers.

By assuming that more explicit policy directives, greater attention to administrative responsibilities, and clearer statements of intended outcomes will improve implementation, forward mapping reinforces the myth that implementation is controlled from the top. This myth is increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of accumulating evidence on the nature of the implementation pro-

[3] See, for example, Harry Hatry et al., *Program Analysis for State and Local Government* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1976), p. 97; Edward Quade, *Analysis for Public Decisions* (New York: Elsevier, 1975), p. 253; Grover Starling, *The Politics and Economics of Public Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1979), p. 430.

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cess. Moreover, forward mapping, as an analytic strategy, treats only a narrow range of possible explanations for implementation failures.[4] The most persuasive explanation for the persistence of forward mapping in the face of its obvious limitations is the lack of a suitable alternative. It is one thing to appreciate intuitively that policymakers may not exercise decisive control over the implementation process; it is quite another to formulate an analytic strategy consistent with that intuition.

Backward mapping shares with forward mapping the notion that policymakers have a strong interest in affecting the implementation process and the outcomes of policy decisions. But backward mapping explicitly questions the assumption that policymakers ought to, or do, exercise the determinant influence over what happens in the implementation process. It also questions the assumption that explicit policy directives, clear statements of administrative responsibilities, and well-defined outcomes will necessarily increase the likelihood that policies will be successfully implemented.

The logic of backward mapping is, in all important respects, the opposite of forward mapping. It begins not at the top of the implementation process but at the last possible stage, the point at which administrative actions intersect private choices. It begins not with a statement of intent, but with a statement of the specific behavior at the lowest level of the implementation process that generates the need for a policy. Only after that behavior is described does the analysis presume to state an objective; the objective is first stated as a set of organizational operations and then as a set of effects, or outcomes, that will result from these operations. Having established a relatively precise target at the lowest level of the system, the analysis backs up through the structure of implementing agencies, asking at each level two questions: What is the ability of this unit to affect the behavior that is the target of the policy? And what resources does this unit require in order to have that effect? In the final stage of analysis the analyst or policymaker describes a policy that directs resources at the organizational units likely to have the greatest effect.

Although backward mapping takes the policymaker's perspective on the implementation process, it does not assume that policy is the only—or even the major—influence on the behavior of people engaged in the process. Furthermore, it does not rely on compliance with the policymaker's intent as the standard of success or failure. It offers instead a standard of success that is in all respects *conditional;* that is, one's definition of success is predicated on an estimate of the limited ability of actors at one level of the implementation process to influence the behavior of actors at other levels and on the limited ability of public organizations as a whole to influence private behavior.

Forward mapping assumes that organizational units in the implementation process are linked in essentially hierarchical relationships. This assumption has

[4] For a detailed discussion of alternative explanations of implementation failures and their consequences for modeling the implementation process, see, Richard F. Elmore, "Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation," *Public Policy* 26 (Spring 1978): 185–228.

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two corollaries: the closer one is to the source of the policy, the greater is one's authority and influence; and the ability of complex systems to respond to problems depends on the establishment of clear lines of authority and control. Backward mapping assumes essentially the opposite: the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate.

Backward Mapping and Implementation Research

Applying forward and backward mapping to the same problem gives much different results. The analytic solution offered by forward mapping stresses factors that tend to centralize control and that are easily manipulated by policymakers: funding formulas; formal organizational structures; authority relationships among administrative units; regulations; and administrative controls (budget, planning, and evaluation requirements). The analytic solution offered by backward mapping stresses the dispersal of control and concentrates on factors that can only be indirectly influenced by policymakers: knowledge and problem-solving ability of lower-level administrators; incentive structures that operate on the subjects of policy; bargaining relationships among political actors at various levels of the implementation process; and the strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices. The crucial difference of perspective stems from whether one chooses to rely primarily on formal devices of command and control that centralize authority or on informal devices of delegation and discretion that disperse authority.

The stakes involved in choosing an analytic approach are clearer when they are put in the context of current thinking about implementation. As the literature on implementation has accumulated, certain issues have emerged that demonstrate the consequences, both intellectual and practical, of seeing implementation either as a hierarchically ordered process or as a dispersed and decentralized process.

Organizational Processes and Outputs

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that decisions are not self-executing. Analysis of policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In answering the question, "What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?" Allison estimated that, in the normal case, it was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation.[5] Hence, in Nelson's terms, "the

[5] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 267.

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core of analysis of alternatives becomes the prediction of how alternative organizational structures will behave over . . . time."[6] But the task of prediction is vastly complicated by the absence of a coherent body of organizational theory, making it necessary to posit several alternative models of organization.[7]

Those policy analysts who are economists, impatient with the complexities of bureaucracy and the lack of precision in organizational theory, have tried to reduce implementation analysis to a simple choice between market and nonmarket mechanisms. Schultze states the basic argument when he says that the "collective-coercion component of intervention should be treated as a scarce resource" in the formulation of policies, and that policymakers should learn to "maximize the use of techniques that modify the structure of private incentives."[8] Wolf furthers the argument, stating that the whole enterprise of implementation analysis can be reduced to a diagnosis of the pathologies of nonmarket structures, or as he calls it, "a theory of nonmarket failures."[9] The simplicity of the argument is comforting, but its utility is suspect. It seeks to solve one type of organizational problem, the responsiveness of large-scale bureaucracies, by substituting another type of organizational problem, the invention and execution of quasi markets. There is little evidence to suggest that the latter problem is any more tractable than the former. One would hardly expect, though, that a detailed framework for analysis of organizational alternatives would emerge from an intellectual tradition that regards organizational structure of any kind as a second-best solution to the problem of collective action.[10]

Defining implementation analysis as a choice between market and nonmarket structures diverts attention from, and trivializes, an important problem: *how to use the structure and process of organizations to elaborate, specify, and define policies.* Most policy analysts, economists or not, are trained to regard complex organizations as *barriers* to the implementation of public policy, not as instruments to be capitalized upon and modified in the pursuit of policy objectives. In fact, organizations can be remarkably effective devices for working out difficult public problems, but their use requires an understanding of the reciprocal nature of authority relations. Formal authority travels from top to bottom in organizations, but the informal authority that derives from expertise, skill, and proximity to the essential tasks that an organization performs travels in the opposite direction. Delegated discretion is a way of capitalizing on this reciprocal relationship; responsibilities that require special expertise and prox-

[6] Richard Nelson, *The Moon and the Ghetto* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 40.

[7] See for example, ibid., p. 41; Elmore, "Organizational Models," pp. 187–89.

[8] Charles Schultze, *The Public Use of Private Interest* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 6–7.

[9] Charles Wolf, "A Theory of Non-Market Failures," *Public Interest* (Spring 1979): 114–33.

[10] For examples of this argument, see Kenneth Arrow, *The Limits of Organization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974); and Oliver Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

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imity to a problem are pushed down in the organization, leaving more generalized responsibilities at the top. For purposes of implementation, this means that formal authority, in the form of policy statements, is heavily dependent upon specialized problem-solving capabilities further down the chain of authority. Except in cases where a policy requires strict performance of a highly structured routine (for example, airline safety inspections), strong hierarchical controls work against this principle of reciprocity. To use organizations effectively as instruments of policy, analysts and policymakers have to understand where in the complex network of organizational relationships certain tasks should be performed, what resources are necessary for their performance, and whether the performance of the task has some tangible effect on the problem that the policy is designed to solve. Analysts and policymakers do *not* need to know how to perform the task, or even whether the task is performed uniformly; in fact, diversity in the performance of the task is an important source of knowledge about how to do it better.

The notion of reciprocity lends some concreteness to the strategic calculations involved in implementation analysis. Instead of stating the central analytic problem as a choice between competing abstractions—market and nonmarket alternatives—it focuses on the *process* by which organized problem solving occurs and the *output* that results from problem solving. Understanding reciprocal dependencies in organizations also simplifies the conduct of analysis considerably. One is not concerned with mapping all the formal authority relationships that could possibly bear on a policy problem but with isolating the one or two critical points in a complex organization that have the closest proximity to the problem and describing what needs to happen at those points to solve the problem.

Shrewd organizational analysis does not preclude the selection of marketlike structures to implement policy. In fact, it clarifies the choice considerably. There is nothing to prevent the analyst or policymaker from concluding that, for purposes of a specific problem, the best strategy is to move problem-solving responsibilities outside formal organizations and rely on individual choices. But the decision to pursue that strategy is based on a prior understanding of the setting and the actors, rather than a presumption that marketlike structures are more effective.

The Complexity of Joint Action

Pressman and Wildavsky were the first to observe the inverse relationship between the number of transactions required to implement a decision and the likelihood that an effect, any effect, would result. Even when the probability of a favorable result is high at each step, the cumulative product of a large number of transactions is an extraordinarily low probability of success.[11] This analysis is

[11] Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation*, pp. 87–124.

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complemented by Bardach's extended discussion of the devices that administrators use to delay, divert, and dissipate the effect of policies and by attempts of other scholars to specify the effect of bureaucratic structure on implementation.[12] These notions have now become part of the standard repertoire of explanations for why policies fail. But they have had surprisingly little payoff in increasing our understanding of how to prevent failure. If we accept that the complexity of joint action is a serious problem, for both policy analysts and policymakers, what can we do about it?

Very little can be done about the problem if analysts and policymakers persist in viewing implementation as a hierarchically ordered set of authority relationships. That is, to the extent that the implementation process is dominated by regulation, formal organizational structure, and management control, one would expect problems of complexity to increase. The tighter the structure of hierarchical relationships, the greater the number of checks and decision points required to assure compliance, the more opportunities for diversion and delay, the greater the reliance of subordinates on superiors for guidance, and the lower the reliance on individual judgment and problem-solving ability. One of the great ironies of increased attention to implementation is that the harder we try, using conventional tools of hierarchical control, the less likely we are to achieve.[13]

Forward mapping, as an analytic strategy, reinforces the pathologies of hierarchy. With a sharp pencil, a good eye for detail, and a pocket calculator, one can demonstrate without much trouble that any policy will fail, simply by counting the number of discrete clearances and decisions, assigning a probability to each, and multiplying them seriatum. The flaw in this kind of analysis lies not in its internal logic, but in its failure to perceive an alternative to hierarchy. Demonstrating so simply that hierarchies increase the probability of failure should suggest the need for an alternative model of the process. A promising lead comes from Bardach's discussion of "fixing," by which he means the skillful and selective intervention of policymakers at various points in the implementation process.[14] The key element of fixing is its deliberate disregard for hierarchy; a good fixer is one who is willing to intervene wherever a breakdown occurs, with scant regard for the line of authority relationships that precedes it. The difficulty with Bardach's account of fixing is that it does not provide very clear guidance about formulating a strategy of intervention: How does one decide among a number of possible points of intervention? What does one do when a point of intervention is identified? And how does one determine whether fixing

[12] Bardach, *The Implementation Game*, p. 65; see also, Allison, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 67–100; and Elmore, "Organizational Models," pp. 199–208.

[13] Richard F. Elmore, "Complexity and Control: What Legislators and Administrators Can Do About Implementation," Policy Paper no. 11, Institute of Governmental Research, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, April 1979.

[14] Bardach, *The Implementation Game*, pp. 274–83.

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has succeeded or failed? In other words, fixing, by itself, is a kind of behavior, not an analytic strategy. Having decided to fix something, one is still left with deciding how to do it, and that requires a logic of some sort.

Street-Level Discretion

Distrust of discretion is deeply ingrained in conventional theories of administration and government. Kaufman confidently asserts, without argument:

> If leaders exert but little influence on the actions of subordinates, then one of the axioms of democratic government ceases to apply. . . . democracy in the modern state presupposes that changing a handful of officials in high places will ultimately change the actions of thousands of employees throughout the system.[15]

Substituting "changing policy" for "changing a handful of officials in high places," yields the essential statement of implementation as a process of hierarchical control. Kaufman argues that the "major contribution" of his own work "lies in the enhancement of leaders' capacities to neutralize tendencies toward non-compliance."[16] Discretion, though inevitable in any complex administrative system, is to be carefully bounded, contained, and controlled by an assortment of devices (selection, monitoring, routinization) that strengthen the top of the system against the bottom. Even theorists of public administration who argue that policymaking and administration cannot be separated harbor a strong distrust of discretion:

> Much of the actual discretion used in administration is used at the very bottom of the hierarchy, where public servants touch the public. The assessor who walks into the home and sees the furniture and the condition of the house, the policeman who listens to the motorist's story, the health inspector who visits the dairy, the income tax auditor who sees the return and interviews the taxpayer—all these people are compelled to exercise more discretion, and more important discretion, from the point of view of the citizen than many other functionaries further up in the organization. While this is the actual situation in badly organized and poorly directed administrative units, it cannot be completely eliminated even in the best.[17]

This theme has been picked up and extended in the implementation literature by Weatherly and Lipsky in their analysis of the role of street-level bureaucrats. The heavy overload of demands and expectations resulting from new policies, they argue, means that street-level bureaucrats are essentially free to develop their own "coping devices" for simplifying, and often distorting, the aims of

[15] Herbert Kaufman, *Administrative Feedback* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 4.

[16] Ibid., p. 5.

[17] Luther Gulick, quoted by Herbert Kaufman, "Reflections on Administrative Reorganization," in *The 1978 Budget: Setting National Priorities*, ed. Joseph Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 400.

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policymakers. The solution to this problem, they suggest, lies mainly in devising more sophisticated ways of bounding and controlling discretion.[18]

The dominant view that discretion is, at best, a necessary evil and, at worst, a threat to democratic government pushes implementation analysis toward hierarchically structured models of the process and toward increased reliance on hierarchical controls to solve implementation problems. Uniformity of implementation, or low variability in the response of street-level bureaucrats to policy directives, has a positive value, whether or not it is positively related to outcomes. Compliance with orders and procedures displaces competence, or becomes the equivalent of competence, in interactions between lower-level public servants and clients. Nowhere in this view is serious thought given to *how to capitalize on discretion as a device for improving the reliability and effectiveness of policies at the street level.* Standardized solutions, developed at great distance from the problem, are notoriously unreliable; policies that fix street-level behavior in the interest of uniformity and consistency are difficult to adapt to situations that policymakers failed to anticipate. Adaptation under these circumstances consists either of subversive, extralegal behavior or a complex procedure of hierarchical clearance. There is little or no room for the exercise of special skills or judgment, not to mention deliberate invention and experimentation.

When implementation consists essentially of controlling discretion, the effect is to reduce reliance on knowledge and skill at the delivery level and increase reliance on abstract, standardized solutions. Hence, a certain proportion of the learning that is required to adapt a broad policy to a specific set of circumstances is lost; adaptive behaviors by street-level bureaucrats are never well understood by policymakers because they are viewed as illicit. Variability and discretion at the delivery level can just as easily be viewed as an asset—a broad-based body of data on unanticipated, adaptive responses to highly specialized problems. To capitalize on this knowledge, however, one's view of implementation has to put a higher value on discretion than compliance.

Coalitions and the Bargaining Arena

One of the earliest and most robust findings of implementation research was that the local effect of federal policy depends, in some critical sense, on the formation of local coalitions of individuals affected by the policy. Derthick documented the helplessness of federal administrators, trying to use surplus federal land as an incentive for the development of "new towns," when local support for the projects failed to gel into a strong coalition.[19] Pressman concluded an analysis of federal programs in Oakland with the observation that their impact depended upon the existence of "effective bargaining arenas," in which

[18] Weatherly and Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucrats," pp. 172 and 196.

[19] Martha Derthick, *New Towns in Town* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1972).

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the competing demands of local groups could be worked out.[20] Banfield concluded his analysis of the Model Cities program with the observation:

> As perceived from Washington, a city government was an entity capable, if sufficiently prodded and when provided with a grant, of making decisions in a rational manner. . . . City officials knew, however, that only in a rather limited sense did such a thing as a city government exist; for them the reality was bits and pieces of power and authority, the focuses of which were constantly changing. Bringing the bits and pieces together long enough to carry out an undertaking was a delicate and precarious operation requiring skills and statuses that few persons possessed.[21]

Unless the initiators of a policy can galvanize the energy, attention, and skills of those affected by it, thereby bringing these resources into a loosely structured bargaining arena, the effects of a policy are unlikely to be anything but weak and diffuse. Once bargaining is recognized as a key element of implementation, certain other conditions follow. Bargaining, for example, requires real stakes. Local actors have no incentive for participation in a bargaining arrangement unless the possible pay-off is tangible and valuable. The terms of the deal cannot be fixed in advance by law and regulation; sufficient flexibility must exist in the outlines of a policy to allow the local bargaining process to work. Carefully specified, hierarchically controlled policies limit incentives to form strong local bargaining coalitions.

Another consequence of local bargaining is that policy implementation has no clear, decisive end point. The outcome of one bargaining episode is the starting point of the next. Success in bargaining is completely relative in one important respect: Each participant judges success in terms of his own objectives, not in terms of an overall set of objectives that applies to all participants. The only measure of success that all participants can agree on is maintenance of the bargaining arena, since it provides them access to the goods that are dispensed there. To acknowledge that bargaining is essential to the process of implementation is to accept the consequence that policy outcomes will never be discrete, determinate end points that can be measured and objectified. An analytic framework that requires the comparison of a clearly specified outcome with a clearly specified intent—a comparison implicit in forward mapping—is inconsistent with a conception of implementation that includes bargaining.[22]

To summarize, the implementation literature provides strong support for an analytic framework that takes account of reciprocity in the relationship between superiors and subordinates in organizations; the connection between hierar-

[20] Jeffrey Pressman, *Federal Programs and City Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 143–44.

[21] Edward Banfield, "Making a New Federal Program: Model Cities, 1964–68," in *Social Program Implementation*, eds. Walter Williams and Richard Elmore (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 210.

[22] Elmore, "Organizational Models," pp. 217–26; Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation through Bargaining: The Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid," *Public Policy* 25 (Fall 1977): 499–526.

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chical control and increased complexity; discretion as an adaptive device; and bargaining as a precondition for local effects.

Recall the logic of backward mapping outlined earlier: Begin with a concrete statement of the behavior that creates the occasion for a policy intervention, describe a set of organizational operations that can be expected to affect that behavior, describe the expected effect of those operations, and then describe for each level of the implementation process what effect one would expect that level to have on the target behavior and what resources are required for that effect to occur. The advantage of beginning with a concrete behavior and focusing on the delivery-level mechanism for affecting that behavior is that it focuses attention on reciprocity and discretion. It puts the policymakers' problem in the following form: "If we propose to affect that behavior, where is the closest point of contact we have with it." It emphasizes, in other words, that it is not the policy or the policymaker that solves the problem, but someone with immediate proximity. Problem solving requires skill and discretion; policy can direct individuals' attention toward a problem and provide them an occasion for the application of skill and judgment, but policy cannot itself solve problems. Hence, the connection between the problem and the closest point of contact is the most critical stage of analysis. After that, analysis consists of describing the most direct means of reaching the point of contact, focusing resources on those organizational units and coalitions that have the greatest likelihood of affecting delivery-level performance. Strategically, the more direct the path for reaching the point of contact—that is, the greater the reliance on delegated discretion, and the less the reliance on hierarchical controls—the greater the likelihood of affecting the target behavior. Rather than reasoning from top to bottom, through successive layers, trying to discover how each layer can control the next, one begins at the point of the problem and tries to find the most parsimonious way of reaching it.

Backward Mapping on Youth Employment Policy

Federal policymakers are currently engaged in an extensive review of youth employment policy.[23] The occasion for the review is the pending expiration of the Youth Employment Demonstration and Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA), which provides support for a variety of locally administered employment and training activities for young people. Among the topics under discussion is whether the existing system for implementing youth employment programs is effectively addressing youth employment problems.

As in most discussions of federal policy, debate has focused on how to

[23] This section summarizes a more extended analysis of the implementation of federal youth employment policy contained in Richard Elmore, "Policy Paper: The Youth Employment Delivery System" (Prepared for the Vice-President's Task Force on Youth Employment, Washington, D.C., August 1979). I have drawn heavily upon extensive studies of the implementation of federal youth employment programs done by Gregory Wurzburg at the National Council on Employment Policy, Washington, D.C.

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allocate federal money among competing administrative agencies and competing purposes within agencies. Thus, for example, one of the most pressing issues, as defined by federal policymakers, is the problem of cooperation between the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) prime sponsors and local educational agencies (LEAs). YEDPA provides financial incentives for collaboration between local educational agencies and prime sponsors, the units of local government designated to administer the federal Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. For example, 22 percent of the funds in one category of YEDPA are set aside for jointly administered programs, but the funds go from the U.S. Department of Labor directly to local prime sponsors, where LEA agreements are made. Federal youth employment funds do not pass through educational agencies at the federal or state level, and LEAs have no independent share of the funds at the local level. Education advocates at the federal level have argued that federal, state, and local educational agencies would be more likely to take an active interest in youth employment problems if they were given an independent source of funding. Others have argued that the important issue is local collaboration between CETA prime sponsors and LEAs and that allocating funds through federal and state education agencies would not necessarily serve that purpose.

Another issue that has surfaced is the problem of knowledge development. While the federal government has been involved in youth employment at least since the mid-1960s, employment and training specialists argue that they know very little about how to solve the unique employment problems of young people. YEDPA was intended to stimulate the development of new program ideas that could be used to improve the overall performance of youth employment programs. The interpretation of this knowledge development objective by local administrators has been diverse, and knowledge development activity has been uneven from one locale to another. Many observers question whether the federal government has a role to play in such a diffuse and ill-defined area, and if so, what that role should be.

The final major issue that has surfaced is the problem of private-sector linkages. Federal policymakers are sensitive to widespread criticism that neither adult nor youth programs administered through the CETA system are effectively connected with private-sector employers, which means that the people who exit training are not adequately prepared for unsubsidized employment. Policymakers are concerned about how federal funds can be used to increase linkages between youth employment programs and private employers.

These issues are in many ways typical of how problems are framed by federal policymakers. They are broad, abstract, and disconnected. They tend to focus on immediate problems of policy formulation rather than more distant problems of implementation. Allocation of funds among competing agencies tends to dominate, even though the consequences of allocation decisions for the delivery of services are vague and unspecified. The issues, therefore, are all framed in a manner consistent with forward mapping: They all state or imply a

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federal objective and then ask what the federal government can do to make people act consistently with that objective. They all suggest that it is the federal government's responsibility to make something happen at the local level, but the mechanism for making it happen is unspecified beyond the allocation of funds to agencies.

What is missing from this formulation is a clear picture of what transactions are critical to the success of youth employment programs and how the federal government can influence those transactions. Why is CETA-LEA cooperation important? What constitutes effective cooperation? For whom, precisely, is knowledge development a problem and why? Where would we expect to see the effects of knowledge development if it were successful? What exactly constitutes a "linkage" between an employment training program and a private employer? Most importantly, though, against what concrete delivery-level behavior are we to judge federal allocation decisions? In order to address these questions, one must start from an explicit statement of the behavior that federal policy is designed to affect.

From this perspective it is clear that the major factors affecting employment of young people are outside the sphere of direct government control. *The target of public policy is the transaction between the young person and the employer.* The major determinants of this transaction are the employer's preferences for entry-level personnel, the young person's preference for a certain kind of work, and local labor market conditions, none of which are directly controlled by federal policy.

Public institutions try either to affect the attributes of the young person that might increase his or her employability or to influence the preferences of employers for entry-level personnel. Two sets of public institutions have the closest proximity to the transaction: schools and employment training programs. The two sets of institutions operate from very different legal and political bases. Schools are the creations of state government, but are largely administered and governed at the local level. Employment training organizations are the creations of the federal government, administered and governed at the local level by CETA prime sponsors. At the delivery level there is considerable variability from one locale to another in the kind of services offered, the level of resources invested by the public schools in preparing young people for job entry, and the level of cooperation between operators of employment training programs and school personnel. In the variability of local settings, however, one thing remains constant: *The point at which public policy intersects private choices is in the transactions between young people, service providers* (schools and employment training organizations), *and employers.*

At least three sets of delivery-level decisions are important in determining the effects of youth employment policy: service providers' decisions about who gets access to which services; young peoples' decisions to enter particular kinds of training and to seek particular jobs; and employers' decisions to fill entry-level positions. These decisions cannot be standardized, managed, or controlled us-

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ing conventional administrative tools. Matching young people to services is a highly discretionary task, requiring judgment, skill, and imagination. Some combination of cognitive skills, vocational skills, job-search skills, and work experience is required for labor force participation; and it is the task of the service deliverer to respond to individual differences in the need for these skills. The decisions of young people and employers are likewise highly discretionary. The central problem for policymakers is not how to make these decisions consistent with some predetermined, uniform plan of action but to maximize the likelihood that the net effect of the decisions will be to increase the employability of young people. The strategic targeting of resources on discretionary decisions is more important than attempts to control behavior according to plan.

The three-cornered relationship between service providers, young people, and employers, and the interdependent decisions among members of the triad, become the reference points against which to judge the potential effect of policy choices and implementation strategies. The closer and more direct the influence on these relationships, the more likely the choice will affect the employability of young people; the more distant, the less likely.

Viewed from this perspective, the issues raised initially by federal policymakers now make a good deal more sense. Instead of phrasing them in terms of a federal objective disconnected from a delivery-level target (more CETA-LEA cooperation, more knowledge development, more private-sector linkages), they can be phrased in terms of their anticipated effect on delivery-level decisions. Without first stating explicitly where the delivery level is, what the critical decisions are at that level, and what the federal interest is in those relationships, one cannot formulate an intelligible policy question. In other words, the process of framing questions from the top begins with an understanding of what is important at the bottom.

What effect would we expect greater CETA-LEA cooperation to have on delivery-level decisions? From the federal level, cooperation among local administrators looks good. The federal administrator's job is simplified considerably by having a tidy, consolidated box at the local level into which federal money can be put. From the delivery level, though, its advantages are far less obvious. Does cooperation among administrators mean that school personnel and operators of employment training programs will work side by side on common problems? Not necessarily. It might, and probably does, mean only that school administrators and CETA prime sponsors have devised a peaceful way of dividing up federal funds and using them for separate activities. Even if we could have a completely consolidated delivery system at the local level, would we want it? What effect would it have on the discretionary choices of service providers, young people, and employers? A major advantage of the CETA system over the school system is that it allows small, marginal, unconventional organizations to form in competition with established providers and schools. Would tighter CETA-LEA collaboration squeeze out marginal providers and reduce choices available to young people? On grounds of simplicity, stan-

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dardization, and management control, CETA-LEA cooperation seems good. On grounds of delivery-level performance, its benefits are mixed, at best.

Viewing the knowledge development problem from the delivery level, it becomes clearer that the notion has very little meaning apart from its effect on how delivery-level personnel understand their work and share knowledge with each other. Federal and local administrators can direct that certain kinds of studies be done, evaluate the performance of program deliverers, and construct elaborate management information systems—all of which have been done in the name of knowledge development—but the net effect of these devices is to increase the knowledge and control of administrators, not delivery-level personnel. Would it not make sense to put a certain proportion of the funds dedicated to knowledge development directly in the hands of the delivery-level personnel?

The problem of private-sector linkages, viewed from the delivery level, looks something like a problem of coalition building. Employers cannot really be expected to take a serious interest in youth employment programs without a tangible stake in the outcome of those programs. One strategy for giving them a stake is to view them as part of the delivery system at the local level, rather than as consumers of a product that someone else produces. This might make them competitive providers of services. It could also bring them into a formal bargaining relationship with CETA prime sponsors and school system administrators for purposes of determining allocation of funds at the local level. Or it could require constructing something like a school-work council at the lowest level of the system, with discretionary control of a certain amount of money for program and knowledge development. In order for employers to alter their preferences toward young labor force entrants, they have to be drawn into a relationship in which they can perceive a benefit.

The critical issues in the formulation of a federal policy toward youth employment, thus, are not how the federal government should allocate its resources among competing, national objectives and how it can manipulate other levels of government to accomplish those objectives, but where, in the complex welter of relationships at the delivery level, are the individuals who have the closest proximity to the problems and what resources do they need to address it. The logic of backward mapping connects policy decisions directly with the point at which their effect occurs.*

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Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter

ROBERT JERVIS

Recent debates on the role of nuclear weapons in American defense policy have not clarified the important issues or dealt with the underlying assumptions that are involved. While some of the specifics of the arguments are new, the basic questions are as old as the nuclear era and can be referred to as the dispute between those who advocate a policy of Assured Destruction (AD) and those who call for Flexible Response (FR). Proponents of AD believe that any nuclear war will be all-out war and therefore that the United States need only have an assured capacity to destroy an enemy's cities even if forced to absorb a first strike. Proponents of FR hold that there is a range of military contingencies for which the United States must be prepared and that nuclear weapons can be used in a variety of such contingencies in a more flexible, limited way. The main arguments against AD, now as in the past, are that it is not credible and would lead to disaster if deterrence failed; the central argument against FR is that it is costly, ineffective, and dangerous. This article generally defends the AD position and argues that FR misunderstands the nature of nuclear deterrence.

Assured Destruction and Flexible Response

Proponents of AD argue that the vulnerability of population centers in both the United States and the Soviet Union that comes with mutual second-strike capability has transformed strategy. Because a military advantage no longer assures a decisive victory, old ways of thinking are no longer appropriate. The

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healthy fear of devastation, which cannot be exorcised short of the attainment of a first-strike capability, makes deterrence relatively easy. Furthermore, because cities cannot be taken out of hostage, the perceived danger of total destruction is crucial at all points in the threat, display, or use of force.

Four implications follow. First, because gaining the upper hand in purely military terms cannot protect one's country, various moves in a limited war—such as using large armies, employing tactical nuclear weapons, or even engaging in limited strategic strikes—are less important for influencing the course of the battle than for showing the other side that a continuation of the conflict raises an unacceptable danger that things will get out of hand. New weapons are introduced not to gain a few miles of territory, but to engage in what Schelling has called competition in risk taking.[1] Escalation dominance—the ability to prevail at every level of military conflict below that of all-out war—is thus neither necessary nor sufficient to reach one's goals, be they to preserve the status quo or to change it. Being able to win on the battlefield does not guarantee winning one's objectives, since the risk of escalation may be too great to justify the expected benefits.

Second, it does not matter which side has more nuclear weapons. In the past, having a larger army than one's neighbor allowed one to conquer it and protect one's own population. Having a larger nuclear stockpile yields no such gains. Deterrence comes from having enough weapons to destroy the other's cities; this capability is an absolute, not a relative, one.[2]

Third, if national security is provided by one's capability to destroy the opponent, not by the possession of a more effective military machine than the other side, then the force that drives the security dilemma is sapped. The security dilemma is created by the fact that in the prenuclear era weapons and policies that made one country secure made others insecure. An army large enough to protect the state was usually large enough to threaten a neighbor with invasion, even if the state did not intend such a threat. But when security comes from the absolute capability to annihilate one's enemy, then each side can gain it simultaneously. Neither side need acquire more than a second-strike capability and, if either does, the other need not respond since its security is not threatened.[3]

A fourth aspect of the AD position is that nuclear war is very unlikely because to initiate it a statesman would have to be willing to run the risk that his country's population centers would be destroyed. Not only is "the balance of terror . . . decidedly not delicate,"[4] but, because statesmen know that imprudent

[1] The phrase is attributed to Thomas Schelling in Herman Kahn, *On Escalation* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1968), p. 3. The topic is discussed in Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92–125.

[2] Thus there is a second meaning in the title of the book of brilliant essays written in 1946 by Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).

[3] Many proponents of AD also argue that the Soviet Union would feel threatened by increases in American strategic forces, however, and this fear is in some tension with the belief described here.

[4] Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 380.

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action could lead to all-out war, the resulting deterrence covers a lot more than attacks on one's homeland. To take any major offensive action is to run an intolerably high risk of escalation. The United States and the Soviet Union may engage in fierce rhetorical battles and even use force in such peripheral areas as Africa and Asia, but there are sharp limits to how far they can push each other. The chance that such attempts would lead to total destruction is simply too great. (And it can be too great even though it is very low. That is, even a very small probability of escalation is sufficient to deter serious encroachments.)

The Flexible Response position is different on all counts. Its logic is best seen in terms of what Glenn Snyder has called the stability-instability paradox.[5] Because the balance is so stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, each side is relatively free to engage in provocations and military actions at lower levels of violence. The most obvious application of this argument is that if NATO lacks the ability to defend Europe with conventional weapons, it faces the danger of having to fight such a war: thus the Soviet second-strike capability would "deter our deterrent" (to paraphrase the title from an article by Paul Nitze).[6] The same argument can be applied to more bizarre situations. To secure some highly valued goal the Russians might destroy most of the American Minuteman force. Since its cities were still in hostage, the United States would be deterred from striking back at Soviet cities.

For the advocates of FR, the United States must be prepared to fight a war—or rather a variety of wars—in order to gain a better chance of deterring the Soviets from making any military moves, to deter them from escalating if they do move, and to secure as favorable an outcome as possible at any level of violence. In contrast to the AD view, FR argues that in the nuclear era, as in earlier times, the absolute amount of armaments on each side is less important than the relative amounts because each nation's military forces as well as its population centers are potential targets. As decision makers stop thinking that any war must be total and realize that the stability-instability paradox allows a wider range of contingencies of controlled and less self-defeating strikes, the importance of the details of the strategic balance becomes clear.[7]

Proponents of FR thus disagree with the AD position that the inherent riskiness of any major provocation in the nuclear era means that a second-strike capability protects against much more than an unrestrained assault on the country's homeland. Secretary of Defense Brown argues that "we now recognize that the strategic nuclear forces can deter only a relatively narrow range of con-

[5] Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in *The Balance of Power*, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler, 1965). This paradox was seen by Snyder as explaining why mutual second-strike capability could lead to conventional wars; the proponents of FR take this one step further by arguing that the overall strategic stability also allows for limited nuclear wars.

[6] Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy* 25 (Winter 1976–77): 195–210.

[7] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization*, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 51.

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tingencies, much smaller in range than was foreseen only 20 or 30 years ago."[8] Similarly, Brown, like Schlesinger before him, claims that "only if we have the capability to respond realistically and effectively to an attack at a variety of levels can we . . . have the confidence necessary to a credible deterrent."[9] But, the proponents of AD would reply, this argument advocating something approximating escalation dominance misses the point. No state can respond "effectively" in the sense of being able to take its population centers out of hostage; thus, it is the willingness to run risks and the perceptions of this willingness that will determine whether a response is "realistic" and a threat is credible.

Stability, Predictability, and Soviet Intentions

Much of the difference between the two schools of thought turns on differing ideas about stability. Both groups agree on the overwhelming importance of preserving one's cities. But for the proponents of FR, the common interest in avoiding a mutually disastrous outcome can be used as a lever to extract competitive concessions. Either side can take provocative actions because the other cannot credibly threaten to respond by all-out war. Proponents of AD, on the other hand, see stability as broader, and deterrence as covering a wider set of interests, since it follows from the reasonable fear that any challenge to an opponent's vital interest could escalate. Paradoxically, stability is in part the product of the belief that the world is not entirely stable, that things could somehow get out of control.

There are two elements that influence beliefs about the extent to which the risks of escalation could be kept limited and controlled, and it is not surprising that advocates of AD and FR disagree about both. The first element is the American reaction and the Soviet anticipation of it. Advocates of FR fear that the Russians might be certain enough that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in response to a major provocation to make such a provocation worth taking. Those who support a policy of AD deny this, noting that the United States has behaved too unpredictably for any state to be sure what it will do. Part of the reason for the disagreement on this point is that proponents of both AD and FR project their views onto the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter believe, and the former deny, that a large Russian arms build-up would intimidate the United States.

The other element in the belief about whether the risks would seem controllable is a judgment about the inherent limits of manipulation and prediction in human affairs. While these factors are rarely discussed explicitly, the tone of much of the FR writings implies that men can make fine, complex, and accurate

[8] Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 76. Brown's posture statement is a combination of FR and AD and so is more honest, but less coherent, than many of the previous statements.

[9] Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 54.

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calculations. Friction, uncertainty, failures of implementation, and the fog of battle do not play a major role. Men see clearly, their subordinates are able to carry out intricate instructions, and the other side gets the desired message. Thus, Secretary Brown recently argued that "if we try bluffing [the Russians with a threat of massive retaliation], ways can be found by others to test our bluffs without undue risk to them."[10] Such attempts would involve reasonable risks only if the situation were under complete control and seen by the Soviets as relatively safe, and then only if they believed this to be the case. (But many proponents of FR also believe that the United States cannot rely on tactical nuclear weapons to defend Europe because their use could too easily lead to all-out war. This fits oddly with the belief that the superpowers could fight a limited strategic war.)

For the advocates of AD, this is a dream world. War plans can be drawn up on this basis, but reality will not conform. Furthermore, decision makers, having experienced the multiple ways in which predictions prove incorrect and situations get out of control, do not commit the fallacy of believing that escalation could be carefully manipulated and thus would not place any faith in the precise options of limited nuclear warfare. FR advocates see the need for a policy they consider to be prudential in the sense of being able to cope with unlikely but dangerous contingencies because they do not think decision makers can be counted on to avoid terrible risks; proponents of AD do not think American policy has to cover such remote possibilities because they are confident that statesmen are at least minimally prudent.

This difference in beliefs—or perhaps I should say in intuitions—goes far to explain why some of the proponents of FR see a much greater danger of a Russian first strike than do advocates of AD. One would not expect any difference of opinion here since the question seems entirely technical. But it is not. To launch a first strike in the belief that one could destroy most of an opponent's strategic forces is to accept a set of complex and uncertain calculations: the weapons have never been tested under fully operational conditions; accuracies are estimated from performances over test ranges, which may be different when the missiles are fired over different parts of the earth; the vulnerability of the other side's silos (and one's own) can never be known with certainty before the war; and the effects on the environment of huge nuclear explosions can only be guessed at. The same orientation that leads one to believe that statesmen could be sufficiently confident of their ability to prevent escalation to allow them to engage in major provocations also fits with the conclusion that statesmen might place sufficient confidence in their estimates to launch a disarming strike.

If differences in beliefs about the risks inherent in major provocations are one source of the dispute between AD and FR, another is a difference in perceptions of the risks that the Russians are willing to run. Most proponents of AD argue that while the desire to expand is not completely absent, the Russians are not so

[10] Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1980*, p.75.

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strongly motivated in this regard as to be willing to endanger what they have already gained. Proponents of FR argue not that the Russians want war, but that they care enough about increasing their influence to run significant risks to reach that goal. And by acquiring massive military might, the Russians could hope to be better able to expand without courting dangerous confrontations. The proponents of AD would reply that almost no decision maker in the world's history would embark on a course of expansion while his cities were held hostage. The sort of leaders the proponents of FR posit are very rare—even Hitler probably was not an example, since he knew that if he could militarily defeat the Allies he could protect his own country.

Because the advocates of AD believe the Russians to be less strongly motivated than do those who call for FR, they believe that much less deterrence, both in terms of the damage that the United States needs to inflict and the probability that it will be inflicted, will be sufficient. Thus there is a disagreement over "how much credibility is enough": two policy analysts therefore might agree on how likely the Russians thought it was that a limited war would escalate and disagree over whether they would be deterred.[11]

Situations Calling for Flexible Response

The basic concern of the proponents of FR is that the threat to attack Soviet population centers is not credible when the Russians can respond in kind. In a crisis the United States must "have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action," to use President Kennedy's terms.[12] The danger that the proponents of FR see was expressed well by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in 1975: "If one side should remove the other's capability for flexible and controlled responses, he might find ways of exercising coercion and extracting concessions without triggering the final holocaust. . . . No opponent should think that he could fire at some of our Minuteman or SAC [Strategic Air Command] bases without being subjected to, at the very least, a response in kind. No opponent should believe that he could attack other U.S. targets of military or economic value without finding similar or other appropriate targets in his own homeland under attack. . . . Above all, no opponent should entertain the thought that we will permit him to remove our capability for flexible strategic responses."[13]

We can examine the problem more clearly by seeing that Schlesinger and other proponents of FR blur the distinction between two kinds of wars. The first

[11] This also partially explains why many of the proponents of FR think that the threat to destroy Russian cities would be an insufficient deterrent and that the United States should develop a targeting policy aimed at convincing the Soviet leaders that their regime would not be able to maintain control of the country after a war.

[12] "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 535.

[13] Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1976 and F.Y. 197T* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. II-4–II-5.

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involves demonstration attacks. Since they do not require large numbers of missiles, neither the size of each side's force nor its vulnerability is important. The second is a counterforce war of attrition in which the Russians would launch the first nuclear strike, trying to destroy as much of the American strategic force as possible, either in one blow or by moving more slowly and taking out the opposing forces in a series of strikes. Although the United States would still be able to attack the Soviet Union's cities, the only result of such a strike would be to have U.S. cities blown up thirty minutes later. If the U.S. strategic force is vulnerable, the Russians can destroy much of it without using a similar proportion of their force; if the U.S. force cannot hit protected targets, it will not be able to reduce the Russian force. But, and this is crucial, it is only in counterforce wars of attrition that the comparison of each side's counterforce capabilities matters.

Examining a number of contexts in which defense problems arise, one can see that the distinction between attacks that have an effect by demonstrating resolve and those that aim at reducing an opponent's capability recurs and is closely tied to the basic difference between the AD and FR positions. If the AD position is correct and counterforce wars of attrition are not a real possibility in the nuclear era, then the United States does not have to worry that its Minuteman force is vulnerable or that the Russians have a greater ability to destroy hard targets than the United States does. To evaluate the arguments, it is useful to examine the potentially critical situations.

Protecting Europe

One major fear is that the Soviets could launch a large-scale conventional attack that would conquer Europe unless the United States escalated. If the United States tried to stave off defeat by employing tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviets could reply in kind, nullifying any advantage the West may have gained. One FR remedy would be to develop the means to defend against an attack at any level of violence. Thus the West would deploy conventional forces to contain a conventional attack and tactical nuclear weapons to cope with a like attack. This alluring argument is not correct. An aggressor could attack in the face of escalation dominance if he believed that the defender would not pay the price of resisting, a price that includes a probability that the fighting will spread to each side's population centers. The other side of this coin is that a state that could be confident of winning a military victory in Europe could be deterred from attacking or deterred from defending against an attack by the fear that the war might spread to its homeland. Only if the risk of such escalation could be reduced to zero would this element disappear and purely military considerations be determinative. The advocates of FR thus overstate the efficacy of their policy.

Of course if the United States lacks escalation dominance it would have to take the initiative of increasing the level of violence and risk in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe. But the onus of undertaking the original move would still remain with the aggressor. And since the level of risk is shared equally by

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both sides, what is likely to be more important than the inhibition against having to take the initiative is the willingness or unwillingness to approach the brink rather than concede defeat, a factor not linked to escalation dominance. Furthermore, some practical considerations reinforce this conclusion. As Bernard Brodie argued, it is hard to imagine that the Soviets would launch a conventional attack in the face of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons. Such an attack would require massed troops that would be an inviting target for NATO's tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets could not be sufficiently confident that their strategic or tactical nuclear forces would deter such a NATO response to leave their armies so vulnerable.[14] And for the Russians to initiate a tactical nuclear war would raise two difficulties. First, the uncertainties about how such a war would be fought are so great that it would be hard for any country to be confident that it would win. Second, a war of this level of violence would be especially likely to trigger the American strategic force.

An alternative FR policy is for the United States to develop large enough strategic forces to threaten, and carry out if need be, a counterforce strike with some of its forces, even though doing so would not leave the Soviet Union totally disarmed. While the Soviet Union could retaliate against American population centers, it would not do so because its own cities were still in hostage. Thus the United States could launch its strike "secure in the knowledge that the United States had a residual ICBM force that could deter attack upon itself."[15] This notion of security is an odd one, resting as it does on the confident prediction that the Russians would calmly absorb a counterforce first strike. This is especially odd because while the proponents of FR tell us that we should pay close attention to Soviet military doctrine, on this point they blithely disregard these texts which stress preemption and deny that limited nuclear wars are possible.

A similar error is embodied in Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's defense of limited nuclear options on the grounds that because the United States has commitments to allies, "we require a nuclear capability that has an implementable threat and which is perceived to have an implementable threat. Unless, in the event of certain hostile acts, we have a threat that we can implement, the existence of the American force structure does not contribute logically to deterrence." If, on the other hand, the United States has the ability to launch limited nuclear strikes, he continues, it "will not be self-deterred from responding to . . . an act of aggression."[16] But the concept of "self-deterrence" is not useful and the argument cannot be sustained. The United States is being deterred by the fear of Soviet retaliation. This danger is present as long as the Soviets have second-strike capability; thus, it is a consequence not of Soviet "superiority" but of

[14] Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[15] Colin Gray, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," *Foreign Affairs* 56 (July 1978): 788.

[16] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975*, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, part 1, pp. 47, 49.

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parity. Even if the United States reached Schlesinger's goal of preserving "an essential strategic equilibrium with the USSR both in capabilities and in targeting options,"[17] the costs and risks of employing the options would remain.

The argument that the side that had better counterforce capability could safely launch such an attack even though the other side would not be disarmed pertains only in wars of attrition in which each side tries to reduce the other's strategic capability and spares the other's cities. The claim that the United States can employ this option to protect Europe is the opposite side of the coin of the claim that if the Soviet Union had a large margin of counterforce superiority, it could use it to coerce the West. The validity of this claim turns on whether a war of attrition is a serious possibility or whether the danger that such a conflict would escalate to attacks on population centers would dominate decision makers' calculations.

Preemption

Some proponents of FR think it most unlikely that the Russians would launch an attack on Europe, but fear that if the Soviet strategic force was much more effective than the American one and if a significant proportion of the American strategic force were vulnerable, the Russians might make a preemptive strike in a grave crisis, perhaps one they had not sought, if they thought that war was very likely. The ability to hit missile silos and command and control facilities that the proponents of FR call for, however, increases this danger, since it enables the United States to destroy a large proportion of USSR's land-based missiles (and most of the Soviet strategic force is land based) if the United States were to strike first. It is a bit disingenuous to argue that the United States needs a new type of missile to decrease the chance that the Soviet Union would attack without also acknowledging that some of the incentive the Russians would have to attack those missiles comes from the very accuracy that is supposedly needed in order to fight a counterforce war.[18]

More importantly, preemption makes sense only if being struck first is much worse than getting the first blow in. A state whose leaders believe that war will lead to total devastation will have no incentive to preempt even if many of their missiles are vulnerable. Here, as at other points, the proponents of FR make the crucial mistake of concentrating on purely military factors—the numbers and characteristics of weapons on both sides—and ignoring the role of military moves as generators of risk. The FR argument is that deterrence requires a sufficient number and kind of forces so that if the other side struck first, it would be militarily worse off than if it had not. Thus it would be dangerous if the Rus-

[17] Ibid., p. 29.

[18] The United States might get around this dilemma by building missiles that were invulnerable, but that lacked accurate MIRVs. It is interesting to note that the U.S. Air Force has done a much better job of developing a powerful and accurate missile than it has in making that missile able to survive a Russian attack.

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sians were able to use, for example, 200 missiles with 2,000 warheads and knock out most of the American ICBMs. As Secretary of Defense Brown has put it: "we must ensure that no adversary could see himself better off after a limited exchange than before it. We cannot permit an enemy to believe that he could create any kind of military or psychological asymmetry that he could then exploit to his advantage."[19] But the fact that the Russians would have gained a more favorable ratio of missiles does not mean that they would be closer to any meaningful goal or even that they would be closer to it than they would have been if the United States struck first and the ratio of missiles available was less favorable to them. The only meaningful goals would be to preserve their cities and, if possible, prevail in the dispute. But gains in purely military terms do not accomplish these objectives in wartime any more than they do in peacetime. As long as each side retains the ability to destroy the other's society, having more warheads than an opponent is an advantage only if it makes the opponent back down, and the proponents of FR have not shown how it will make such a contribution. The military advantages of striking first can only be translated into political gains if the war remains counterforce and the state with the most missiles left after a series of exchanges prevails without losing its population centers.[20] The FR fallacy here is parallel to that involved in the claim that escalation dominance is necessary or sufficient for deterring or prevailing in a conflict in Europe. Competition in risk taking, rather than competition in military capability, dominates.

Counterforce Wars of Attrition and the Balance of Resolve

In a counterforce war of attrition the numbers and characteristics of the weapons would matter a great deal. As in the prenuclear era, what would be crucial would not be absolute capability, but the relative strengths of the opponents. The basic argument of the AD school is undercut because the primary targets of the warheads are not population centers but other weapons. Is the likelihood of counterforce wars of attrition sufficient to warrant the necessary preparations? Could there be a nuclear war in which population centers were spared and the outcome determined by which state is able to do the better job of reducing the other's military forces? Even if the Russians had the ability to win such a war, they would have to be desperate or willing to run terribly high risks to place sufficient faith in American self-restraint to order an attack. Even if the United States could win such a war, its threat to initiate it would not be credible (for example, in response to a Soviet attack on Europe) unless the Russians believed that the United States thought that control would be maintained throughout its course.

This control would have to be maintained, furthermore, although un-

[19] Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1979*, p. 56.

[20] This point is overlooked by Paul Nitze in "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976): 226–30, and in "Deterring our Deterrent," p. 210.

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precedented numbers of civilians would be killed; a large Russian counterforce strike could not be limited to destroying only military targets. Although it would be obvious to the president that most American population centers were still held hostage, sufficient damage would have been done to raise sharply the danger of an all-out response. The chance of such a reaction—which would be present even if the United States said it would not react in this way—would have to weigh very heavily on the Soviet decision makers.

But the existence of tight control would not ensure the success of a strategy of attrition. If the Russians launched a counterforce strike and the United States did not retaliate against Soviet cities, it might nullify a Russian war-fighting strategy by not responding at all. This may seem as bizarre as a counterattack on population centers, but on closer examination it makes some sense. Why should the United States retaliate? What would the Russians have gained by destroying a significant portion of the U.S. strategic force? Why would they be in a better position to work their will after a strike than before it? If the United States acts as though it is weakened, it will be in a worse bargaining position, but this is within American control. To withhold a response, while maintaining the ability to destroy Russian cities later, could as easily be taken as a sign of high resolve as of low. The United States would forego hitting many Russian military targets, but this would not sacrifice much of value since attacking them would not limit the Soviet ability to destroy the United States. Only if a war in Europe were being fought at the same time, and thus a failure to respond created or magnified an imbalance of land forces, would withholding a return counterforce strike give up something of value. But for the Soviets to attack American strategic forces (and NATO tactical nuclear forces) in conjunction with fighting a war in Europe would be to run a very high risk of an American counterattack on Soviet population centers.

The possibility of not responding to a Soviet counterforce strike points to the odd nature of a nuclear war of attrition. The benefit of the efforts to reduce an opponent's strategic forces comes only near the end, when the state is able to take its society out of hostage. Unless and until that point is reached, the side that is "losing" the counterforce war of attrition can do nearly as much damage to the side that is "winning" as it could before the war started. Military efforts can succeed only if the "loser" allows them to by sparing the "winner's" cities. Of course it will be costly for the "loser" to initiate counterstrikes against population centers, since the "winner" will presumably retaliate. But this is true regardless of the details of the strategic balance.

If the ultimate threat, even during a war of attrition, is that of destroying cities, it is clear that such wars are more competition in risk taking than they are attempts to gain an advantage on the battlefield. To concentrate on the military advantages that accrue to one side or the other by counterforce attacks is to ignore the fact that in any nuclear war the element of threat of escalation will loom very large.[21] This general point is missed by Secretary of Defense Brown

[21] Indeed the incentives for the state that is behind in a counterforce war to escalate increase as its

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when he says that the ability to hit a wide range of military targets "permits us to respond credibly to threats or actions by a nuclear opponent."[22] But what is crucial is less the capability than the willingness to use it. Even if the United States had the ability to match the Soviets round for round, target for target, it might not do so—and the Russians might move in the belief that the United States would not respond—because the costs and risks were felt to be too great. And even if the United States lacked such a capability, the Soviet fear of an all-out response could lead it to expect that any provocation would be prohibitively costly. Since what matters in limited strategic wars, even if they involve targets that are predominantly military, is each side's willingness to run high risks, it is the "balance of resolve" rather than the "balance of military power" that will most strongly influence their outcomes.[23] Extra ammunition cannot compensate for weakness in will or a refusal—perhaps a sensible refusal—to run the risk of destruction.

The importance of competition in risk taking implies that demonstration attacks would be more useful than attempts to reduce an opponent's military capabilities. Such attacks could be aimed at a military installation, an isolated element of an opponent's strategic forces, a command and control facility, or a city. The purpose of such an action would be to inflict pain, show resolve, and raise the risks of all-out war to a level that an opponent would find intolerable. Such risks, of course, weigh on both sides, but only by willingly accepting high risks can a state prevail. In addition to high resolve, in order to engage in nuclear demonstrations a state needs to be able to carry out a certain number of limited options. But the ammunition requirements are nowhere near as high as they are for a counterforce war of attrition (and both sides can simultaneously have the capability for demonstrations).

Demonstration strikes would exert pressure in three ways. First, they would exact some degree of punishment on the other side. But the immediate pain inflicted would probably be less important than the underlying motivation of these strikes—the implied threat to do more harm unless the opponent complies with the attacking state's demands. This threat gains its credibility because the attacking state has shown that it is willing to engage in very risky actions that have increased the chance that targets in its own country would be struck. When both sides have second-strike capability, one side prevails in a crisis, not by showing that it can inflict pain on the other (for this is obvious and true for the both sides), but by demonstrating that it feels so strongly about the issue at stake that it is willing to be hurt in return rather than suffer a defeat. Third, any nuclear attack increases the chance that uncontrolled escalation will occur. It is

military situation worsens. If it fears it may soon lose its second-strike capability, the losing state may will feel greater pressure to up the ante while it still can.

[22] Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1980*, p. 78.

[23] For further discussion of this point see Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 314–22. The Soviet stress on the importance of the "correlation of forces" is not inconsistent with this notion.

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this specter that exerts so much pressure on statesmen not to use nuclear weapons in the first place or to make concessions in any conflict in which they are used. Even if one side launched a counterforce strike, the war would almost surely end before either had run out of ammunition. Resolve, not capability, would be the limiting factor. When Secretary Brown claims that "fully effective deterrence requires forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively a range of military and other targets"[24] and argues that to do this the United States needs an invulnerable ICBM, he is either thinking in terms of a war of attrition or overstating the number of warheads the United States needs.

Possible Objections

Before drawing the conclusions that are implicit in the previous analysis, I should note three obvious objections. First, it can be argued that if I am right, and the strategic balance is quite stable, an increase in American arms will not have dire consequences.[25] Since all the United States can lose by additional deployment is money, argue the critics, it is better to play it safe and buy the extra systems. Moreover, how can anyone be sure that a war of attrition will not occur? But surely there must be some judgments about plausibility, some concern for costs, and some consideration of the chance that the United States might teach others lessons that are both incorrect and dangerous. The new weapons cost a lot of money and avoiding waste is not a goal to be scorned lightly.[26] Furthermore, although there are no strong and direct links between the adversaries' defense budgets or between the budgets and the degree of superpower conflict, it is hard to keep the military and political tracks entirely separate. A final line of rebuttal is the most important: to develop a posture based on the assumption that limited nuclear wars are possible is to increase the chance that they will occur. If the Russians already believe in the possibility that such wars could be kept limited, U.S. acceptance of this position would increase the likelihood of their occurrence. On the other hand, if the Russians now find these kinds of war incomprehensible, they might learn to accept them if the United States talked about them long and persuasively enough. This could decrease the chance that a nuclear war would immediately involve the mass destruction of population centers, but at the cost of increasing the chance of more limited nuclear wars—which then could escalate. Such a trade-off is

[24] Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 5 April 1979, p. 3. Also see Department of Defense, *Annual Report, F.Y. 1980*, pp. 77–78.

[25] There is a similar contradiction in McGeorge Bundy's claim that although nuclear superiority is meaningless, we need arms control agreements "To Cap the Volcano" (*Foreign Affairs* 48 [October 1969]: 1–20).

[26] Bernard Brodie argues that the strategic balance is so stable that saving money should be the main goal of arms control ("On the Objectives of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Security* 1 [Summer 1976]: 17–36). His position is further developed in "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," ibid. 2 (Spring 1978): 65–83. I am greatly indebted to these articles.

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highly likely, and even Schlesinger acknowledged that adoption of his doctrine might increase the chance of limited nuclear strikes.[27]

The second objection is that my analysis ignores the fact that the Russians do not accept the notion that mutual assured destruction creates stability. Soviet military doctrine is an arcane field that cannot be treated in detail here, although the bulk of the evidence indicates that the Soviet view of strategy is very different from the American.[28] They appear to take war more seriously. Indeed, much of Soviet military doctrine is pure military doctrine—that is, the ideas are not particularly Russian or particularly Marxist but simply those one would expect from people charged with protecting society and winning wars. Many statements by Soviet generals are similar to statements by American generals when the latter are not influenced by the ideas or constrained by the power of the civilian leadership; many American military officials seek the same program that the Russians are following. Thus one cannot draw from the fact that Russians probably buy more than is needed for deterrence the inference that they are willing to run high risks to try to expand. The American generals who call for higher spending are not necessarily more bellicose than those who disagree with them.[29] Both the Russian and the U.S. generals may want to prepare for the worst and get ready to fight if a war is forced on them. The Russians may be buying what they think is insurance, and we do not ordinarily think that someone who buys a lot of insurance for his car is planning to drive recklessly.

While there is considerable evidence that the Russians want military forces that would provide as good an outcome as possible should war be forced on them, there is very little evidence that they think that such forces could be used to coerce the West. It has yet to be shown that they think that a superior ability to destroy military targets provides a shield behind which they can make political advances or that Soviet military doctrine measures American deterrence in terms of the United States' ability to match their posture. The Russians may not accept the idea that mutual vulnerability is a desirable state of affairs, but they seem to understand very well the potency of the American threat to destroy their society. Indeed their outlook is uncongenial to a counterforce war of attrition. While the Russians probably would attack U.S. strategic forces in the event of war, they have not talked about sparing the opponent's cities. Instead, they seem to be planning to hit as many targets as they can if war breaks out.

Even if the Russians were to say that they believed a war of attrition was possible, the United States would not have to adopt such a view. While it takes the agreement of both sides to fight a counterforce war, this is not true for AD.

[27] House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Military Posture*, p. 50.

[28] For a dissenting view, see Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 3 (Summer 1978):112–47.

[29] A study of postwar situations reveals that the U.S. military often advised against foreign military adventures. See Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

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If one side denies that counterforce wars could be kept limited and convinces the other side that it believes this, the other cannot safely act on its doctrine. The Russians understood this in the periods when McNamara and Schlesinger were enunciating their doctrines, and American statesmen took their professions of disbelief seriously. Even if the Russians were to reverse their position, they would have to take American denials seriously also.

A third objection is that although the Soviet superior ability to destroy strategic forces and the related existence of Minuteman vulnerability is not a strategic problem, it is a political problem. Accordingly, because other nations are influenced by indicators of nuclear superiority, the United States must engage in this competition. (This argument loses some credibility since most people who make it also claim that superiority is meaningful apart from these perceptions.) There are several lines of rebuttal. First, there is little evidence that European or Third World leaders pay much attention to the details of the strategic balance. Second, the United States provides most of the information and conceptual framework that underpins third-party discussions of the balance. The United States might be able to persuade others that it would behave differently because the Russians could wipe out much of the American capability to destroy Soviet missiles. But it would probably be easier to convince them that this was not true. Few world leaders expect the United States and the Soviet Union to fight a war of attrition. Moreover, if the Russians believe that superiority matters and thus may be somewhat emboldened, the bargaining advantages they will gain will be slight if the United States holds to the position that this is nonsense. If the United States convinces the Soviet Union that it does not see a meaningful difference in strength, the USSR cannot safely stand firm in crisis bargaining because it will not have any reason to think that the United States is more likely to retreat.

Conclusions

We can draw several conclusions. The question of which side has greater ability to destroy the other's strategic forces matters only in a war of attrition. Such a war seems unlikely enough so that it is not worth spending large sums and running considerable dangers to prepare for it. Because either side can use its nuclear weapons to destroy its opponent's population centers, the danger of escalation would play a very large role in any war and could not be controlled by having more missiles, more accurate missiles, and more invulnerable missiles than the other side. The nuclear revolution cannot be undone. As we have seen, many of the arguments about the supposed dangers following from Soviet superiority in fact are consequences of parity. The American deterrent is deterred by the fact that its cities are vulnerable, not by the fact that the Russians have some supposed military advantage. Since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can take its cities out of hostage, the state that is willing to run the greatest risks will prevail. Many of those who call for the United States to match

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or surpass the Soviet's nuclear arsenal are trying to have the United States compensate for what they feel is a weakness of resolve by an excess in weaponry. But such a deficiency, if it exists, cannot be compensated. A wider range of options will merely give the Russians more ways, and safer ways, of coercing the West.

If the balance of resolve is so important, is the United States at a disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union? Some would argue that the United States has shown in Vietnam that it will not fight to defend its interests and those of its allies. But few dominoes fell after April 1975; other states may have been less impressed by the final American withdrawal than they were by its willingness to spend so much blood and treasure on an unimportant country. Furthermore, resolve is not so much an overall characteristic of an actor as it is a factor that varies with the situation because it reflects the strength of the state's motivation to prevail on a given issue. The state defending the status quo has the advantage in most conflicts in which the balance of resolve is crucial because it usually values the issue or territory at stake more than its opponent does.[30] It is easier for a state to convince the other side that it will fight to hold what it has than it is to make a credible threat to fight rather than forego expansion. A world in which resolve matters so much may not be so bad for the United States.

Even if both sides recognize the greater determination of the side defending the status quo, accidents and miscalculations are still possible, especially in situations growing out of a crisis in a third area. To rely solely on AD may be too dangerous. Some degree of insurance can be purchased by a continuation of the present American posture, which includes the availability of limited nuclear options. But these should be demonstrations, keyed to competition in risk taking, not attempts to wage a war of attrition; thus, the United States would not have to match the Soviets on any of the standard measures of nuclear power. It does not take a superior or even an equal military force to show by limited use that one is willing to take extreme measures rather than suffer a defeat. Such costs and risks are the trading chips of bargaining in the nuclear era; even if the United States had the weapons and doctrine for an FR policy, it could not avoid relying on them.

Although the United States should be able to conduct limited nuclear demonstrations, it should not stress this part of its policy. At this point there is no reason to think that such fantastic measures will ever be necessary, and they should be looked on as something to be done only in the most dire emergency, not as a tool of statecraft. Too much discussion of the possibility of such strikes might lead either or both sides to believe that the risks of a limited exchange were manageable, that escalation would remain under tight control. At best, the United States would therefore create a world in which limited nuclear wars were more likely to occur. At worst, these beliefs would be tested and proven to be incorrect.

[30] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," p. 318.

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Of course a policy of AD supplemented by the ability to conduct demonstration attacks may not succeed. The specter of all-out war is probably compelling enough to make both sides so cautious as to render forcible changes of the status quo on important issues too dangerous to be attempted. But miscalculations are possible, even in situations that seem very clear in retrospect, and states are sometimes willing to take what others think are exorbitant risks to try to reach highly valued goals. Both a cautionary tale and reminder that superior military capability does not guarantee deterrence is provided by the Japanese decision to go to war in 1941. Japan struck because her leaders saw the alternative not as the foregoing of gains, but as losing "her very existence."[31] They were thus very highly motivated—much more so than American decision makers thought. Furthermore, they knew perfectly well that they could not win an all-out war. But they were not expecting to have to fight such a war; they thought that the war would be limited as the United States would prefer to concede dominance in East Asia rather than engage in a long and costly struggle. It is always possible that the Russians might similarly believe that a nuclear war could be kept limited because the United States would rather concede than move closer to the abyss. The penalty for miscalculation would be much greater for Russia than it was for Japan, and so their caution should be much greater. The danger remains, however, and it cannot be met by building more weapons.*

[31] Robert Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p 203.

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The National Endowment for the Humanities has announced that its program of Summer Seminars for College Teachers will offer 120 eight-week seminars during the summer of 1980. Twelve college teachers will be selected to attend each seminar, and participants will receive a stipend of $2,500 to cover travel expenses to and from the seminar location, books and other research expenses, and living expenses. The purpose of the program is to provide opportunities for faculty at undergraduate and two-year colleges to work with distinguished scholars in their fields at institutions with library collections suitable for advanced research. The 1980 Summer Seminars for College Teachers brochure, which lists seminar topics, directors, dates, and locations, will be available locally from department chairpersons or from the Division of Fellowships, National Endowment for the Humanities, 806 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20506 after January 1, 1980. College teachers interested in applying to a seminar should write directly to the director (addresses are listed in the brochure) for detailed information and for application materials. The deadline for submitting applications to directors will be April 1, 1980.

(A public service announcement)

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Generational Differences and the Women's Movement

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
JOHN V. REYNOLDS

This article examines the dispositions toward the contemporary women's movement and its goals of two generations of similarly educated women. Specifically it is a comparison of mothers and daughters who have attended (or are attending) the same college. Two competing hypotheses will be offered to explain the basis of support. One hypothesis identifies the social position of women as the key variable, starting with the assumption that all women occupy similar positions in the social structure; that is, their position is lower than that of the males. We shall refer to this hypothesis as the stratum theory. The other hypothesis, instead of emphasizing the common aspect, focuses on age-based differences in experiences and socialization patterns and their consequences for the movement. We shall refer to it as the generational hypothesis.

To begin with the generational hypothesis, age-based differences should be expected for several reasons: Mothers in all probability have been socialized to rather traditional values regarding the proper female role; marriage and childrearing have offered them experiences none of the daughters in our sample has as yet had; and these experiences (and the status connected with them) might have caused them to feel a certain emotional commitment or investment in the persistence of these time-honored patterns. Some corroboration for these assumptions can be found in the literature on generations. One set of explanations deals with the different developmental stages at which two or three generations find themselves. For example, Bengtson and Kuypers suggest that generational discontinuities are likely to arise because children and adolescents are at

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different stages in their personal development than are their parents.[1] These developmental differences provide the younger generation with less of a "stake" in maintaining similarities with their parents. Consequently daughters might have less of a stake or investment in maintaining traditional definitions of the feminine role. Havighurst moreover asserts that the nature of the responsibilities assumed by the older generation creates developmental transformations in the older generation that cannot yet be expected of the younger one.[2] Such responsibilities increase the likelihood that the generations will take different approaches to many problems with which both must deal.[3]

Developmental differences then are one reason for expecting generational differences. Differences within the political context in which whole generations come to adulthood is offered as another explanation. This type of explanation is largely derived from Karl Mannheim's notion of a political generation. A political generation according to Mannheim is seen as embracing related age groups that share "a common location in the social and historical process" and that are limited by that context to "a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action."[4] Not everyone reaching maturity during a specific historical period necessarily belongs to a new political generation. Rather, a political generation is that segment that responds to the unique spirit of the times, the *Zeitgeist*. Although chronological age is not the exclusive criterion by which a political generation is determined, such a generation is primarily formed by the youngest adult generation at a given historical time.

The contemporary women's movement became prominent during a historical period that has been variously labeled as the era of The New Politics or the Post-Materialist Revolution.[5] The New Politics advocates new life styles "based on values opposite those of an achievement-oriented, conventionally religious middle class conservative American stereotype."[6] Although the women's movement is very concerned with sex-based material inequalities in society and strongly supports achievement orientation in women, many of the most controversial questions it raises are questions of life style—the female role in society, female

[1] Vern L. Bengston and J.A. Kuypers, "Generational Differences and the Developmental Stake," in *Life-Span Development Psychology: Personality and Socialization*, eds. Paul B. Baltes and K. Warner Schaie (New York: Academic Press, 1973), p. 239.

[2] Robert J. Havighurst, "History of Development Psychology: Socialization and Personality Development Through the Life Span," in ibid.

[3] Vern L. Bengston and K. Dean Black, "Intergenerational Relations and Continuities in Socialization," in ibid., p. 227.

[4] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1954), p. 291.

[5] Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, *Leadership and Change: The New Politics of the American Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers Inc., 1976); Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 65 (December 1971): 991-1017.

[6] Miller and Levitin, *Leadership and Change: The New Politics of the American Electorate*, p. 63.

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sexuality and self-expression, family planning. The fact that life-style issues, including advocacy of women's equality, are featured prominently on the public agenda of The New Politics probably facilitated the ability of the women's movement to make these issues public. Such issues certainly were not part of the public agenda when the mothers were reaching adulthood—the *Zeitgeist* being different then.[7] These, however, are the very issues often viewed as the most incomprehensible or threatening to the older generation. Having experienced marriage and motherhood, the older generation has made a considerable investment of self into roles and life-styles now challenged (or at least questioned) by the younger generation. Radically to rethink the old values would thus demand not only a break with learned norms but also a reevaluation of one's self-image in relation to the role one has chosen to play (with the verdict possibly being negative). Obviously this is a task many mothers might prefer to avoid. For that reason, according to the generational hypothesis, a "state of dynamic tension" can be expected between the two generations.

The stratum theory, on the other hand, explains support for the movement as a product of a common fate—consciousness of which has come about (or been accelerated) by the activities of feminists. In this formulation, what unites women in a common fate is stronger than what separates them on the basis of age. It argues that all women suffer one common characteristic vis-à-vis the male society, namely, second-class citizenship. Gender, not generation, serves as a basis for social stratification, with the upper stratum being occupied by the males. This fact, so the argument continues, should cause all women regardless of age to respond positively to the feminist *Zeitgeist*; self-interest or the desire to improve the position of one's stratum creates a common bond.

The notion that awareness of mutually shared self-interests can reduce the probability of conflict in the group was developed by Foner.[8] She applied it, however, to age not gender. She held that age is not conflict-producing when common material benefits are at stake (such as better wages and working conditions). We propose to apply her line of reasoning to gender. The sex-stratum hypothesis holds that orientations to the women's movement and to feminist issues are age-independent because all women stand to gain from the changes advocated by the movement. Gender rather than age predicts attitudes on feminist issues; hence consensus rather than conflict will prevail between the generations.

Study Design

Our population consisted of two generations of Douglass College (Rutgers University) students: mothers who had graduated from the college and

[7] Gerald Pomper, *Voters' Choice—Varieties of Electoral Behavior* (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1975), p. 106.

[8] Anne Foner, "Age Stratification and Age Conflict in Political Life," *American Sociological Review* 39 (April 1974): 187–96.

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daughters who were attending it during the 1975–76 academic year. The study was originally begun as a class project at the request of an undergraduate seminar and was conducted through mail questionnaires. No sampling was undertaken. Instead all mothers whose daughters were currently enrolled at the college were contacted, as were the daughters. This process yielded forty-six pairs (but forty-seven daughters since one mother had two daughters enrolled). All but one mother and one daughter (unfortunately of different lineage pairs) returned the questionnaire which was identical for both sets.[9] The questionnaire contained eighty-six items that dealt with political and feminist issues. Here we shall restrict ourselves to an analysis of the seventeen feminist issues. Of these, one question asked respondents' views of the goal(s) of the contemporary women's movement; another asked their general disposition toward it; fifteen questions dealt with current feminist issues.[10] The format for the fifteen issues was a Likert-type seven-point scale.[11]

Because of the nature of the project, our study did not include a control group of noncollegiate mothers (or even mothers who had attended colleges different from their daughters). We also were unable to include mothers from genuine working-class families. We are fully aware that such a homogeneous sample severely limits the general applicability of the study's findings. A definitive study of orientations to feminist issues and the women's movement needs to be undertaken with a more representative sample. This investigation is intended as a pilot study for the purpose of generating hypotheses for further and more definitive testing. With these caveats in mind, however, we consider our sample particularly heuristic and felicitous. The women's movement has frequently been described as a middle-class movement, appealing particularly to well-educated women with career or other professional ambitions or attainments. Our sample clearly fits that description. If, nonetheless, age-based differences in feminist attitudes should occur even within a sample theoretically so attuned to the benefit of the women's movement, we would consider this evidence in support of the generational hypothesis. If, on the other hand, we should find consensus on the material feminist issues only (to use Foner's terminology), we would consider this tentative evidence in support of the sex-stratum theory.

Two analyses will be performed in this article: an aggregate analysis comparing mothers and daughters as separate aggregates; and a lineage paired analysis. Such an aggregate analysis can inform us about similarities and differences in the orientations of the two generations and can document the presence or ab-

[9] With the exception of some items where common sense dictated different questions formats. For example, mothers were asked what they had done immediately after graduation, and daughters were asked what they planned to do. If gainful employment was the answer in either case, both respondents were then asked their reason for seeking such employment.

[10] Eight of the fifteen issues had been planks of the National Women's Agenda of 1975 where they were phrased as explicit demands on government and the private sector. The remaining seven issues deal with relations between the sexes and orientations toward the female role.

[11] To avoid response set, the most feminine answer was seven at one time and one at another. After the administration all were converted to a value of seven.

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sence of a generation gap on any issues (or selected aspects of them). This kind of analysis, however, does not tell us much about the consensus or conflict that prevails within mother-daughter dyads or about the effectiveness with which specific dyads have become socialized. Note that we did not say the effectiveness with which mothers have socialized daughters. Similarities between them may be due to such transmissions but it could also be due to the reverse, namely, daughters socializing mothers; similarities could be the result of a mutual influence process—what Bengston and Black call "bilateral negotiations."[12] These bilateral negotiations in turn may be the result of outside influences (such as the mass media). Our study will not permit us to make such causal inferences, but we do want to explore intrafamilial similarities. To discover them, an aggregate analysis is inadequate, and only a lineage paired analysis will do.

Aggregate Comparisons

The women's movement projects a somewhat uniform image across the two generations. Over 90 percent of both mothers and daughters perceive it primarily as a movement that seeks the legal and economic equality of women. Similar percentages of both generations also reject the suggestion that the movement is seeking extreme goals, such as the dissolution of the family. While the similarity in perception does not eliminate the possibility of generational conflict, it does seem clear that the two generations are at least basing their attitudes on similar views of the movement. These findings also suggest that the women's movement has succeeded in projecting an unambiguous image of itself as an organization on behalf of women's civil rights and equality.

The data indicate that mothers and daughters both are favorably disposed to the idea of the contemporary women's movement,[13] since only a small minority in each group (mothers, 12 percent; daughters, 13 percent) actually oppose it. Support of the idea, though clearly representing majority sentiment, is by no means overwhelming: 58 percent of the mothers and 67 percent of the daughters support it unequivocally—pointing to some generational differences in the expected direction. Where mothers and daughters differ most is in the intensity of their support: whereas mothers are somewhat more inclined to be ambivalent about the women's movement (30 percent of the mothers are ambivalent, daughters, 20 percent), daughters are over twice as likely to opt for the strongest possible position in support of the movement (daughters, 29 percent; mothers, 14 percent). Thus, the majority sentiment favors the movement, with mothers more reticent and daughters more enthusiastic in their support.

Table 1 presents two different sets of information that were derived from two separate analyses. The first three columns show the strength of support for feminist issues offered by the two groups: columns one and two show the mean

[12] Bengston and Black, "Intergenerational Relations and Continuities in Socialization."

[13] The exact wording was: "What are your reactions to the Contemporary Women's Movement?"

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strength of support (measured by a seven-point Likert scale) for each group separately; column three shows the absolute difference between the two groups. Column four addresses the association of age or generational membership with support for feminism. The tau c's reflect the degree to which feminist attitudes covary with the generational variable. Therefore, we can use these data to identify the generation that provides the most consistent support and to specify the issues that reflect the greatest generational differences.

Table 1 clearly indicates that the daughters evidence stronger support for feminist issues than do the mothers; their support extends to more issues (daughters support twelve and mothers support seven of the fifteen issues), and it also tends to be stronger on each issue. Daughters frequently opt for the strongest feminist position (Likert value of seven) on a given issue. In six instances the differences between mothers and daughters are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that five of these six issues relate in one way or another to concerns about sexuality, reproduction, or physical contact with the opposite sex. Thus, it appears from the means alone that not only are daughters more supportive of feminist positions, but that the areas in which the generations differ most are areas where the traditional social mores governing the conduct of women have been strictest.

TABLE 1

Support for Feminist Positions by Generation

	Daughters	*Mothers*	*Differences in Means (D-M)*	*Tau c*
*No such thing as rape**	6.80	6.64	.16	(NS)**
Birth control should be available	6.58	5.93	.65†	.32
Women should not work if husband works	6.42	6.45	−.03	(NS)
Sex drives equal	6.40	5.34	1.06†	.48
Approve of legal abortions	5.96	5.35	.61	(NS)
Admission to service academies	5.89	5.40	.49	(NS)
Women are discouraged	5.70	4.88	.82†	.28
Public day care	5.56	4.86	.70†	.25
Need to be more competent	5.47	5.47	.00	(NS)
Motherhood most fulfilling	5.33	4.62	.71†	.26
Women want careers	5.32	4.82	.50	(NS)
No contact sports for women	5.20	3.78	1.42†	.43
No emotional differences	4.93	4.36	.57	.20
Work or marriage as a goal	4.45	3.86	.59	.20
Affirmative action	4.19	4.29	−.10	(NS)

* The issues are listed in abbreviated form. For the full questions see Appendix. The strongly feminist position was assigned a score of seven and the strongly antifeminists were given a score of one.

† Statistically significant at .05 level.

** (NS) indicates that the differences between the group means and the relationships between feminist attitudes and generation were not statistically significant at the .05 level.

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An additional point must also be made here. The mothers in the sample should not be seen as antifeminist. Only on the issues of contact sports for women and the importance of marriage are the mothers' mean scores less than 4.0 (the value of the "ambivalent" category on our attitude scales). In general, the mothers as a group tend to be either ambivalent or slightly profeminist on the fifteen issues. It is therefore often merely a question of intensity, not of direction.

A review of the fourth column of Table 1 allows a closer examination of the potential for generational conflict. Listed are the tau c values for the eight issues on which generational and feminist attitudes covary in a statistically significant way. High tau c values can be interpreted in this table to indicate that the younger generation is markedly more feminist than the older group. Therefore, it is interesting to note that seven of the eight statistically significant relationships reflect on the stereotypical way in which American society traditionally views women. Specifically, these seven issues (sex drive, birth control, marriage, motherhood, day care, contact sports, and emotional disposition) focus upon personal or private concerns rather than on career-related questions or economic discrimination. In contrast, five of the seven issues on which there is little generational conflict focus on essentially economic issues, such as employment, job qualifications, and placement. Thus, there appears to be a division between the generations on some but not all issues, and the division seems to separate issues of private life-style from those that deal with career or economic benefits, issues that Foner labeled as material issues.

In sum, the issues of agreement—inasmuch as they deal with questions of career—seem to be the type of material issues that we had predicted would cut across age differences in uniting women for a joint goal: to obtain legal and economic equality of opportunity. The issues of widest disagreement, as we had also predicted, center around new views of what it means to be a woman and what women want out of life. The daughters do not value marriage and motherhood as highly as do the mothers, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say they do not see these institutions as the main avenue for self-fulfillment. Nor do the daughters see women as so very different from men, at least as far as sex drive and emotional differences are concerned. Ideas about sex, motherhood, and marriage are precisely the kind of ideas (Foner's ideal issues) people internalize relatively early in life and resist abandoning by the time they have reached middle age. This finding is congruent with our initial assumption that mothers, having acquired a stake in marriage and the family, would value these traditional institutions more than would their daughters.

These findings thus point to sex-stratum solidarity on career issues and to generational conflict on feminine-role issues. Overall concurrence is more prevalent than conflict, but even where concurrence is present, daughters tend to be more decisive or intense in their endorsement of feminist issues.[14] This also is in keep-

[14] Mothers differ from daughters in that they constitute a more heterogeneous population. This conclusion has been drawn from a comparison of the standard deviations of the two groups on the

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ing with our prediction that change generally is more discomforting to the older generation, who therefore accept change with more restraint than the younger generation, even when both generations stand to gain from it. Our data do not permit us to conclude that mothers and daughters are poised in conflict (that is, we cannot confirm the political generation hypothesis); nor can we say that they are in a state of consensus (the sex-stratum hypothesis). However, each hypothesis predicts well a different set of issues.

Lineage Comparisons

Our aggregate analysis informed us about similarities and differences in feminist orientations of the two generations. "This kind of comparison of aggregates," according to Allerbeck, Rosenmayr, and Jennings, "does not, however, tell us much about the actual relations of the members of both generations. The generations do not interact as aggregates."[15] To obtain information of familial (or rather mother-daughter) similarity we shall now turn to a lineage comparison.

Not one pair of mothers and daughters was in complete agreement on all issues. But two dyads came surprisingly close, agreeing eleven and twelve times, respectively. Conversely, only one dyad never found itself in agreement even on a single issue. The mean for the frequency with which the pairs could be found in perfect agreement was 4.6 issues out of a possible 15. In other words, perfect agreement could be found on slightly less than one-third of the issues.

If we relax our criteria for agreement or concordance to include all instances where mothers and daughters differed from each other by no more than an absolute value of 1 on the Likert scale, we find close agreement to be far more frequent. In that case the mean frequency of proximate agreement within the lineage pairs rises to 9.24. Depending on how we want to look at it, we could say that an overwhelming majority of pairs (78 percent) agree on half or more of the fifteen issues. Or, using more rigorous standards, we could say that fewer than half of the dyads (47 percent) are in proximate agreement on a wide range of feminist issues (ten or more). Seven percent of the dyads agree on twelve or more of the issues while another 7 percent agree on five or fewer issues. Thus, we can see that in trying to assess the frequency of agreement between members of the same lineage pair, the pattern is similar to that found in the aggregate. Both analyses show a pattern of similarity with the differences being a matter of degree rather than a matter of kind.

What are the *issues* on which we find lineage concordance most pronounced? The following five issues find over two-thirds of the mother-daughter pairs agreeing with each other (either completely or proximately): Rejecting the idea

fifteen issues. The mean standard deviation for the daughters is 1.38 while the mean for the mothers is 1.62.

[15] Klaus R. Allerbeck, Leopold Rosenmayr, and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Protest and Political Socialization: A Comparative Analysis in Five Countries" (Paper presented at the Tenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1976), p. 17.

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TABLE 2

Mother-Daughter Pairs Agreement on Feminist Issues

Issue	Percentage of Pairs Agreeing*	Percentage of Pairs in Moderate Disagreement	Percentage of Pairs in Sharp Conflict
No such thing as rape	90	7	2
Women should not work if their husbands do	88	12	0
Legalization of abortion	77	12	12
Availability of birth control	69	21	9
Sex drives are equal	67	21	12
Women want careers	62	31	7
Public Day Care	61	28	9
Admission to service academies	57	37	7
Need to be more competent	55	17	26
No emotional differences	55	31	15
Motherhood most fulfilling	52	31	17
Affirmative action	48	36	17
No contact sports for women	43	27	31
Work or marriage as a goal	45	43	12
Women are discouraged	31	24	43

* Percentages range from 97 to 101 percent due to rounding.

that there is no such thing as rape; rejecting the idea that married women should not work outside the home;[16] approving the legalization of abortion; agreeing that birth control should be readily available to unmarried female collegians; and agreeing that women's sex drives are as strong as males'. By contrast the issues on which we find the largest number of mothers and daughters to be in sharp disagreement (4 to 6 points difference) are the designation of contact sports as exclusively male, the idea that society is to blame if women have so far failed to achieve much, and the idea that women need to be more competent than men if they want to get ahead. On these issues some mother-daughter pairs not only disagree among themselves but disagree so sharply that they actually take opposing positions. Such intense conflict between mothers and daughters, however, is the exception rather than the rule (highest disagreement is on the question of societal discouragement where 43 percent of the dyads sharply disagree, contact sports 31 percent, and the need for female competence 26 percent). From the above it would seem that mothers and daughters do not necessarily hold the same view of society and its treatment of women. The daughters are clearly more critical. But mothers and daughters are in substantial agreement on questions that deal with female sexuality.

Interestingly enough the above instances of dyad agreements are the very

[16] In response to the statement: "Women whose husbands work should not work outside the home. That just takes jobs away from men."

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issues on which the aggregates found themselves in significant *disagreement*, with the exception of the question of rape and work outside the home. Apparently what separates the cohorts or aggregates is what unites the lineage pairs. How can we explain this seeming paradox?

The issues that unite dyads (with the exception of equal opportunity in employment) are not economic but highly personal, perhaps moral, ones. All these issues have, directly or indirectly, a strong sexual component, and they also touch on the question of what it means to be a woman. These may very well be the types of issues where the family is most influential. These may also be the issues on which mothers and daughters have engaged in many "bilateral negotiations" over an extended period of time. By contrast, questions of social discrimination, affirmative action, and careers for women may be much more indicative of the new *Zeitgeist* that attributes the current unequal situation to political and social forces of long-standing rather than to women themselves. Whereas daughters in their fresh contact with the *Zeitgeist* may respond much more positively to new political ideas, mothers may be more restrained. It may also be that issues such as these seem not to be as amenable to familial control as moral and sexual values and hence fewer bilateral negotiations may have taken place.

If this interpretation has any merit, we are faced with the paradoxical phenomenon where the two generations in the aggregate differ from each other in their response to the new definition of the female role but where individual dyads find themselves in substantial agreement on it. Such a conclusion at first seems to stand in sharp contrast to the findings of the literature on political socialization, since these studies have documented little intrafamilial similarity except for party identification.[17] It must be borne in mind, however, that most of the issues examined by these scholars were political ones rather than more basic values. Niemi, Ross, and Alexander in a secondary analysis of the 1968 Yankelovich study noted that mother-daughter correlations on sexual matters, though still modest, tended to be higher than those for most political questions (except, of course, party identification).[18] Studies of college student populations also have pointed to relatively close correspondence between parental and offspring values.[19] It would therefore seem that the family is an important value

[17] See for example, R. W. Connell, "Political Socialization in the American Family: The Evidence Re-examined," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (Fall 1972): 323–33; Kent L. Tedin, "The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974): 1579–92; M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *The Political Character of Adolescents—The Influence of Family and Schools* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Richard Niemi, *How Families' Members Perceive Each Other* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974).

[18] Richard G. Niemi, R. Danforth Ross, and Joseph Alexander, "The Similarity of Political Values of Parents and College-Age Youths," unpublished working paper.

[19] Richard Flacks, "The Liberated Generation: Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest," *Journal of Social Issues* 23 (July 1967): 52–75; Kenneth Keniston, "The Sources of Student Dissent," *Journal of Social Issues* 23 (July 1967): 108–37; David L. Westby and Richard G. Braungart, "The

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TABLE 3

Feminist Balance within Lineage Pair by Issue

Issue	*Mothers More Feminist*	*Daughters More Feminist*	*Exact Agreement*
Affirmative action	17	18	7
Need to be more competent	17	15	10
Women want careers	12	18	12
No contact sports for women	11	26	5
Admission to service academies	11	17	14
Women are discouraged	10	24	8
Public Day Care	10	22	10
Work or marriage as a goal	9	25	8
Motherhood most fulfilling	9	23	10
No emotional differences	7	24	11
Availability of birth control	7	20	15
Legalization of abortion	7	15	20
Women should not work if their husbands do	7	12	23
Sex drives are equal	4	28	10
No such thing as rape	3	9	30

socializer.[20] It would not be surprising if this should apply particularly to values on such private matters as sex, marriage, and family. Lineage and dyad data from a recent five-nation study parallel ours in many respects, yielding lineage similarity in spite of pronounced aggregate discrepancies.[21] The authors concluded that it "is clear that parents serve as positive referents much more frequently than as negative referents."[22] This held for the U.S. sample as well as the four European ones.

So far we have emphasized the extent of intradyad agreement. What, however, about the instances where such agreement does not prevail? Are the daughters then always more feminist? Not invariably so. Examining the forty-two pairs for feminism, we find that in over two-thirds of the cases (69 percent) the daughters are the more feminist members; in 26 percent of the cases the mothers are more feminist. However, in the dyads where mothers are more feminist than daughters, the differences between the two members of the lineage pair is less pronounced than in the dyads where the daughters are more feminist.

Alienation of Generations and Status Politics: Alternative Explanations of Student Political Activism," in *Learning About Politics*, ed. Roberta Sigel (New York: Random House, 1970). For a comment on the methodological limitations of these studies see Niemi, Ross, and Alexander, "The Similarity of Political Values of Parents and College-Age Youths."

[20] Vern L. Bengston, "Generation and Family Effects in Value Socialization," *American Sociological Review* 40 (June 1975): 3–26.

[21] Allerbeck, Rosenmayr, and Jennings, "Political Protest and Political Socialization."

[22] Ibid., p. 17.

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In the typical dyad, therefore, the daughter is not only more feminist than the mother, she is more feminist on many more issues than is the feminist mother in the atypical dyad (Table 3).

Conclusion

In general our findings point to the absence of a pronounced generation gap whether we examine the two generations as aggregates or as mother-daughter pairs. To be sure, disagreement exists between the generations, but it tends to be one of intensity rather than direction—mothers are more ambivalent or restrained in their endorsement of feminist issues than are daughters. This finding would tend to confirm our notion of the emergence of a new *Zeitgeist* to which mothers and daughters react similarly. The explanation might be that the contemporary women's movement articulated for them and made visible demands and discontents that they have long felt. Consensus tends to be particularly strong in the realm of material issues, that is, all those designed to obliterate legal, political, and economic discrimination of all women. These findings are consistent with the sex-stratum hypothesis.

However, areas of disagreement, and even sharp conflict, exist side by side with consensus. For the aggregates these areas center around the new role of women, her sexual nature, and her personal life; issues that society previously had labeled life-style or cultural issues. Here mothers tend to cling to the more traditional view of the importance of marriage and motherhood and of the essential differences between males and females with respect to emotions and sexual drives. Daughters reject the traditional view more readily. Findings in this area argue for the appearance of a new political generation as defined by Mannheim, who argued that new generations come about when young people make fresh contact "with the accumulated cultural heritage," begin to reflect on it and—finding it problematic—devise "a novel approach in assimilating, using and developing the proffered material."[23] This, according to Mannheim, is most likely to occur in youth "where life is new, formative forces are just coming into being and basic attitudes in the process of development can take advantage of the moulding power of new situations."[24] The formative process permits youth both "to forget that which is no longer useful and to covet that which has yet to be won."[25] The contemporary women's movement might be visualized as having supplied "the new contact, a reasoned system of thought," and "vehicles of formative tendencies and fundamental integrative attitudes" that furnish the younger generation "with a set of collective strivings."[26] By raising the consciousness of young women as they make their first adult encounters (the fresh

[23] Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, p. 293.
[24] Ibid., p. 296.
[25] Ibid., p. 294.
[26] Ibid., p. 305.

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contacts) with our culture's sexual biases, the women's movement might have given rise to a new political generation, the generation of feminists.

Before accepting a political generation point of view, we must, however, point to a counter-indicative finding. Although we found aggregate generational differences on sexual matters, we did not observe them within dyads. Lineage congruence was rather pronounced, suggesting much effective intrafamilial (or intralineage) socialization. The discrepancy between aggregate and lineage findings should alert us to the need of not drawing generational conclusions from an examination of one or the other alone. "Any inference from aggregate differences to families," note Allerbeck, Rosenmayr, and Jennings, "is likely to be misleading. There is no necessary, clear-cut inference about agreement or conflict in families on the basis of aggregate similarities or differences alone."[27] Nor are we entitled to make inferences about generations from lineage studies alone. It is quite possible that some individual family units change ahead of widespread social changes, perhaps in response to the socialization of the older by the younger, while others resist them longer than the bulk of society.[28] Whereas the new cohorts entering the political arena may discard or modify old values and thereby create some intergenerational tension, individual families may well remain untouched by the social turmoil around them.

> The extent to which the problem of younger generations are reflected back upon the older one becomes greater in the measure that the dynamism of society increases. Static conditions make for attitudes of piety—the younger generation tends to adapt itself to the older. . . . With the strengthening of the social dynamic, however, the older generation becomes increasingly receptive to influence from the younger.[29]

The chances for such receptivity are vastly enhanced, we would suggest, when the influence of the younger is also in the self-interest of the older females who stand to benefit from the changes advocated by the younger generation. It is our explanation for the mutedness of the conflict over feminist issues.

Given that such conflict seems to revolve around the specific nature of the issue under discussion, we conclude that neither hypothesis can fully explain the reaction to the contemporary women's movement on the part of educated women. Each hypothesis explains some aspect of it. The stratum hypothesis best explains reactions to material issues where common feminine interests are at stake and conflict with traditional values is minimal.[30] The generational hypothesis seems to have more explanatory power than the stratum theory

[27] Allerbeck, Rosenmayr, and Jennings, "Political Protest and Political Socialization," p. 17.

[28] Too often this reverse socialization process is overlooked because we tend to focus on the transmission from the older to the younger.

[29] Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, p. 302.

[30] One could, of course, assert that even material discrimination against women (in the labor force, in politics) is also part of our tradition. It must, however, be borne in mind that this tradition coexists with another American tradition, that of equal opportunity. This may well be one reason why the women's movement has made relatively rapid strides in the United States whereas it has failed to do so in certain other Western democracies, such as Switzerland and West Germany.

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when traditional values and questions of life-style are at stake; there the younger generation finds change more acceptable. Findings such as these point to the complexities and subtleties involved in the process of social change and to the difficulties in formulating theories to explain them adequately.*

Appendix

The full wording of each attitudinal question used in the analysis is listed below.

A. The measure of support for the women's movement gauged by the response to the question:
What are your reactions to the contemporary women's movement?

B. The statements used to measure attitudes on the feminist issues are listed here. These statements were worded in such a way as to avoid the problem of response set. However, those marked with a dagger (†) were recoded to convert all the feminist responses into agree responses.

There is much talk today about what women are like and what they want. Below are some statements that are frequently made. Please circle the extent to which you agree or disagree with each.

—The ultimate goal for most women is still marriage more than a career.†
—If fewer women than men have achieved success, it is because society has discouraged them from achieving.
—Women's sexual drive is not as strong as men's.†
—There are great emotional differences between men and women.†
—Women want a career just as much as do men.
—For a woman to reach a position of considerable responsibility, she has to be more competent and work harder than most men.
—There is no such thing as rape. Most raped women have invited the attack either consciously or unconsciously.†
—Motherhood is the greatest form of self-fulfillment for the normal woman.†
—Women whose husbands work should not work outside the home. That just takes jobs away from men.†
—Publicly financed Day Care Centers to enable women to work while raising a family.
—The Supreme Court's decision to legalize abortions.
—Admission of women to service academies, such as police and firemen academies, West Point, Annapolis, etc.
—Making birth control information and contraceptives available to unmarried college students.
—Affirmative action for women (insisting that employers give preference in hiring to qualified women).
—Designation of contact sports (football, LaCrosse, etc.) as exclusively male sports.†

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House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation

ROBERT STRUBLE, JR.

The two centuries since the American Revolution have seen the eclipse in Congress of a long-standing principle of government. Under the Articles of Confederation maximum congressional service was three years in six, in order, argued Thomas Jefferson, "to prevent every danger which might arise to American freedom by continuing too long in office the members of the Continental Congress."[1]

After 1789 rotation in the legislative branch was no longer obligatory by law. In practice, however, turnover continued so sweeping that, as late as the nation's centennial year, members of the U.S. House of Representatives averaged less than one prior term in that chamber.[2]

During the twentieth century the constitutional system of biennial elections has not prevented the House from rivaling in tenure both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Senate.[3] Average tenures in the three bodies since World War II

[1] Articles of Confederation, Article V; see Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), pp. 126, 130, 133–34; and Thomas Jefferson, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian F. Boyd et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950–), 1:411.

[2] Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), pp. 296–97, Table 46. From 1789 to 1876 the typical election gave upwards of half the House to newcomers. The election of 1882 was the last in history to put into the House more newcomers than incumbents.

[3] Senators are defeated with about twice the frequency per election as congressmen. The average percentage of incumbent candidates defeated in general elections between 1914 and 1976 outside the South was 27 percent for the Senate and 12 percent for the House. In 1978 the rate was, Senate, 44 percent; House, 6 percent. See footnote 19 on data sources.

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are as follows: Supreme Court, 10.9 years; Senate, 10.4 years; House, 10.2 years.[4]

A number of the factors contributing to House turnover have been assessed already in political science journals. An emphasis has been on relatively recent variables, such as vanishing marginals, declining party competitiveness since 1950, modern advantages of incumbency, and the congressman's increasing orientation to bureaucratic tasks.[5]

As for the ascendancy of dissimilar norms in past generations, opinions and principles are obscure influences to measure. Yet they lie within the sphere of political science, for conceptual precepts secure obedience both within the governmental hierarchy and among the citizenry. "Ideas are, in truth, forces."[6]

One such force was the principle of rotation in office. George Mason of Virginia, one of the more influential founders, held that "nothing is so essential to the preservation of a republican government as a periodic rotation."[7] This point of view was popular in the United States for a century or more and ought not to be ignored for its direct effect on Congress, or conversely for the absence of its impetus when, as today, the body politic attributes more utility to tenure.

A difficulty for scholars has been the paucity of data on congressional elections that antedate the 1950s. Although two studies have compiled data on percentage of first-termers per House, as well as average tenure per Congress since 1789,[8] neither statistic reveals the chief components in turnover—that is, withdrawal from contention before the general elections, and defeats of incumbents at the polls.

[4] Compiled from U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Printing, *Congressional Directory*, 79 to 94 Congs., 2d sess., and in part from Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., *The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969*, 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House, 1969), 4:3232–35.

[5] Four studies not cited elsewhere in this article and that refer to additional works are: David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity* 6 (Spring 1974): 295–317; John A. Ferejohn, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 71 (March 1977): 166–76; Morris P. Fiorina, "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It," *American Political Science Review* 71 (March 1977): 177–81; and Candice J. Nelson, "The Effect of Incumbency on Voting in Congressional Elections, 1964–1974," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Winter 1978–79): 665–678.

[6] Quotation from Henry James, *Charles W. Eliot*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), 1:235. On ideas and their effect on history see, Allan Nevins, *The Gateway to History*, rev. pbk. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 261–62. See also Keynes's concluding notes elaborating on the theme that "the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas" (John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money* [New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936], pp. 383–84).

[7] From Mason's address recorded in Jonathan Eliot, ed., *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on Adoption of the Federal Constitution*, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1836), 3:485.

[8] Rice, *Quantitative Methods*, pp. 296–97; for an update of Rice's study, see Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968): 146, Tables 1 and 2; Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rhode, and Peter Wissel, "Historical Change in House Turnover," *Congress in Change*, ed. Norman J. Ornstein (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 26.

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Examination of these components became practical after the publication in 1975 of *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections*. Employing this source of raw data in 1977, Samuel Kernell's useful compilations of preelection withdrawals concentrated on five selected decades, so chosen chronologically as to confine his quantitative analysis to the downward side of the nineteenth-century trend in withdrawals.[9] The earlier rising portion of the trend which Kernall did not analyze, however, is indispensable to a balanced study of rotation. Nor did Kernell afford much attention to electoral defeats, which relate to public opinion on rotation more directly than withdrawals.

This article takes a comprehensive approach and breaks down the House turnover into withdrawals of incumbents, and percentage of incumbents defeated at the polls, during the entire century and a half, from 1824 to 1976. For the purposes of this article turnover is defined simply as change in House membership for any reason, public or private, whereas rotation implies departure of incumbent congressmen because of political or social aversion to long tenure in office.

This study will not be confined to a historical enforcement of rotation in constant and mechanistic ways, such as Kernell's investigation of strict two-term customs in nominating conventions. Instead, rotation is here defined as the turnover resulting from an idea, a normative judgment, an evaluation—specifically the negative evaluation in America of congressional careerism. This sociopolitical bias reinforced whatever political obstacles a post-1789 incumbent faced and represented a debit in the equation for elective careers. The debit was potentially decisive at various stages of an individual's career and in a number of ways: for example, through peer group pressures, in the nominating conventions, or at the polls.

Of course evidence of the influence of an idea or principle must necessarily be circumstantial, in that the multitude of nineteenth-century incumbents, nominators, and voters cannot be surveyed as to motives. Yet insofar as the wax and wane of the popularity of rotation—as indicated by testimonial evidence such as contemporary books, newspapers, and letters—meshes chronologically with the quantitative data, one has to think that so fundamental a reevaluation by the body politic as to whether tenure is an asset or a liability must indeed have been a significant factor in contemporaneous renominations and reelections.

Rotation before 1824

A brief look at rotation in office during the initial half-century of independence will serve to preface and put into perspective the analysis of rotation norms after 1824.

For some fifteen years until the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, America

[9] Samuel Kernell, "Toward Understanding 19th Century Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (November 1977): 669–93.

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was a debating ground as to governmental forms. The educated class studied ancient constitutions and cited them as relevant to the American experiment. Prior to the first century B.C., the *polis* generally rotated its officials annually; notable were Athens, Sparta, and republican Rome.[10] Also the Middle Ages and Italian Renaissance saw a number of city-states in northern Italy employ rotation extensively in the highest political offices. Florence did so for centuries, with interludes, and Venice for more than 600 years without interruption until the Napoleonic conquest. Americans studied also the theory behind rotation in office, as articulated during antiquity by Aristotle, and in the early modern period by James Harrington, the author of *Oceania*.[11]

In January, 1776, John Adams assessed American opinion on the eve of Independence:

> A rotation of all offices, as well as of representatives and counsellors, has many advocates, and is contended for with many plausible arguments. . . . These persons may be allowed to serve for three years, and then be excluded three years, or for any longer or shorter term.[12]

By 1787 the triennial rotation of the Continental Congress had been six years in force under the Articles of Confederation. When Governor Edmund Randolph read the Virginia Plan during the second week of the Constitutional Convention, it provided for exit, after a single term, of all incumbents in the lower chamber of the national legislature. But during the fourth week the convention rejected the ban on consecutive terms.[13] No doubt, the mandatory rotation had been discredited somewhat by association with the Confederation. The convention delegates defeated also the various plans to ban or restrict reelection in the presidency.

Efforts toward a rotation amendment continued for a year or two after the convention of 1787. Leading advocates included George Mason, Thomas Jeffer-

[10] A few sources on rotation practices of antiquity include, Artistotle, *The Athenian Constitution* 4.3, 62.3, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard-University Press, 1935), pp. 21, 171; Charles Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 153, 237–44; A. H. M. Jones, *Sparta* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 26; Livy, *From the Founding of the City* 7.42.2, 10.13.8, trans. B. O. Foster, Loeb Classical Library, 13 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924), 3:513, 4:405; Leon Pol Homo, *Roman Political Institutions from City to State* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), pp. 160–61.

[11] On the Italian city-states and rotation see for example, Ferdinand Schevill, *History of Florence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936), pp. 67, 154, 162, 209–10; Bella Duffy, *The Tuscan Republics* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898), p. 105; Frederick C. Lane, *Venice, A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 96–97, 100, 116, 251, 257, 392, 428–29. Philosophical apologies for rotation include, Aristotle, *The Politics* 3.4.5–7, 6.1.6–8, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), pp. 203, 205, 489, 491; James Harrington, *The Oceania and Other Works. . . .* ed. John Toland (London: A. Millar, 1737), pp. 54–57, 124–25, 140, 161, 303–23, 504, 523, 623–24, 629, 632.

[12] John Adams, *The Life and Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851), 4:197–98.

[13] Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), 1:20, resolution 4, and 1:210, 217, 221.

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son, and Richard Henry Lee.[14] Their insistence on constitutional limitation of tenure proved fruitless, but the philosophical objections to perpetuity in office continued well into the future and influenced extraconstitutional practice.

For the years 1789 to 1823, good data on withdrawals and electoral defeats are not available, and no quantitative analysis of rotation in that generation will be attempted here. James Young's *The Washington Community, 1800–1828* is an important source for the general distrust of power in that period.[15] Also some normative views before 1824 are illustrative. According to one early congressman, continuous reelections were perilous because in time "the very best men among us become more or less impressed with opinions not comformable to that of the people."[16] An 1822 editorial in the influential *Niles Weekly Register* supports this reasoning, because in politics "the mind gradually becomes callous of wrong."[17] In the same year an article in the *Richmond Enquirer*, entitled "Rotation in Office," argues that lengthy tenure in Congress promotes usurpation of power from the states and the people; and the article contends that the "long cherished" principle of rotation has been impressed on the republican mind "by a kind of intuitive impulse, unassailable to argument or authority."[18]

Incumbent Defeats in General Elections, 1824–1976

The rotation impulse—for some voters intuitive, for others theoretically developed—is implied in the electoral defeats after 1824. The basic measure will be the percentage of incumbent congressmen standing for reelection who lose at the polls. The analytical procedure will be to present indications of the influence of rotation on nineteenth-century voting patterns, and then to advance further evidence against two plausible objections. The general thesis is that the relatively high levels of incumbent defeats before the twentieth century, especially for the more senior incumbents, and the lower loss rates since, are related to the wax and wane of the rotation principle as a conceptual force.

Some quantitative evidence is summarized in Table 1.[19] In terms of time-series data, changing attitudes toward long tenure in office should logically have the

[14] Eliot, *Debates*, 3:485; Thomas Jefferson, *Papers*, 12:440 and 13:490; Richard Henry Lee, *An additional number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican* (1788; reprint ed., Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1962), pp. 94–97.

[15] James S. Young, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 51–52, 55–57, 59–61, 64, 145.

[16] Hezekia Niles, "Rotation in Office," *Niles Weekly Register* 23, 16 November 1822, p. 162. Niles says the quotation in text was made to him "several years ago at Washington," by a "*republican* member of congress."

[17] Ibid. The quotation in the text is the observation of Niles himself.

[18] *Richmond Enquirer*, 8 November 1822, p. 3.

[19] Sources for Tables 1–3, Figure 1, and footnote 3: *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the Congress of the United States*, 1st ed., ed. William B. Dickinson, Jr. et al. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1971), pp. 2a–175a; *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections*, ed. Robert A. Diamond et al. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1975), pp. 543–880

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TABLE 1

Percentage of Incumbent Candidates Defeated in House General Elections (South excluded)

	Average percentage defeated		
	Freshmen	*2+ Termers*	*Ratio:*
1824-37	20	19	1.1 to 1
1838-65	30	23	1.3 to 1
1866-96	25	18	1.4 to 1
1898-1932	23	11	2.1 to 1
1934-48	28	11	2.5 to 1
1950-60	20	5.4	3.7 to 1
1962-76	12	5.6	2.1 to 1

Source: See footnote 19.

least effect on freshmen defeats. A freshman seeking reelection would be less likely than a sophomore, for example, to gain or lose votes from comparison with the nonincumbent challenger's newcomer status. And indeed the breakdown of the incumbent defeats into freshmen vis-à-vis the more senior congressmen, shows relatively moderate time-series fluctuations in the defeat rates for freshmen (Table 1). During the period 1824–1960, average defeats of freshmen incumbents stay between 20 percent and 30 percent inclusive, with as recent a period as 1934–48 having a freshmen defeat rate of 28 percent.[20] Only since 1960 has the long-term rate for freshmen fallen below 20 percent.

Using the relatively constant freshmen rate as a reference point in time series, the rest of the incumbent field (hereafter signified "2+ termers" for sophomores

(House), pp. 483–509 (Senate); *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 32 (13 July 1974):1815, and November postelection issues since 1956; *Notable Names in American History* (Clifton, N.J.: James T. White & Co., 1973), pp. 70–266; U.S., Congress, House, Document no. 607, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, 1774–1949, and also the 1774–1971 issue, U.S., Congress, Senate, Document no. 92–8, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Printing, *Congressional Directory*, 60 to 95 Congs., 1st sess.

Defeated incumbents are losers listed in the *Guide to U.S. Elections* who had any service at all in the expiring House. Winners similarly. Withdrawals are computed by adding the incumbent winners and losers, and subtracting the total from the number of seats in the expiring House. I delete Secession from the withdrawal data for 1860–61.

The reader will note the exclusion from Tables 1 and 2 of defeat rates for Southern congressmen. The only portions of the data for which the percentage of defeats in the South equals or exceeds that of the rest of the nation are the years 1824–37 and 1866–76 (Reconstruction). One-party dominance shifted the action to the nominating stage after Reconstruction, and eventually reduced general election defeats in the South to the vicinity of zero percent. The inclusion of such data only distorts the picture of what is taking place in the meaningful general elections, and for the sake of uniformity and simplicity the eleven states of the Secession are excluded from the entirety of the 1824–1976 analysis of defeats.

[20] The range between 20 percent and 30 percent in freshmen defeats represents the long-term average. The biennial fluctuations for the period 1824–1960 are much wider, of course, ranging from 10 percent to 51 percent, as voters reacted to short-term issues.

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and up) can be compared historically for shifting voter preferences concerning tenure. The effect of voter adherence to rotation norms should be to narrow the gap between the "ceiling" defeat rate of freshmen and the rate for 2+ termers. Conversely when rotation declines and voters attribute more value to experience, the spread between freshmen and 2+ termers should widen.

As indicated by the ratios in Table 1, the gap as of the first third of the twentieth century reached a then record width, and continued further to widen until 1960. If, as suggested by these data, the about-face in public thinking took place on the eve of the turn of the century, it would tentatively seem that the movement for a professional civil service, and thus the nation's clear rejection of rotation in appointive federal office after 1883, was the vanguard by not many years of the equivalent trend for the office of congressman.

That the great decline of the popularity of rotation among voters took place shortly before 1900 is consistent with the watershed character of the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Basic shifts in the American mode of life included urbanization, the industrial revolution, and the end of the frontier.[21] These fundamental changes accelerated tremendously from 1880 to 1900 and, accompanied by the economic and political shocks of 1893–96, created a political climate very different than the milieu in which rotation had flourished.

The preliminary conclusions as concerns general elections are: After 1824 public favor for rotation in office—as a defined principle or simply an intuitive impulse to throw the rascals out—worked to retard what superiority in polling strength 2+ termers enjoyed as compared to freshmen congressmen. Near 1900 a countertrend in public evaluation of long tenure in office promoted substantially wider spreads in reelection rates between freshmen and 2+ termers.

One might object that the 2+ field has aged. From 1838 to 1865 only 17 percent of the 2+ candidates consisted of 4+ termers, as compared with 50 percent from 1906 to 1932. By the period 1950–76 two-thirds of the 2+ field consisted of 4+ termers. This aging of the nonfreshmen might be more significant than shifting voter preference as a factor in the declining 2+ termer defeat rate.

In terms of political advantage at the polls, however, the accumulation of incumbency yields minimal rates of return after the sophomore term. The breakdown of 2+ data into rates for 2, 3, and 4+ termers in Table 2 reveals that twentieth-century incumbents accrue most of their polling power during the second term. Between 1906 and 1960 the 4+ termers performed within two percentage points of sophomores.

In addition, time-series comparisons within the respective classes—within the middle columns in Table 2—where accumulation of tenure is equal over time, show a chronological decline that is quite large. The downward trend would seem to derive from the electorate's changing evaluation of the tenure for the class in question. Sophomores average 25 percent defeats about mid-nineteenth

[21] Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1953), chap. 1. This chapter is a reprint of a paper presented by Turner to the American Historical Association, 1893.

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TABLE 2

Percentage of Incumbent Candidates Defeated in House General Elections (South excluded)

	Terms served by incumbents			
	1	*2*	*3*	*4+*
1838-65	30	25	19	19
1906-32	24	13	13	11
1934-48	28	10	13	10
1950-60	20	8	3	5
1962-76	12	9	5	5

Source: See footnote 19.

century and 8 percent defeats near mid-twentieth century. The three-termers drop from 19 percent to 3 percent during the same period.

The continuing decline of defeats during the twentieth century is not of course due to the abandonment of antitenure attitudes as such, for rotation norms were disregarded early in the century. As the popularity of rotation gradually terminated about 1900, the popularity of the principle of expertise gradually accrued. The negation of sociopolitical biases against careerism meant that long tenure was tolerable, not that it was at once affirmed enthusiastically in 1900. Increasingly in the twentieth century, demand for professionalism pervaded virtually every occupational field, including politics, which naturally reflected in voter preferences, with steady increases until 1960 in rates of reelection for 2, 3, and 4+ termers.

One might also object that the data can be explained better in terms of party competitiveness. In competitive eras, freshmen would be distributed relatively evenly among the congressional districts. But when party competitiveness declined, an ever growing number of safe districts would produce safe careers, while those districts that remained competitive would contain increasing proportions of freshmen. Thus the gap would widen in defeat rates between freshmen and senior incumbents.

On the contrary, however, among every class of incumbents, nineteenth-century withdrawals were numerous; thus freshmen were well represented, as an aftermath of seniors withdrawing, even in districts that had little party turnover. It is noteworthy that the period 1824 to 1834, one of the most sectionalist eras ever, saw the electoral defeat rates virtually identical for freshmen and 2+ termers.

Moreover, the period 1934 to 1948, described by E.E. Schattschneider as competitive in all the states outside the South,[22] saw the gap in defeat rates between freshmen and 2+ termers continue to widen, relative to the earlier gap during

[22] E. E. Schattschneider, "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government," in *Modern Political Parties*, ed. Sigmund Neumann (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 208; Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," in *The American Party*

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the sectionalist fourth-party system. Indeed the rate for three-termers remained the same as during the quarter century prior, and sophomores actually incurred defeats at a lower rate than before; yet the freshmen defeat rate rose substantially in response to the more competitive situation. The party competitiveness thesis does not explain why the rate for 2+ termers failed to respond upward as well. Changing voting habits do explain it: the electorate's increasing preference for 2+ term tenure was strong enough to cancel out the conducement to defeats inherent in party competitiveness.

The long-term decline in the defeat rates for 2, 3, and 4+ termers spans four-party systems; it is too consistently in decline to derive only from competitiveness, which fluctuates up and down more than once over the same period.

To sum up, in nineteenth-century House elections, the rotation idea was influential enough in public thinking not to quash but certainly to retard the advantage accruing to the accumulation of incumbency. The Northern electorate of 1838–65 defeated 4+ termers at the relatively high rate of 19 percent (more frequently than twentieth-century voters have turned out sophomores—11 percent). Popular loyalty to the principle of rotation never demanded that nineteenth-century voters defeat a majority of the incumbent candidates; so many congressmen withdrew at the nomination stage that rapid turnover in the House was a certainty, even had the voters reelected every incumbent on the ballot. The rotation principle was a significant check to reelection if it simply dulled or nullified the natural weapon of every incumbent—his propaganda appeal on the basis of experience in Congress.

That the 4+ termer in the mid-nineteenth century enjoyed a moderately better chance at the polls than the freshmen or sophomore incumbents of his day can be attributed in part to the selectivity at the nominating stage, where to survive for four terms must have required exceptional skill in the political arena.[23] A major reason the 4+ termer did somewhat better in general elections was apparently that it took shrewder politicians just to achieve four renominations.

Finally, it is safe to say that especially during the era from the second Adams to Appomattox, 1824–65, the occupancy of a seat in Congress for several terms did not greatly impress voters. The incumbent's experience in the House was disregarded by many citizens, was feared by others as conducive to an aristocracy of officeholders,[24] or was deemed noxious for the incumbents themselves because "power is too apt to turn the head."[25]

Systems, 2d ed., eds. William Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 302.

[23] So few congressmen won four renominations during the years 1838–65 that the incumbent candidates with four successive terms or more averaged a mere 2.9 percent of their expiring House memberships.

[24] On the idea that prolongation in office leads to an aristocracy of officeholders, see James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 3d ed., 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1907), 2:241; Edwin L. Godkin, in *Cyclopaedia of Political Science*, ed. John J. Laylor, 3 vols. (New York: Charles E. Merrill & Co., 1890), 3:19.

[25] *Richmond Enquirer*, 12 November 1822, p. 3.

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FIGURE 1

Withdrawal as Component of House Turnover



Source: See footnote 19.

Withdrawals, 1824–1976

Withdrawal of incumbents prior to the general elections was much the largest component in House turnover. For the seven decades 1824–96, an average of 35 percent of the House withdrew from the running before the general elections, or about two-thirds of the average turnover from all causes (51 percent). Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 1, the trend in withdrawals was steeply up between 1824 and mid-century, was erratic for a period of fourteen years that included the Civil War, and was sharply down between 1868 and 1898—a trend that matches chronologically the wax and wane of the spoils form of rotation introduced by the Jacksonians.

In 1829, in his first address to Congress, President Andrew Jackson declared that rotation in office "constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed."[26] The seventh president went on during his eight years in office to enforce an unprecedented turnover in the executive bureaucracy. Following this extension of the spoils system to the federal level came a fundamental change in how Americans viewed U.S. government. For more than half a century, the idea that federal offices were spoils to be spread among the party faithful had a significant effect not only on appointive places, but also on nominations for the elective seats in Congress.

During the years after Jackson, 1838–53, the rate of withdrawal in non-Southern states averaged 45 percent among freshmen congressmen, 61 percent

[26] James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 10 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896–99), 2:448–49.

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among sophomores, and 42 percent among 3+ termers. The configuration by class in rates of withdrawal continues to show a bias toward the sophomores through the 1890s according to Kernell's figures.[27] In volume, the great bulk of the withdrawals at mid-century accrued to the freshmen, as by far the largest class in the House.

The role of rotation in promoting these withdrawals is touched upon by the *New York Statesman* in 1824, which ascribes many or "perhaps most" of the turnover in the state's congressional delegation to "an arrangement, by which it is stipulated, that, after a given time, one aspirant for office is to succeed another."[28]

Such arrangements took principally two forms during the nineteenth century: agreements between competitors in a nominating convention that the incumbent, normally after one or two terms of service, shall then retire and aid the nomination of his nearest rival; and a custom known as the claim of locality, whereby the different geographical sections of the congressional district furnished the party's candidate in turn.[29] The former case, agreements between competitors, found its most favorable milieu in the district conventions, which became increasingly standard nominating machinery after the Jacksonian revolution began. More than in state legislative caucuses or statewide conventions, the local leaders in district conventions held sway and could reach and enforce agreements to pass the seat around among themselves.

A case in point was the seventh congressional district in Illinois, where Abraham Lincoln resided, and where the Whigs adopted the conventions system in 1843. Lincoln's associates, Nicolay and Hay, portray the setting: 'The Sangammon district was the one which the Whigs of Illinois had apparently the best prospect of carrying, and it was full of able and ambitious men, who were nominated successively for the only place which gave them the opportunity of playing a part in the national theatre at Washington."[30]

In 1846 a meeting by the Whigs of the Athens precinct is notable for moving the nomination of Lincoln with the following whereas clause: "our present Representative, Hon. E. D. Baker, recognizing the principle of 'rotation in office,' has generously declined a reelection."[31] However, the predecessor of Baker proved less cooperative.[32] Former Representative Hardin declared his candidacy

[27] Kernell, "Ambition, Competition, and Rotation," p. 687, Figure 2.

[28] Quoted in *Niles Weekly Register* 27, 4 December 1824, p. 217.

[29] Frederick W. Dallinger, *Nominations for Elective Office in the United States* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), pp. 88–89; Laurence N. Powell, "Rejected Republican Incumbents in the 1866 Congressional Nominating Conventions," *Civil War History* 19 (September 1973): 228–33.

[30] John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, 10 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1890), 1:289.

[31] *Lacon Illinois Gazette*, 7 February 1846, p. 2.

[32] In 1843 the Whigs of the seventh (Sangammon) district nominated General John Hardin for Congress. Also the convention approved, nineteen to fourteen, delegate Abraham Lincoln's motion limiting Hardin to a single term and designating Edward D. Baker as the Whig candidate for the subsequent term. See *Lacon Illinois Gazette*, 14 February 1846, p. 2.

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against Lincoln, waged a hot contest, and moved Lincoln to remind Hardin by letter of an agreement three years earlier, between themselves and Baker, that none of the three was to be a candidate out of his turn.[33] Hardin soon withdrew his candidacy,[34] and in the district convention Lincoln's nomination was without opposition.[35]

Lincoln exited the House by the same principle. During the first year of his single term in Congress, he wrote his law partner that political support notwithstanding, he would not run for reelection, excepting no other Whig came forward, because "to enter myself as a competitor of another, or to authorize anyone so to enter me, is what my word and honor forbid."[36] The Whig nomination went in 1848 to Steven Logan, who had nominated Lincoln in the previous district convention.[37]

Geographic rotation, or the claim of locality, operated somewhat differently from the rotation among rivals like Baker, Lincoln, and Logan, who all resided in the city of Springfield. As Nicolay and Hay observed with some exaggeration: "To ask in a nominating convention who is best qualified for service in Congress is always regarded as an impertinence; but the question 'what county in the district has had the Congressman oftenest' is always considered in order."[38] Also an article in the *Christian Examiner*, September 1869, states that, "there is a constant temptation, in a district made up of an aggregation of counties or towns, to pass the offices round from town to town, or county, to another; each claiming in its turn the honor of furnishing the member."[39] In 1866 just such a system characterized New York State according to Horace Greeley.[40]

The chronology of the gradual eclipse of nomination rotation is perhaps best seen in the declining trend line for withdrawals (Figure 1) which is steepest for the thirty-year period, 1868 to 1898. Testimonial evidence is also indicative. Rotation in the House was still strong enough when James Bryce visited America in the 1870s and 1880s that he found: "So far from its being, as in England, a reason for re-electing a man that he has been a member already, it is a reason for passing him by, and giving somebody else a turn."[41] And as late as July, 1896, Frederick W. Dallinger wrote that intraparty agreements among

[33] See letter to John Hardin, 7 February 1846, in Abraham Lincoln, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler, 10 vols. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 1:361.

[34] *Lacon Illinois Gazette*, 28 February 1846, p. 2.

[35] Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, 1:245.

[36] See letter to William Herndon, 8 January 1848, in Basler, ed., *Works of Lincoln*, 1:430–31.

[37] Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, 1:245.

[38] Ibid., 1:290.

[39] W. F. Allen, 'The Caucus System In the United States," *The Christian Examiner* 87, September 1869, p. 148.

[40] Powell, "Rejected Republican Incumbents," p. 236, n. 109.

[41] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1891), 1:192. Please note that in the third edition (1907) the phrase "as in England" is omitted (1:195–96).

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rivals to rotate the nomination occurred "often," while in other districts geographic rotation was "customary."[42] It was, however, but the remnants of these practices that gave way to direct primaries between 1903 and 1915.[43]

The Theory of Withdrawals

A separate aspect of nomination rotation was the normative justification, that is, the principle, or at least the appearance of principle, to embellish the practice. As rotation conceptually understood was, according to Bryce, the philosophical adjunct without which the country would never have let the politicians rivet the spoils system to the civil service,[44] so did the same philosophy lift the intraparty machinations for sharing seats in Congress to a level of respectability impossible if the practice were unadorned.

Until the rise of the Jacksonians, the principle of rotation at the federal level was primarily limited to the connotation it had held since the Revolution—that of the antipower attitudes documented in chapter three of James Young's *Washington Community*. The tendency to look askance at political power was so ingrained in American culture, says Young, that even the officeholders themselves perceived their occupations in a disparaging light.[45] A widespread conviction, as articulated by James Fenimore Cooper in 1838, viewed "contact with the affairs of state [as] one of the most corrupting of the influences to which men are exposed."[46] Half a century earlier the president of the Continental Congress, R. H. Lee, had written to Samuel Adams: "The fact is, that power poisons the mind of its possessor."[47]

The Jacksonians mixed this original connotation to rotation with an entirely new meaning. For both major parties rotation in office came to embrace the doctrine of taking turns in the distribution of prizes. More than once in his quest for the Whig nomination to Congress, Lincoln employed the slogan, "turnabout is fair play."[48] By fair play he referred not to the antipower notions described by Young but to the contest for the prize of office.[49]

During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the antipathy to power (which was held to be in the best interests of the country) and the normative in-

[42] Dallinger, *Nominations*, pp. 88–89.

[43] C. E. Merriam and L. Overacker, *Primary Elections* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61–63.

[44] Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 3d ed., 2:133.

[45] Young, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828*, pp. 51–52, 59–61, 64, 145.

[46] James Fenimore Cooper, *The American Democrat* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), p. 52.

[47] Letter dated 14 March 1785, in Richard Henry Lee, *The Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, ed. James C. Ballagh, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914), 2:344.

[48] Letter to N. J. Rockwell, 21 January 1846, in Basler, ed., *Works of Lincoln*, 1:359, 361.

[49] By Lincoln's time the spoils principle had become so acceptable to Whigs as well as the Democrats that a Whig writer could boldly oppose the nomination of a fellow Whig and former congressman on the following grounds: "we maintain that it is Mr. Lincoln's turn to 'rotate' into congress, that his 'turn' has come" (*Lacon Illinois Gazette*, 14 February 1846, p. 2).

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novations of the Jacksonians (which played to the self-interest of local leaders) were coupled under one philosophical heading called rotation in office. Apparently the combination of connotations and motives redoubled the impetus to nomination rotation and promoted a steep rise in incumbent withdrawals. By mid-century, close to half the House membership per term agreed, either voluntarily or by party push, not to seek reelection.

That the principle of rotation was the deciding factor or at least a major contributor to the rise in withdrawals is yet more credible in that the post-bellum decline in the popularity of the spoils principle paralleled the downward trend in the withdrawal rate. According to Carl Russell Fish, the decline of rotation in the civil service dates from 1865 when President Lincoln refused to enforce rotation in the appointive offices under his jurisdiction.[50] Later that year Representative Thomas Allen Jenckes introduced his first civil service reform bill, which the House would vote down by a narrow margin. In defeat the Jenckes reform bill became the springboard of a great national debate. The 1872 Democratic party platform heralded civil service reform as "one of the most pressing necessities of the hour," while the Republican platform of the same year advocated reforms to "make honesty, efficiency and fidelity the essential qualifications for public positions, without practically creating a life-tenure of office."[51] During the years 1872–92, every platform of the two major parties contained strong planks for civil service reform. The Republican proviso against a life tenure of office vanished after 1872. Meanwhile newspapers and periodicals were replete with articles and editorials supporting the reformers from Jenckes onward. The post-bellum generation underwent, in short, something of a revolution in the prevailing attitudes toward career government service. Careerism was transformed in leading minds from a vice to a virtue, and the effects of this conceptual revolution could not but spill over into the sphere of elective office.

The idea of rotation was called further into question after 1865 by at least two basic social changes. Post-Civil War America witnessed a growing ascendancy of cosmopolitan over local life. Since support for spoils was rooted in the localities, the declining influence of counties and towns hastened the eclipse of nomination rotation.[52] Moreover, the post-bellum nineteenth century saw a shift in the balance of power to the business class, where professionalism and careerism were increasingly the standard. In turn, the U.S. government began to

[50] Carl Russell Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 172. Contemporary accounts also cite as a turning point the Civil War. According to an 1868 article, it mattered less how officialdom exercised its functions prior to the war, "for the Government was seen rather than felt, it was an idea rather than a fact. All this changed with the rebellion" (*Nation* 6, 28 May 1868, p. 425).

[51] Kirt H. Porter and Bruce Johnson, eds., *National Party Platforms, 1840–1960*, 2d ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), pp. 42, 47.

[52] Samuel P. Hays, "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum," pp. 172–73, 177; and Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," p. 284, both works in *Party Systems*, eds. Chambers and Burnham; Powell, "Rejected Republican Incumbents," pp. 236–37.

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reflect the methods and manner of the ruling industrial elite.[53] Big business was then both novel and awesome in its success, and this formidable model dissented from the antipower attitudes described by Young. In short, the industrial revolution in America contained elements hostile both to the spoils principle and to the older norms concerning the perils of long tenure in power.

The long-term fluctuations in the quantitative phenomena of withdrawals by congressmen thus were related to whether the politicians and voters in the nation regarded careerism as good or evil, fair or unfair, expedient or inopportune. When these normative judgments were reversed, a revolution in basic political values had transpired, and a major transformation of Congress ensued.

The chronology of such a revolution in ideas is more broad brush than for the practices. As late as 1889 Frederick Whitridge wrote in *Political Science Quarterly* that many Americans regarded the idea of rotation in office as a "shibboleth" by which their neighbor's democracy might be tested. But by 1904 Professor Fish was writing in the past tense about "the days of rotation."[54]

It may well be that misgivings about prolongation in office, as expressed by the electorate, outlasted intraparty support for the spoils principle as manifested in withdrawals. For a quarter century before the economic depression of 1893–97, incumbent withdrawals had been in steep decline, whereas at the polls incumbent defeat rates had yet to fall substantially. Neither did the gap in electoral defeat rates between freshmen and 2+ termers widen appreciably until the late 1890s.

Rotation Relative to Ambition and Competition

Of course variables other than rotation contributed to the component trends in turnover. T. Richard Witmer wrote in 1964 that a "labyrinth of factors" accounted for the increase in survivability in the House.[55] One factor, institutionalization of the House internally, as elucidated by Nelson Polsby,[56] became a factor quite late in the nineteenth century or early in the twentieth. Two variables that were significant throughout the nineteenth century—ambition and party competition—bear on the contemporary importance of rotation.

In 1977 Samuel Kernell asserted that nomination rotation did serve as a "significant impediment" to career development, but that it was of third-rate importance behind the ambition of incumbents for House careers, and interparty

[53] Hays, "Political Parties," pp. 177–78; Fish, *Civil Service*, pp. 233, 245; Godkin, *Cyclopaedia of Political Science*, 3:24.

[54] Frederick W. Whitridge, "Rotation in Office," *Political Science Quarterly* 4 (June 1889): 281, 294; Fish, *Civil Service*, pp. 236–37. Both Whitridge and Fish refer principally to rotation in the civil service, but rotation had similar apologies and conceptual support wherever applied. Rotation in appointive versus elective office was a fairly subtle distinction, and the declining popularity of both applications seems to have been closely associated.

[55] T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," *Political Science Quarterly* 79 (December 1964): 527–28.

[56] Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," pp. 144–68.

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competition as manifested in defeat at the polls.[57] Kernell's analysis undervalues rotation, however, in at least four respects.

First, as established above, rotation was a factor in nineteenth-century electoral defeats. Kernell makes the assumption that changing defeat rates at the polls were due almost exclusively to party competitiveness.

Second, rotation is causally interrelated to ambition, because the attractiveness of the job—hence ambition—was linked culturally to whether prolongation in office was deemed good, neutral, or evil by contemporary society and peers.

Third, the effect of interparty competition on withdrawals was also causally interrelated to rotation. The major parties came to regard nominations for the House as "salary" due their leading troops.[58] Making good on this payroll, through rotation in nominations, helped keep the intrastate party machinery in fighting trim. And of course to win the numerous state and local offices, discipline in the party ranks was more important, especially with stiff competition, than the modest returns to the party expected from incumbent renominations to the House.

Had the custom of nomination rotation not existed, competition would have placed the expediency from the state and local parties' perspective on renominating incumbents as the stronger candidates. The spoils principle shifted the locus of expediency to withdrawals, so as to spread the payoffs as widely as possible. This intraparty motive was intensified by interparty competition. Since competition called for party discipline, which required more attention to the rotations payroll, competition and the nomination rotation were causally interrelated.

Fourth, Kernell's methodology in estimating the effect of rotation on House turnover is demonstrably invalid for the antebellum period, when rotation was at full tide. To determine the percentage of all careers ended by rotation, Kernell simply subtracts the percentage of sophomores renominated from the percentage of freshmen renominated, on the assumption that a two-term limit was so much the prevailing way of rotating nominations that rotation was not, on average, conducive to withdrawals by first-termers.[59] This methodology leads Kernell to conclude that rotation terminated no more than 4 percent of all House careers after 1854.

An examination in Table 3 of the three largest state delegations in the House during the ten elections between 1838 and 1857 is particularly useful because it is possible to ignore the factor of ambition—assuming that at this point in time, the House was more or less equally attractive to incumbent congressmen from New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. A fourth state, Massachusetts, is not included in the analysis, but appears in Table 3 for reference, as the Northern state with the lowest withdrawal rate.

[57] Kernell, "Ambition, Competition, and Rotation," pp. 688–90.
[58] Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 3d ed., 2:133.
[59] Kernell, "Ambition, Competition, and Rotation," p. 688.

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TABLE 3

Percentage of Class to Withdraw, 1838–57

	All Terms	*Freshmen Class*	*Sophomore Class*	*3+ Termers*	*Kernell Formula**	*Percentage of districts with Party Turnover*
New York	65	62	74	64	12	35
Pennsylvania	52	41	70	73	29	26
Ohio	40	28	60	47	32	21
Massachusetts	28	25	17	39	−8	11

Source: See footnote 19.

* Percentage of sophomore class minus percentage of freshmen class.

Table 3, as well as testimonial evidence, indicates that during the ten elections covered, New York was the leading state in commitment to rotation in office. At that time the Albany Regency so dominated Democratic politics in the Empire State that, according to Jabez Hammond, the Regency settled "all questions in relation to the selection of candidates for elective office."[60] The Regency was led by Martin Van Buren, William Marcy, and Silas Wright, who were also the leading figures under Jackson in extending the spoils system nationally. That only 1 percent of New York congressmen managed to win three consecutive renominations from 1838 to 1856 cannot be unrelated to the influence of the Albany Regency in behalf of nomination rotation. And the fact that three-fourths of the withdrawals were freshmen, renders untenable Kernell's assumption, at least for the largest state, that the bulk of rotation was confined to sophomores.

Furthermore, the rates of withdrawal in the first three columns of Table 3 indicate that rotation in New York was substantially stronger than in Pennsylvania or Ohio. A generous estimate for the effect of interparty competition in frightening congressmen into withdrawal[61] would subtract only 5 percent and 6

[60] Jabez D. Hammond, *The History of Political Parties in the State of New-York*, 3 vols. (Cooperstown, N. Y.: H. & E. Phinney, 1842–48), 2:429; Fish, *Civil Service*, pp. 91, 165; Denis T. Lynch, "The Growth of Political Parties, 1777–1828," in *History of the State of New York*, ed. Alexander C. Flick, 10 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), 6:54, 56, 68, 72, 83, 110.

[61] According to Kernell's figures for five selected decades of the nineteenth century, the withdrawal rate averaged 44 percent in districts with party turnover (calculated from Kernell, "Ambition, Competition, and Rotation," p. 681, Table 1). Formula A below assumes that in districts with party turnover, fully half the incumbents anticipated the worst and did not seek renomination for fear of defeat in the interparty competition. Kernell, however, regards interparty competition of the nineteenth century as insignificant for promoting withdrawals (ibid., p. 682).

Formula A

$$w' = \frac{x+y}{2} + z$$

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percent, respectively, from the margins by which Pennsylvania and Ohio trail New York in the first column (all terms) and (assuming ambition was relatively equal in the three states) the remainder of New York's lead in the withdrawal rate is attributable to rotation. Yet according to Kernell's formula (percentage for sophomores minus percentage for freshmen), New York is by far the weakest of the three in supporting rotation. The relative strength of rotation in the three states, using the Kernell formula, is exactly the reverse of what the first three columns indicate.

It is clear, then, that the procedure whereby the withdrawal rate for freshmen is a "benchmark" against which to measure the effect of rotation in other classes is not valid for the antebellum period. In this light Kernell's formula is highly questionable for the post-bellum rotation as well. Since freshmen were far more numerous than any other single class, and until 1876 usually constituted a majority of the House, the proportion of House careers ended by rotation must have been much larger than Kernell's estimate, which is based exclusively on the set of congressmen who belonged to the sophomore class.[62]

Kernell does state that his effort is "an educated guess" about the relative effects of ambition, competition, and rotation. However, ranking the three factors according to their percentage effects on House turnover stretches the empirical evidence beyond reasonable limits. The findings above indicate the contributions of the three factors in terminating the careers of the nineteenth-century congressmen are simply too causally interrelated, and their borders too indistinct, to be sorted out with any hope of factuality.

Conclusion

Rotation in office was a development of the American Revolution, with precedents dating back to ancient Greece and republican Rome. The fervor and altruism began to fade, however, and political realities supplanted some of the origi-

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Where:

w = actual total withdrawals for state in question.

w′ = adjusted total withdrawals at hypothetical party turnover rate.

x = number of districts in state with party turnover.

y = additional number of districts with party turnover assuming some higher rate of party turnover.

$z = w - \left(\frac{x}{2}\right)$ = withdrawals not due to anticipated party turnover.

Under Formula A, dividing w′ by the size of the state's delegation in the expiring ten Houses (N. Y., 358; Penn., 261; Ohio, 210) yields the adjusted withdrawal rate for a hypothetical party turnover rate. Applying New York's party turnover rate to the other states adjusts the withdrawal rate upward to 57 percent for Pennsylvania and 46 percent for Ohio—still below the 65 percent rate for New York.

[62] Laurence Powell writes that there is good reason for attributing largely to rotation the amazingly high House turnover of the nineteenth century, for the practice of giving turns to the various counties and aspiring politicians would surely have had "more than a casual bearing" ("Rejected Republican Incumbents," pp. 235–36).

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nal ideals. One of the casualties in the twelfth year of the new Republic was the legal maximum on consecutive terms in Congress.

After 1789 short-tenure norms persisted, notwithstanding the lawfulness of multiple reelections. But unlike the two-term tradition in the presidency, which became almost sacred with age,[63] the rotation of congressmen was tainted over several decades and discredited. From the age of Jackson onward, spoilsmen distorted the principle of rotation into a philosophy and policy quite different from the original.[64] Perhaps the geographic spread of the hundreds of nominating conventions, coupled with the lack of a constitutional system of nonpartisan rotation, made it inevitable that the extraconstitutional practice would sooner or later be politicized and diverted from service to the Republic as a whole.

Eventually the United States embraced the antithesis of rotation, thereby culminating a conceptual revolution that was slow but sweeping. This revolution negated America's initial revolt against old evaluations of tenure, which had taken place when the thirteen former colonies instituted rotation in the Continental Congress. Parliament and monarchy in the Mother Country had abhorred such Harringtonian aberrations.[65] Thus, when careerism reemerged it was, in a sense, a reversion to the prerevolutionary standard. In short, the professionalization of the House represented a counterrevolution against an original principle of the American Revolution.

[63] In 1875 the House of Representatives passed by the extraordinary margin of 233 to 18 the following resolution:

> "*Resolved*, That, in the opinion of this House, the precedent established by Washington and other Presidents of the United States, in retiring from the presidential office after their second term, has become, by universal concurrence, a part of our republican system of government, and that any departure from this time honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free institutions" (U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1875, 4, pt. 1:228). Half a century later an essentially identical resolution passed the Senate, 56 to 26. See U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, 69, pt. 3:2842. For a thorough history of the two-term limit in the presidency see, Charles W. Stein, *The Third-Term Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).

[64] Whitridge, "Rotation in Office," pp. 282–84, 288–89.

[65] According to John Aubrey, a contemporary of James Harrington, all but eight or ten members of Parliament in 1659 "hated" Harrington's plans for parliamentary rotation. See John Aubrey, *Brief Lives, chiefly of contemporaries . . .*, ed. Andrew Clark, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 1:291. See also, Edmund Burke, *Reflections On The Revolution In France* (Middlesex, England: Pelican Classics, 1968), p. 139.

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The Coming of the Third World War: A Review Essay

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

For three decades, the specter of mutual annihilation of the Soviet Union and the United States has troubled man's sleep, rising and falling in his consciousness. It is possible to chart the anxiety curve of the sleepless patient haunted by his fears without ever fully knowing the cause of those fears. Anyone striving to look beyond the fever chart is thrown into the realm of intangibles: of shifting patterns of public attitudes; of national moods; of political debates and election contests; of controversies over "missile gaps" and gains and losses in the arms race; of hopes and fears, dreams and disillusionment; of weighty personalities tipping the scales; of public response to new arms technology priest kings; and of ambitious leaders striving to recoup their fortunes. When the fever begins to climb, the political technician can graph its ascent. His testing can probably show "who fears what and sometimes why." As with individual anxiety, as any pastor, priest, or psychiatrist can attest, "the rub comes with the why." When technical men yield to diagnostic men, the layers of the problem to be studied deepen and multiply. What is needed are new forms of wisdom whenever we move from the "what" to the "why."

The "what" is not difficult to define for the 1980s. The national mood is troubled, anxious, and confused. Doubt and despair are pervasive. From supreme self-confidence that for every problem a solution could be found, the national consensus on the future has fallen to a level of dread fear that national problems have outrun solutions. In this, public leaders and followers reinforce one another. Liberal Republicans such as the late Nelson Rockefeller by the late 1970s had joined conservatives like Barry Goldwater in expressing their doubts.

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Public concerns that the nation has declined and lost its confidence and resolve are charted in growth rates and inflation curves, attitude studies and opinion polls. Moving into the 1980s, Americans not surprisingly have seen anxiety and fear sweep across national boundaries. National despair, in other words, has not been contained at the water's edge. As Vietnam, Watergate, and the energy problem have weakened America's image of its international role, the crisis of confidence has spread to issues of national security and the threat of a nuclear war.

The national mood helps to explain, without fully accounting for, the British and American response to a gripping and fictional narrative by General Sir John Hackett entitled *The Third World War: August 1985*. Sir John, who commanded the British Army of the Rhine in World War II, has employed his considerable military knowledge and literary imagination in writing a history constructed after the war's conclusion about its grim and fateful days. Thus a summary of the events of August 20, 1985, discloses:

> A Soviet SS-17 missile's nuclear warhead detonates over Birmingham, England. An estimated 300,000 people are killed and 250,000 seriously injured. In immediate retaliation two submarine-launched ballistic missiles, one American and one British, destroy Minsk, in the Soviet Union. The Third World War has begun.[1]

I

The book provides a stunning realism about non-nuclear as well as nuclear conflict. Its credibility for at least some Americans is linked with the national mood. The cause of World War III put forward by Sir John is more plausible than most scenarios: it came about because of Soviet opportunism and by accident. Soviet military strength had grown in the late 1970s to a position of supremacy. "The warning was as clear as any given by Hitler before the Second World War. The steady build-up of offensive military power . . . was not only wholly consistent with a determination to impose Soviet-Russian ends . . . by force of arms if necessary. It was hardly consistent with anything else."[2]

In the late 1940s and 1950s, men like William Bullit and John Foster Dulles talked about a Soviet design for dominating the world. In the late 1970s, the threat, as conceived by men like Hackett, was less global and universal. It was instead, a strategy of unlimited Soviet opportunism within a wide range of possible contingencies, requiring "the preparation of a position of military strength from which any international situation could be manipulated to the Soviet advantage."[3] Yet the Soviet military build-up was threatening not only in itself but because of the relative decline of the West in the 1970s.

[1] Drew Middleton, review of *The Third World War: August 1985* by General Sir John Hackett et al., *New York Times*, 3 July 1978, p. 22.

[2] General Sir John Hackett et al., *The Third World War: August 1985* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1978), p. 49.

[3] Ibid.

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The military defenses of western countries had fallen into disrepair for different reasons. General Hackett is most unsparing of his own people, noting that the proportion of Britain's gross national product devoted to defense decreased from 11.2 percent at the close of the Korean War in 1952 to 4.9 percent in 1976–77. Britain's withdrawal from its empire was unsettling, but British national power suffered most from its obsession with the redistribution rather than the creation of wealth. It forgot that national welfare depends on national wealth; it found it could no longer bear the full burden of massive trade unionism. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, slow but significant changes occurred. "A total addiction to redistributive economic and fiscal policies, which showed itself in hostility to profit-making and in penal taxation on industrial enterprise, was . . . replaced by more sensible attitudes which at last permitted an increase in national wealth."[4]

The new realism and common sense spread to other areas including national defense. Britain since its Defence White Paper of 1957 had for twenty years depended for its defense on the prospect of early escalation of conflict into a strategic nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. The concept of Britain as a conventional trip-wire setting off massive nuclear retaliation by the United States enabled the party in power to claim that it had freed the nation from peacetime military conscription. It allowed Britain to pay lip service to shifts in defense concepts ranging from massive retaliation to flexible response but little else. Currents of public concern then began to flow and the reductions in defense expenditures, which General Hackett described as "part of the ritual liturgy of radicalism," were seen as no longer conforming to the people's wishes.[5] A trend was reversed, and by 1983 the defense ceilings of five years earlier had been exceeded by more than two-thirds.

What General Hackett prophesied for Britain in the 1980s, he also predicted for other countries in the North Atlantic community. The United States grew increasingly aware of the true dimensions of the Soviet threat. It began to press its European allies, strengthened by prosperity, to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. Americans and Europeans questioned whether any American president, faced with the breakdown of conventional NATO defenses, for example, in the Northern Army Group in Germany, would risk the incineration of Chicago by employing nuclear weapons through the supreme allied commander in Europe. Americans on their side called on Europeans to review non-nuclear defense commitments—and by the late 1970s, the Europeans responded. The build-up of Europe's defenses and American military strength at the eleventh hour assured the successful defense of Europe in World War III and led to a brilliant victory for the West. Yet had the United States and the European states not reversed defense policies, the Soviet Union would have triumphed.

[4] Ibid., p. 51.
[5] Ibid., p. 57.

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II

It is clear that *The Third World War*, however vivid and exciting a study of war, is something more in its intention and purpose. The study is at base a legislative tract and a position paper on national defense policy. The moral is inescapable: a renewed military effort, even in a nuclear age, even with actual nuclear exchanges between the superpowers, can guarantee victory and survival.

With General Hackett's chilling account of the causes and effects and the conduct of the Third World War, students and decision makers seeking guidance are again in the presence of a profound moral dilemma. The social sciences and, therefore, military science as it affects foreign policy, are shaped and determined by the purposes of the observers. As the initiative for engineering science coincided with the need for roads, the force that propels military thought is the goal of making a nation wholly secure. What makes the debate over SALT so excruciatingly difficult for John Q. Citizen to penetrate is that judgments of military sufficiency rest on hidden assumptions.

Five assumptions underlie Hackett's prophecy of a Third World War. Each is essential to Sir John's projections. His military and political assumptions bear examination not because they are necessarily false but because they are interconnected; taken together they constitute the architecture of his study. First, he assumes that given present trends, the Soviets will attain both conventional and nuclear supremacy in the 1980s. Sir John is persuaded that such a prospect is one the peoples of America and Europe cannot accept. What he is calling for and what he expects is a return to the will and resolve that led to individual sacrifice and a sustained military build-up before, during, and after the Korean War but on the level of higher and more sophisticated weapons technology. Even with a major national and international military effort by the NATO countries and America, the Soviets will be tempted to military adventures that can be turned back only by war.

Second, and a direct outgrowth of Hackett's first assumption, the Soviets, as Hitler before them, will use their conventional and nuclear power to pursue foreign-policy objectives. Hackett's second assumption flies in the face of other estimates by experienced Western authorities who question Soviet use of nuclear weapons and the direct use of its conventional armies in areas such as Western Europe. For example, George F. Kennan has observed: "The Russians . . . for all their sins, and I don't think anyone knows them better than I do, have not threatened people with nuclear weapons. . . . I don't detect any real intention on their part of using these weapons."[6] Another British leader some three decades ago appeared to agree with Kennan more than Hackett when he spoke of the Russians not wanting war, but the fruits of war.

Third, General Hackett would have people believe that Soviet leaders, par-

[6] Quoted in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Virginia Papers on the Presidency* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), p. 17.

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ticularly in the 1980s, will be reckless in their military calculations, not cautious and prudent as other political observers have suggested. To be fair, his estimate is based on the prediction that with the succession following Brezhnev younger leaders who remember little about the heavy costs for the Russians of World War II will come to power.

Fourth, the global political scene by the mid-1980s, in Sir John's account, will find the postwar international system in disintegration and disarray. Eastern Europe will by then be in a prerevolutionary state. India and South Africa will be in the process of dissolution. Jamaica will have replaced Cuba as Russia's most dependable ally in the Western Hemisphere, and Central America will have taken a major turn toward the Communist regimes. The Serbs will confront the Croats and the Slovenes in Yugoslavia and will invite a Soviet invasion of their country, to which Russia will respond as the least risky military action to demonstrate its control in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Determined to interrupt the flow of oil to Europe and America, a Soviet submarine will sink an Iranian transport and an American intelligence-gathering ship in the Gulf of Aden. Egypt, having overturned a capitalist regime in Saudi Arabia, will join that leading oil-producing country and Iraq in a new United Arab Republic, reconstituted for the sixth time and linked militarily with the Soviet Union. Only Iran, which will continue to be militarily the most powerful Middle Eastern state, under the leadership of the Shah will ally itself with the western powers.

Fifth, the new American president, a Republican southern governor elected to succeed President Carter in 1984, will falter and, following initial Soviet military advances outside its own territorial boundaries, will accept a standstill and a false detente carrying more than a hint of Chamberlain's Munich in August of 1938. The Soviets, having tested the new American president and found him wanting, as they had his predecessors, launched a military invasion in support of the Soviet-inspired Committee for the Defence of Yugoslavia and followed it in the summer of 1985 with military action in the central region of Europe. By then, the die was cast and World War III was a reality.

The newly elected fortieth president of the United States, whose inauguration occurred in January 1985, was ill-prepared for the crisis and "needed help." President-elect Thompson the weekend after the election accordingly called two prestigious advisers to his home in South Carolina. The two came not from the Trilateral Commission or the Council on Foreign Relations in New York—Thompson had campaigned against the "soft-centered international liberalism" of the Democrats—but were the director of the United Universities Think Tank and a former secretary of state. In their reports the two advised Thompson of violence by urban guerrillas in the Third World, of potential coups d'etat, and of likely dictatorial succession in all but 35 of the 180 governments of the world.

The Think Tank report sounded the alarm signaling instability and change in the "poor south" which the Soviet Union would seek to exploit. The "poor

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south" was comprised of four groups: a few breakthrough countries with rising gross national products such as Brazil, Singapore, and Malaysia; a certain number of unstable right-wing countries including Mexico and Argentina in South America, the richer states of the former Union of South Africa, and the capitalist half of the disintegrating Indian Union unsettled by labor strife and urban violence; a group of "unstable left-wing" countries now including most African countries, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the poorer states of a disintegrating India; and a number of Moscow-oriented Communist countries clustered together in the Caribbean and led by Jamaica and Cuba, with a few "unstable left" countries like Egypt moving in that direction. However, the small countries in East Asia (Vietnam, North Korea), who had fought so-called wars of national liberation with Soviet help, now only calling themselves Communist, have been drawn economically into the new Japanese-Chinese East Asian co-prosperity sphere. Meanwhile, the Asian republics of the Soviet Union grow increasingly restless and show signs of forging economic ties with the Japan-China co-prosperity sphere, thereby loosening Moscow's hold on them.

The Think Tank report identified as flash points of international conflict: Egypt in the Middle East fomenting coups d'etat in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf of Aden with Soviet help; Communist governments in the Caribbean and unstable regimes in Central America trying to overthrow a dynamic new president in Mexico; Zimbabwe and Namibia supported by Cuban, Jamaican, and perhaps Soviet volunteers leading military and political incursions and attacking the remaining right-wing governments of the former Union of South Africa. The former secretary of state in his report found the flash points of conflict in crises breaking out to the west, east, and south of the Soviet Union generated by the growth of nationalism in Russia's Asian republics and the pull of the Japan-China economic miracle; unrest created in Poland and Yugoslavia by dissatisfactions and divergences from Soviet norms; awareness in East Germany that even with its vaunted economic superiority in Eastern Europe and a GNP per capita of $4,000 (twice that of European Russia), it lagged behind West Germany's $11,000; and lack of security in the remaining three-quarters of the world because of Soviet nuclear superiority and the ineffectuality of SALT.

The world for General Hackett is a global battlefield, and although he lays part of the blame for its continued instability on the persistent Soviet-U.S. military rivalry, he plainly perceives its salvation as requiring American victories and successes in that rivalry. A Third World War, he predicts, will break out only if two or more of the main points of instability around the world reach a crisis stage at the same time. Then the international system would become overloaded, for example, by simultaneous crises in Yugoslavia, Europe, or the Middle East, and events would move out of control. Confronted by multiple crises, the Soviet empire would begin to crack under its own pressures and its dissolution be set in train.

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III

In all this, the military analyst looking into the future sees the resolution of the cold war in terms of outright victory and defeat. His objectives are tangible, his expectations unambiguous. He arranges the world in neatly ordered categories: Right, Left, and center; stable and unstable; dictatorial and democratic. Columns form of friends and enemies and of "unstable" regimes crossing over from one to the other. The military mind is best equipped to advise the people whether we are ahead or behind in the arms race. Its judgments carry conviction for those who are impatient with "soft-centered internationalists."

Yet the cold war and the arms race occur in a setting in which intangibles, not tangibles, dominate, and this is the sphere in which General Hackett and most military experts are consistently wide of the mark. Looking at the Middle East in the mid-1970s until a point in 1978, the western military observer understandably saw in the Shah's Iran the linchpin of a non-Communist world order. For every index of tangible factors of international politics—tanks and guns, missiles and aircraft, and pages of plans for modernization and social reform—Iran, as President Jimmy Carter declared, was the bulwark of freedom. Yet the dominating forces in the area proved to be not the tangible ones but the intangibles. It was not the Shah's planes and guns nor long overdue reformist plans but hatred and resentment, envy and dislike, Islam and Khomeini, and the emotions of rural peoples and the young that swept all the tangibles before them. So unprepared for these changes was so cultured and sophisticated a military observer as Sir John Hackett that in chronicling the end of the war of 1985 in the Middle East he wrote: "The success of Iran in the Persian Gulf and southern Arabia had been such that even before the nuclear exchange in Europe precipitated the end she was already concentrating forces on her northern borders for the invasion of the Soviet Union."[7] If military prophecy in forecasting the future has failed more conspicuously, it would be difficult to match this example.

Beyond overdependence on the weighing of hardware and tangibles, the military perspective errs by employing the worst-case scenario. In order to justify optimum military preparation, it appears to ask itself "what are the worst possible circumstances our side could face?" Having made this assessment, the military spokesman not surprisingly asks for the means and the weaponry of defense for survival in the worst situation. Given this addiction to the worst-case psychology, militarists see concessions or compromises as an invitation to destruction and defeat. It is precisely this psychology that conditions those who oppose arms agreements, whether SALT I or SALT II or any future agreement. It would be the height of invention to suppose that militarists would

[7] Hackett et al., *The Third World War*, p. 275.

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change direction on specifics when their vision of the political scene internationally remains intact.

What sharpens the dilemma is the indisputable fact that knowledge is preferable to ignorance in the nuclear age. The uninitiated soon flounders in weighing the alternatives of throw weight and warheads; military authority must be brought into play. The tragic dilemma of General Hackett's *The Third World War* is that without hard military expertise and data, which only military men command, comprehension of the struggle soon exceeds public understanding. The president requires military help. Yet at the same time, specialized knowledge, whether military or any other, exists in context. It can never be isolated from the wider social and political context. Thus the wisdom of a military leader like Hackett, while necessary for understanding World War III, is curiously and inescapably insufficient. The general, once having moved beyond the boundaries of his military competence, is as helpless in grasping social and political trends as the nonmilitary mind is in comprehending military necessity. At some point there must be a union of the two, but it is a union that becomes ever more difficult to attain in the crises of the nuclear age. The failure of General Hackett's account of the Third World War results not from the clarity and precision in which he sketches in the details of the conflict. It results from the limits of his political and diplomatic knowledge and the impossibility of political prophecy.

Failures in political prophecy are, of course, nothing new. History records countless examples of decisive political developments that caught even the most experienced observers by complete surprise. In the eighteenth century neither Benjamin Franklin nor Frederick the Great appear to have anticipated the approaching French Revolution, yet both were constant observers of the course of French affairs. Nor did someone as active in revolutionary politics as Madame Roland make a single allusion before 1789 in her voluminous correspondence to the impending downfall of the French monarchy. Napoleon was confident that "Europe will be either Cossack or Republican," and Pitt prophesied that the end of the Papacy was in sight.

Political prophecies concerning foreign states have most often fallen short of the mark. The knowledge that people possess of the social and political conditions of another country is almost always so imperfect and superficial, so circumscribed and confined by parochialism, that popular generalizations tend to go widely astray. In 1760, Rousseau predicted that in twenty years England would be ruined and lose its liberty. The statesmen of Europe joined philosophers such as Rousseau in proclaiming England a decadent and second-class power, a sort of insular Poland, selfish, faction-torn, without nerve and consistency, and destined probably to fall under Russia's domination. The illusion that England was fast declining was shared by Joseph II of Austria, Frederick II of Prussia, and Catherine II of Russia. These erroneous estimates provided the groundwork for momentous policies that affected the future of the

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world. Most fateful of all, the Kaiser and Hitler underestimated both Britain and America and chose courses that changed the history of the West and of the rest of the world as well.

If these experiences carry any lesson for the present, it is that future events may be decisively shaped by the political estimates of America or Britain or Russia or India or Japan or China or Poland or Yugoslavia being formulated as a basis for contemporary foreign policies. Even more than military estimates, political and diplomatic prophecy is the scene of tragedy and failure for prophets, whether soldiers or diplomats. Yet in the thermonuclear age, the factor of military assessment is so essential to foreign-policy analysis that it is likely to be accorded overwhelming importance unless it is weighed with considerable skepticism and reserve.

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Book Reviews

The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked *by Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1979. 387 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $5.95.*

In one of the best analyses we have of U.S. decision making in the Vietnam War, Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts argue that U.S. policy in Southeast Asia failed, but the domestic decision-making system worked as it was designed to do. The system did so, moreover, "in a way that most constitutionalists and democratic pluralists believe it should work. Vietnam was not an aberration of the decisionmaking system but a logical culmination of the principles that leaders brought with them into it" (p. 2). The cause of the disaster was rooted less in our bureaucratic politics than in our ideology.

The ideology is not examined in great depth. Little material is presented on socioeconomic views of Roosevelt, Acheson, Dulles, or the 1960s officials. Although they cite evidence to the contrary, for example, the authors conclude that FDR and Cordell Hull used "economic interest . . . as a cloak for political interest," and thought of Indochina as a "geographical abstraction" (p. 33). Neither assertion is true. The two officials seldom separated the economic and political factors this way: historians celebrate Hull as the classic case of an official who saw economics and politics as two sides of the same coin, and Roosevelt was well versed on the resources and population movements in Indochina. Larger regional and global perspectives are also passed over at times, as, for example, Dulles's and the National Security Council's concern that Indochina had to be saved partly for the use of a revitalized Japan.

Because of its thesis, the book stresses elite policymaking more than the "principles" carried by the officials when they made policy. Exceptions that appear in the book are the well-known negative references: anticommunism, stop the falling dominoes, and do not be defeated by the cold war Right in the next election. At the end the authors declare that "the need for pragmatism more than doctrines, formulas, and ideologies is the basic lesson of the Vietnam War" (p. 368). One wonders, however, whether the evidence in this account does not argue powerfully for less pragmatism and more fundamental reexami-

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nation of the "doctrines, formulas, and ideologies" that are going to govern any policy-making process.

In this critical sense, as the authors neatly point out, the system did not work. Throughout the post-1954 years "debates revolved around how to do things better and whether they should be done, not whether they were worth doing" (p. 190). The needed reassessment "could not come from a foreign policy review within the upper echelons of the executive branch. These men were locked into their perspectives" (p. 200). Dissenters in the lower echelons were ignored, and when the needed jolt finally came from the outside in 1968, it was too late. The top officials worked well within their own narrow system, but that should not be confused with the American system of government, at least as "constitutionalists and democratic pluralists" usually view it.

Gelb and Betts provide enough other instances of foulups to make one wonder whether the system functioned well even at the top. So-called peace offensives were undercut by bombing raids until Chester Cooper believed "there was just no interest or effort expended in orchestrating military and diplomatic moves; everyone was doing his own thing" (p. 154).

The documentary material on the U.S. escalation is presented with clarity, and the last seventy pages raise central questions—for example, whether the liberal-Left search for a compromise was an impossible dream, and whether those inside or some critics outside the government understood the implications of the reality that the Vietnamese were engaged in civil war. The great values of the book, however, are its close analysis of decision making from the 1940s to 1969, and the doubt this analysis raises about the remedial qualities of pragmatism when officials are already determined to apply pragmatically tragically mistaken policy principles, but there is no check within or without the government to make them reconsider.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The Swine Flu Affair: Decision-Making on a Slippery Disease *by Richard E. Neustadt and Harvey V. Fineberg. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 189 pp. $3.00.*

In February 1976, an army recruit at Fort Dix, N. J., died. Tests revealed that he and 4 other recruits had been infected with swine flu virus, and a survey at the base suggested that perhaps another 500 had been exposed. That raised the specter of an influenza pandemic similar to the one of 1918, which killed 500,000 Americans (1 of every 200).

In response, the federal government undertook to immunize in less than a year all of its 200 million citizens. That disaster is chronicled by Richard E. Neustadt and Harvey V. Fineberg (of Harvard's Kennedy School and School of Public Health, respectively), though their purpose is not merely to tell a fascinating story, but to provide HEW, who commissioned the study, with lessons for the future.

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That might seem simple. The swine flu caper is a classic fiasco, replete with premature commitment, personal agendas, incomplete analysis, unspecified uncertainties, unstated assumptions, the neglect of implementation, and the failure to reconsider prior decisions. Today, no one would defend it. There must be a myriad of lessons here. Yet who should have done what—and more importantly, in future situations, who should do what—is not so obvious.

President Ford, for example, appeared to do the right thing. Presented with a unanimous recommendation, he called in a collection of outside experts—including Drs. Salk and Sabin, the most famous physicians in the immunization business—and directly asked them whether the recommendation made sense. Those in attendance may have thought the meeting staged, but Ford did not; he conscientiously tried to give them every opportunity to dissent. No one did. So what choice did he have?

Thus, it is not so simple. The president and the secretary of HEW were boxed in, write Neustadt and Fineberg, by an expert who "evidently held the not uncommon premise that the boobs [the political leaders] could not be trusted to decide right on their own," and thus "thought it was his task to make his constitutional superiors do right" (p. 99). How can political leaders avoid such traps? What questions should they ask? Of whom? How can they challenge scientific assumptions? How do they structure the issues, the forum, the councils of experts to avoid groupthink, to ensure a complete exploration of the problem, and to encourage candor and dissent? How can the president or the secretary protect himself—and the public—from scientific expertise gone, not mad, but conscientiously and collectively amuck?

In the swine flu affair, emphasize Neustadt and Fineberg, the scientific expertise was particularly problematical—they call influenza a "slippery disease" because of the scientific unknowns and the popular misconceptions—yet "science" provided the sole basis for the policy. Political and managerial expertise was not even solicited. Yet politicians, public managers, and journalists all had contributions to make—contributions that might have prevented or at least mitigated the disaster. Public policymakers need to be able to integrate scientific judgments with political and managerial ones.

Neustadt and Fineberg wrote their analysis for HEW—to provide lessons for future similar, or dissimilar, dilemmas. But they provide lessons for everyone up and down the line—from the president to the Center for Disease Control, and outside the line too, for those in HUD or the Navy, in state or local government, or in academia. There is a lot here, and to learn the most from this study, one needs both to read and think.

ROBERT D. BEHN
Duke University

Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy *by Benjamin I. Page. Chicago, Ill., The University of Chicago Press, 1978. 336 pp. $17.50.*

Ever since Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates completed their pioneering study of the 1940 presidential election in Erie County, Ohio, students of electoral behavior have pondered

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and debated a number of questions that have enormous importance for how democratic governmental systems actually work. Those questions include: the extent to which voters are aware of and influenced by political issues; the "rationality" of the electorate; and the degree to which the mass of the voters are able to exercise a measure of control over public officeholders through democratic elections. As is well known, some of the first electoral studies tended to stress the relatively limited role that issues played in the electoral process. Many of the studies since 1964, by contrast, have given greater emphasis to the actual or the potential impact of the issues. Nevertheless, most of these later electoral studies, like the earlier ones, focused primarily on what might be called the outputs of the electoral process—how the voters decide how they will vote in an election campaign.

It is the special merit of Benjamin I. Page's recent book, *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections*, that he concentrates the majority of his attention on the inputs into the electoral process. There are, to be sure, extensive data and some fascinating new findings on the public's perceptions of presidential campaigns. But there is even more on the issue positions that are taken (or not taken) by the candidates, the degree of choice (or lack of choice) that is offered to the electorate, and the consistency of the issue stands that are espoused by the candidates. Page looks, in short, primarily at what the candidates and the parties actually say and do in a presidential election campaign, rather than at the public's response to an election.

Page notes that there have been two broad sets of theories about how candidates and political parties are likely to behave in an election campaign. Economic theory of democracy and public opinion theories suggest that parties and candidates will take their policy stands at the midpoint of the public's opinions on issues, in order to maximize the candidates' chances of winning votes. According to these theories, the issue choice offered by the parties is likely to be very narrow.

Responsible party and party cleavage theories, by contrast, suggest that the issue differences between the parties and their candidates will be fairly wide, in response to real differences in the parties' bases of electoral support and the contrasting policy preferences of their party activists. As one might expect, Page finds both kinds of tendencies in the behavior of parties and candidates. But he also demonstrates that neither set of theories fits all the realities of an American presidential election campaign.

Page then undertakes a highly valuable analysis of what the candidates have actually said and done in presidential campaigns since Franklin Roosevelt was first elected in 1932. How consistent or constant are the candidates in the issue positions that they take? How much do candidates shift their positions between the primary elections season and the fall general election campaign? How do they go about appealing to "special audiences"? How frequently and conspicuously do candidates take policy stands? And how specific are the candidates when they do so? (One of Page's chapters is aptly titled, "The Art of Ambiguity.") Page also explores how candidates respond to potentially explosive issues—such as Vietnam in 1968, or Proposition 13 in 1978—when both major parties tended to take similar positions. (One moral seems to be that we should be spending more of our time studying the effect election campaigns have on the way politicians attend to issues, rather than the effect of the issues on the electoral outcome.)

The picture that emerges from Page's careful analysis is not that of two major parties that attempt to sharpen the issue choice for the voters' edification and enlightenment. The

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impact of issues is often muted because the candidates do their best to blur them. Nevertheless, Page suggests that two other models of democracy explain a good deal of what candidates and voters actually do in a presidential campaign. Moreover, the operation of both models suggests how a measure of democratic control may be attained. There is first what Page calls the "theory of electoral reward and punishment." For example, politicians hope to be reelected if things go well during their tenure; and politicians have good reason to fear defeat if things do not go well. And there is an ongoing if not always successful quest for the "selection of a benevolent leader." Thus, many citizens appear to base their vote heavily on the candidates' personal characteristics.

Page is quick to note that this kind of electoral process leaves disturbing gaps in the enforcement of accountability and control in relations between the governed and those who govern. The haziness with which issues are often discussed in a campaign gives wide leeway to the candidates who are elected. And there is the ever-present problem of manipulation—candidates may try to manipulate the issues and even events, when election time comes near. The efforts by the party in power to tinker with the economy every four years are a case in point. Nevertheless, Page argues, these models come close to describing the kind of electoral procedures we actually have.

The analytical framework that Page brings to bear on the electoral process is so helpful that one wishes that some topics had been explored more fully. More attention needs to be given, for example, to the effects that voters' policy preferences and concerns have on the issue positions that the candidates take. As noted, both parties straddled two of the genuinely major issues of the last decade—Vietnam and Proposition 13. Yet in both cases, voter concern over those problems probably had a decisive impact in reorienting the positions the candidates and the parties took on those issues.

Page's analysis also points up the need for more work on the problem of how, or whether, democratic controls are exerted on elected officials. As he notes, we need more data on actual policymaking, as well as on what candidates say in an election campaign. The vexing problem of manipulation also calls for further study. What do candidates do to try to fudge the issues? How successful are the candidates' attempts to distort them?

All of these questions suggest that we need more empirical study of the input side of the electoral equation to match the work that has been done on electoral outputs. But this will surely come, in part because the central premise of Page's admirable book is so right. If we are to continue to enlarge our understanding of why voters behave as they do, we need to give increasing attention to what the candidates actually offer the voters on election day.

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American Politics and Public Policy *edited by Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1978. 418 pp. $17.50.*

This is a memorial volume in honor of Jeffrey L. Pressman, an outstanding scholar and teacher of American politics, who died in 1977 at age 33. Twenty scholars have contributed sixteen original articles of an unusually high average quality in content and readability, especially written for this book. The scholarly reputation of this distinguished group is itself a tribute to the standing achieved in so short a career by Professor Pressman, whose own work is frequently cited by the authors.

The editors apparently strove hard, and have succeeded far more than most, to give this assortment of independent essays a much higher degree of internal coherence than is customary with such collections. The volume is divided into five parts: electoral politics (3 articles); presidential leadership (4 articles); legislative politics (3 articles); urban politics and public policy (2 articles); implementation (4 articles). The range of the articles is often sufficiently broad that other categorizations might have been equally suitable.

As would be expected, the approach, methodology, and style of the authors vary widely. Three of the articles are case studies of unusual interest: Thomas Cronin's study of the failure of the National Teacher Corps; Frank Levy's surprising evaluation of Governor Reagan's California Welfare Reform Act; and Philip Heymann and Martha Weinberg's penetrating review of Mayor White's unsuccessful attempt to reform Boston's city charter. Some of the essays are contemplative. Others are empirical studies of electoral trends and legislative policy. Several essays are assaults on some current controversial theory and attempts to formulate frameworks for alternative theories or models, particularly on political process.

Of special interest in the last group are the thoughtful and informed overlapping essays by Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz and by Michael Lipsky, which deal in different ways and with provocatively differing emphases with the politics of implementation and the "where is policy actually made" controversy.

While several important issues are tackled by more than one author, the nature of such a volume's construction precludes an author's building upon or integrating with another author's points. And, of course, where differences occur the essays do not directly confront each other's arguments or seek resolution. For example, it would have been interesting to know how Rein-Rabinovitz or Lipsky might have used the Cronin case study to support their theses; or to see whether Lawrence Brown would find his attempt to spell out systematically the major determinants of mayoral behavior congenial with the Heymann-Weinberg study.

Nonetheless, there is an unusually high degree of congruity in the themes. The book opens with Walter Dean Burnham's disquieting analysis of voting in the 1976 presidential election, demonstrating that political parties have lost their salience in favor of "personalism." The pattern indicates further fragmentation and institutional deadlock that must hamstring the presidency as an institution of national leadership. The next two essays support this general view. Robert Nakamura and Denis Sullivan develop theoretical models that suggest that changes in rules for party nomination have con-

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tributed to reducing party cohesiveness and effectiveness and have rendered parties less able to perform their democratic function.

Nelson Polsby then deals with effects of the presidential nominating process passing out of the hands of interest groups and party leaders. He argues that the type of intermediation that gets a president nominated and elected, based on personal organizations and use of media, is not adequate for development of a governing coalition.

Martin Levin also deplores the politics of personalism, arguing that what a president will do in office is less a function of what he is like than what the political institutions around him will do to him. He appeals for a "politics of institutions, not men" (p. 110), but he is not optimistic. Douglas Yates does not seem to concur. He argues that too few political scientists study presidential character and personal leadership. Aaron Wildavsky and Jack Knott present a forecast of what Jimmy Carter is "likely to do as president" (p. 71), based mainly upon his public statements and actions before his election. They assert that he is no ideologue on policy, but they fear his technocratic disposition may make him inflexible on procedure and structure. Together these five essays can offer useful insights on President Carter's basic difficulties during his first two and one-half years in office.

Such institutional problems offer useful background for reading Demetrios Caraley's interesting empirical analysis of congressional voting on urban programs in 1977 and his pessimistic appraisal of the prospects for increased federal aid to beleagured cities. Eugene Bardach undertakes to develop a framework for a theory of "social regulation." He fears that present trends tend to undermine the practice of social responsibility.

Benjamin Page offers a theoretical evaluation of the effects of legislative bicameralism and appears generally sanguine. After a rather wordy discourse on political metaphor, William Ker Muir presents an intriguing study of California's legislature as an example of a legislature serving as democracy's "school of political capacity" (p. 243). He advances the challenging thought that educational institutions can learn much from legislatures on how to educate.

In this brief space it is not possible to offer an assessment of each of these essays which, of course, vary in value. Suffice to say that anybody with a live interest in American politics should find at least several of these articles both informative and stimulating and definitely worth his or her thoughtful attention.

HERMAN M. SOMERS
Princeton University

The Last Half-Century: Societal Change and Politics in America *by Morris Janowitz. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1978. 583 pp. $25.00.*

This is a rambling, discursive, but inherently fascinating analysis of social change in America and its political implications. Morris Janowitz, a distinguished sociologist, combines a uniquely personal view with a broad survey of the literature on such diverse

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themes as political participation, military organization, community association, the role of the media in society, and labor-management relations. His point of departure is political. He sees the decline in party affiliation, the growth of ticket splitting, and the absence of a critical realigning election since 1932 as signs of political weakness characteristic of an advanced industrial nation. An advocate of social control, Janowitz sees the political disarticulation as a manifestation of a deeper division within American life—the separation of the place of work from the residence and an increasingly differentiated pattern of social stratification. As a result, it becomes "progressively more difficult for the citizenry to calculate their political self-interest on the basis of occupational and work place affiliations" (p. 301).

The picture that Janowitz paints is a bleak one. People are torn between their occupation and their residential interests; the media, especially television, enhance distrust for elected officials by practicing advocacy journalism; the growing professionalism of the military robs the citizenry of the sense of participating in the nation's defense; the lack of effective industrial relations leads to declining productivity, progressively lower capital investment, and the growing problem of stagflation. Janowitz sees little help from political scientists, who surrender their objectivity in favor of direct involvement in the political process, and he is only slightly more positive about the efforts of other social scientists to achieve renewal through group psychotherapy and experiments in community participation. The only hope, he suggests at the end, lies in clarifying the nature of social disarticulation so that we can search for ways to become whole again.

The book is too long, too rambling, too didactic. Janowitz could have presented his essential thesis more easily in one long article. The real value, ironically enough, lies in the parts, not the whole. His essays on military trends, the media, and community efforts in the 1960s are illuminating and provocative. He raises questions that desperately need answers. How far can the trend toward increased welfare payments in the federal budget go before the nation becomes bankrupt (payments that have risen from 9.5 percent of the GNP in 1935 to 18 percent in 1974)? Why has the abundance of material goods and the growing permissiveness of American society failed to lead to greater personal happiness and individual contentment? But at the same time, his survey of societal changes neglects equally important developments, such as the geographical shift of industry, people, and political power to the Sunbelt area; the impact of technology on contemporary American life, particularly the automobile, television, and the stereophonic sound revolution; and the changes in family life, ranging from a declining birth rate to the impact of women's liberation.

Above all, one can question Janowitz's assumption that the weakening of party affiliation and the stalemate in American politics first noted by Samuel Lubell in 1952 signifies deteriorating social control. He places too high a value on the electoral process. The malaise of our time is genuine, but it transcends politics and reflects the dilemmas of an advanced industrial society that Janowitz only partially explores in this important but limited book.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

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The Nature of Mass Poverty *by John Kenneth Galbraith. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979. 150 pp. $8.95.*

How to resolve the grinding poverty of three-quarters of the world's population is a major problem for debate among economists. The usual approach in identifying solutions for a complex problem is first to ascertain the root causes. In this book, Galbraith reviews generally accepted explanations—lack of resources, economic system, absence of capital (both human and physical), legacy of colonialism, and adverse terms of trade—and dismisses them by counterexample (a none-too-persuasive technique). He then provides his own explanation, distilling the debate into one central concept: "accommodation." This is in effect an entrepreneurial approach to development. Accommodation is Galbraith's buzz word for economic motivation. He argues that people accommodate to being poor; that they are not necessarily striving to break out of the "equilibrium of poverty," especially in the rural areas; and that Western aid and Western solutions have falsely assumed that the motivation is there. Where rejection of accommodation can be found, and how it can be nurtured provide the basis for the Galbraithian approach to reducing mass poverty.

The more provocative chapters of this book are the central ones which cover Galbraith's diagnosis of poverty in terms of accommodation. He argues, convincingly, that people—if bowed by poverty, soothed by religion, untouched by political upheaval, and devoid of role models—can passively accept their position and resist change in their own lives. Yet each population harbors pockets of people who resist such limitations. Galbraith feels that it is to these movers and doers that resources should be directed. Resources that are offered to all may dilute the possibilities for the few. This assessment of motivation provides a basis for analyzing some of the failures and some of the successes seen in development and gives Galbraith an opportunity to sweep over several major development topics—the relative failure of land reform, the role of income redistribution, the efficacy of basic education—in an accommodation-nonaccommodation framework. If the reader sees a framework for explaining the achievements of the Horatio Algers, or of specific migrant groups such as Indians in East Africa, then the accommodation concept fits well. The practical applications are, however, less clear. To these Galbraith turns in the remainder of the book.

Building on his foundations, Galbraith uses the last three chapters of the book to outline policy prescriptions. He urges that efforts to relieve poverty have two basic components that then reinforce one another. The first is action to facilitate escape from poverty (such as education and migration); the second, action to support those who seek to escape.

As an explanation of mass poverty, the accommodation approach is appealing, but is it sufficient? How does it actually apply to current practices? For example, Galbraith uses agriculture to make his point: education in new farming methods should deliberately be kept at a primitive level until those who are willing to risk more complex approaches have identified themselves. An obvious problem is that of possibly reinforcing an uneven income distribution as has been the case with the Green Revolution.

In reviewing the limitations of development efforts in the past three decades, Galbraith argues that the traditional explanations are ill-founded and that therefore the solutions

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are ineffective. He proposes his own interpretation and his own solutions. However, in thinking through how his interpretation would work in practice, what Galbraith is really proposing is not a *substitute* for on-going policies, but rather an approach that *complements* current action. He thus offers an overall strategy for development rather than a decision rule for sectoral emphasis.

Viewing his suggested approach as complementary to on-going efforts rather than as a substitute, his ideas are in the same vein as the recent acceptance of "basic human needs" (BHN) as the philosophy behind bilateral and multilateral aid efforts. In BHN, one is not changing policy but modifying the emphasis, as one does in questioning the role of accommodation. As an example of BHN in practice, loans are still being made to poor farmers but now poorer ones are eligible, and concurrently agricultural education is being provided at an elementary level. With this approach Galbraith would surely agree.

In sum, this highly readable set of lectures grown into a book does not pretend to be either a review of the literature or a textbook of theories. Rather it is the reflections of a sensitive observer who has been interested in the problems of poverty for most of his professional life, heightened by the years as U.S. ambassador to India in the early sixties, a period of optimism for American foreign aid. As one would expect, Galbraith presents economics in lucid prose: "Price is not decisive if you have little or nothing to sell" (p. 89); "If to be a producer of primary products . . . places a country in the Third World, then the United States . . . is, by a wide margin, the first of the Third World nations" (p. 20). For those with a background in development economics, this is a provocative interpretation of the problems of the past; for those without such a background, this could be a stimulating introduction to some of the issues. The diagnosis is incomplete and the prescriptions limited in their applicability, but it is a refreshing review and scintillating reminder of the human element in economic development.

E. HAZEL DENTON
Congressional Budget Office

Yankee From Georgia: The Emergence of Jimmy Carter *by William Lee Miller. New York, Times Books, 1978. 247 pp. $10.95.*

William Lee Miller has drawn a multidimensional portrait of Jimmy Carter. His broad strokes reveal the propensities and the paradoxes that have characterized Carter in the presidency. There is Carter the manager and Carter the moralist, Carter the doer and Carter the believer, Carter the puritan and Carter the reborn.

As manager and doer, Carter exhibits many of the traits that have come to symbolize the puritan ethic—hence the title, *Yankee From Georgia*. Tenacity, diligence, and industry characterize his work style. He has a penchant for detail, a patience for deliberation, and a persistence for working things out. He is self-disciplined, self-confident, and a self-starter. Miller describes Carter's managerial ethic in the following way: "Include everything, do everything, work harder than everybody else. Enter ever primary. Shake every hand. Cover every state. Every policy should be comprehensive. And include every area of policy in your effort" (p. 145).

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As moralist and believer, Carter is the born again Christian, the earnest, soft-spoken Sunday school teacher, insulated from anxiety by his religious convictions. He is a standard-setter. His words and deeds are connected. He needs to do what he has promised. Miller suggests that Carter's compilation of his campaign pledges into an "action" document is indicative of his moralistic ethic. "Engage the will; commit the self by lists, promises, and resolutions; write them down; check them off" (p. 112).

Is there a conflict between being a manager and being a moralist? Miller does not think so, but he does perceive two deficiencies in the psychological-philosophical portrait he paints of Carter. Miller concedes that his subject has an ideological void: most of Mr. Carter's visceral commitments seem to be found not at the level of ideology but above it and below it: above it in the realm of moral affirmation; below it in the realm of managerial skill" (p. 131). Miller also notes Carter's potential for underestimating the political: "The moralizer (the conscientious man striving to fulfill the plain dictates of right and wrong) and the manager (the competent man trying to straighten out the world and make it efficient, predictable, and reorganized) share an implicit picture of human history and society that does not take fully into account the perennial ingredients of politics: conflicting interests, struggle for power, and differences in values among groups" (p. 146).

The author does not stress either of these points. In retrospect he should have. They strike at the heart of the Carter presidency as the events of July 1979 poignantly and painfully illustrate.

The reappraisal at Camp David, the sermon written on the mountain, and the cabinet reshuffle confirm the contours of Miller's portrait. They indicate the hand of both the moralist and manager at work. Carter's actions during this crisis in his presidency bear a striking, almost eerie, resemblance to his actions during his personal crisis in 1966, a crisis that culminated in his rebirth as a Christian. In 1966 and in 1979 he admitted his failings, accepted blame, reaffirmed his priorities, and rededicated his efforts.

Carter the manager then took over. In 1966, he began planning and executing a strategy for his race for the governorship of Georgia in *1970*. In 1979, he purged the unfaithful from his disciples so that his message would not be distorted or his objectives sabotaged.

What he did not calculate in 1979, or at least not correctly calculate, was the political fallout his actions would generate. Carter failed to anticipate how the reaction of the Washington community and the general public would affect his goal of providing leadership to rekindle America's spirit in much the same manner as his own spirit was rekindled thirteen years before.

One may quibble with the author's title, object to some of his interpretations, and be disappointed by his failure to project Carter in the presidency. There is little emphasis on the potential problems that a Yankee from Georgia would face in the White House. Nonetheless, William Miller has painted a rich portrait that gets at the essence of Carter's personality.

STEPHEN J. WAYNE
George Washington University

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The American Presidency *by Richard M. Pious. New York, Basic Books, 1979. 491 pp. $16.00.*

Richard Pious has written a textbook on the presidency of outstanding merit. It discusses the origin and constitutional position of the office and then treats each of its aspects—the president as politician, communicator, administrator, policymaker, chief legislator, commander in chief, and so on—thoroughly, with balance and discrimination, and realistically, even at times to the point of cynicism.

The author appears to have read everything ever written on the subject, and he has digested it all, synthesized the best of the thinking of other scholars, and added restrained comments of his own. It is a book of facts, basically, not of philosophy. The introductory chapter is subtitled "Is Presidential Power Poison?" but the question subsequently gets lost and is never directly answered even at the end. Pious does not offer an original theme, like Neustadt or Schlesinger, nor new empirical data, like Cronin. He is content to see and describe the trees, leaving the forest to others.

But that is what a textbook does best. This one assembles in highly readable form what is known about the presidency, illustrates each topic with well-chosen case material from current and recent history, and laces it with insightful and provocative criticism. It should serve admirably to organize and stimulate classroom discussion. If specialists will not find much here that is new, they can rely on it as an authoritative starting point for digging into any aspect of the presidency they may be concerned with.

In a book so rich in detail, every reader is sure to find at least a few of what appear to be errors of fact or interpretation. To select from those that struck this reviewer: "Urban unrest and rioting in the 1960s" did not, as the author says, "spark" the antipoverty, job training, community action, legal services, and civil rights legislation of that decade (p. 151); all of those were enacted *before* the period of riots was touched off in Watts. The interpretation of the Truman civil rights program as nothing more than a ploy to win black votes (p. 149) is unfair and needlessly cynical; all moral leadership can be portrayed as cheap and empty politics by that line of reasoning. A quotation from my own writing (p. 170) is removed from context and given nearly the opposite of the meaning it had in context. Among factual errors are identification of James Forrestal as an admiral rather than as secretary of the navy (p. 362), the assertion that the secretary of state was not one of the original members of the National Security Council (p. 362), and the misspelling of Averell Harriman's name throughout. These may appear as petty examples, but they make the point that there are enough obvious errors to shake, though only slightly, a reader's confidence in the whole volume.

Most economists, surely, will find the book much too negative in its appraisal of the worth of their professional advice (chapter 9). Scathing in his criticism of the economists' failures and limitations, the author makes scant mention of their successes. With all due disrespect to three decades of institutionalized economic advice to presidents, the basic facts remain that the country has been depression-free for the entire postwar period and all recessions have been short-lived.

One final complaint concerns a sloppy—and, unfortunately growing—practice of lazy publishers. Considering the exhausting labor that goes into proper footnotes—and this book is meticulously documented—why do publishers feel compelled to bury them where

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they cannot be found unless the reader memorizes the number of the chapter he is reading? Who ever does that?

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
The Brookings Institution

Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America's Political Parties *by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1978. 86 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper, $3.95.*

This brief book follows closely a series of articles Professor Ladd published in *Fortune* magazine in the autumn of 1977. The work treats two main topics: the relative strength, social composition, and ideological complexion of the Democratic and Republican coalitions; and the health (or pathology) of American political parties as intermediary institutions linking citizens with government.

Ladd argues that the Republicans have deteriorated into only half a party, a minority in virtually every demographic grouping, unable to compete effectively, and increasingly in danger of becoming a political church for true believers. The Democrats he sees as an unwieldly supercoalition, divided by factional tensions between "New Class Democrats" and "Old Class Democrats," and immobilized by ideological squabbles over economic liberalism and social liberalism.

Both parties, Ladd argues, are cases of institutional failure, revealing diminished capability to organize, to control nominations, to compete, to ensure accountability. Institutional enfeeblement originates from the loss of functions once the parties' own, from an electorate grown irreversibly less dependent on parties, and from the reforms of the past decade specifically aimed at creating more open, less controlled political parties. The consequences of weakened parties Ladd sees as unrepresentative nominees, reduced popular control of government, and increasing voter frustration and alienation.

A major virtue of the book is its readability. It sets a lively and engaging pace and turns an unusual number of felicitous phrases. These properties should make it especially useful for classroom use. The two chapters on the current composition of the Democratic and Republican coalitions, for instance, can be profitably paired with Seymour Martin Lipset's essay on voting demography during the 1950s, "Elections: The Expression of the Democratic Class Struggle" (*Political Man*, 1960).

Specialists in the field will naturally find this book to be familiar and derivative. The book's brevity automatically limits the depth and subtlety with which some topics can be treated. And at points it is short on references for the curious and lean on evidence for the skeptical. But these limitations, as well as the book's considerable virtues, would seem to stem directly from its magazine origins and its direction at a nonspecialized audience.

The section on parties as intermediary institutions would particularly benefit from greater length. The rival theories of intraparty democracy versus interparty democracy deserve more explication and closer analysis than they currently receive. Additional accounts of actual party organizations and concrete examples of their difficulties would also be welcomed. The book is currently rich with survey data on "parties in the electorate,"

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but includes rather little detailed treatment of life such as it exists in party caucuses, clubhouses, primaries, conventions, the state chairmen's offices, the national committees, legislative party chambers, or other locales where "parties as organizations" might be found.

In Ladd's earlier *Transformations of the American Party System* (with Charles Hadley) one could detect a certain sympathy with the party reformers. There party reform seemed inevitable and irresistible, the product of politically ascendant middle and professional classes, the embodiment of their desire for open, porous parties that they could hope to dominate. There, too, the theory of intraparty democracy was pictured as in tune with American values of individualism, making the claim of established party leadership hard to defend. In the current book sympathy for the reformers is much less evident. Ladd finds the parties to have been more deformed than reformed in the last decade. "Open" parties are now viewed as having an unacceptable upper-middle class bias. And the pendulum is seen as having swung too far in emphasizing participation over other values such as leadership. There is even a two-page appreciation of Mayor Daley and of the Chicago machine near the end of the current volume.

Professor Ladd—in company with many of the rest of us—demonstrates an ultimate ambivalence on the old dilemma of strong parties versus open parties. He finds the basic insights of the party government school to be "sound," but feels that it "asks too much." He thinks that vigorous parties could be an acceptable counteracting or centripetal force in the U.S. political system, but recognizes that the middle-class reform ethic in this century has been wedded to notions of partisan independence and a kind of episodic, issue-oriented interventionism. Surveying the political landscape with a realistic eye leads him to a certain resignation. He makes a ritual call for major efforts to rebuild our parties but sees no public will to do so and thus predicts "an increasingly partyless politics that fragments and disorients, and which thereby mocks our effort at mature self-government" (p. 77).

MICHAEL KAGAY
Princeton University

Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time *by Herbert J. Gans. New York, Pantheon Books, 1979. 393 pp. $12.95.*

Many events take place in the world every day. Which of these are reported as "news" by American television networks and American news magazines? How do journalists fit into the structure of contemporary American society? How do they go about doing their work? Why do they do what they do? How could they do it better?

Herbert J. Gans, a Columbia University sociologist and author of several books on urban living and popular culture, gives us fresh and refreshing answers. They are based on extensive participant observations and interviews with news personnel at all levels of network news organizations and news magazines. Gans focused his research on CBS, NBC,

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Newsweek and *Time* magazine. However, his observations and insights reach beyond these organizations.

This is a superbly organized, penetrating study that takes the reader step by step into the news decision-making process and the rationales behind it. It is divided into three parts: two brief ones that dissect the news as it exists today and as it might be tomorrow, and a very long one that analyzes journalists from a sociological perspective. All angles are covered. Gans examines the often contradictory considerations that journalists employ in selecting among sources and stories that compete for their attention. He analyzes the mixed value structures, partly conservative and partly reformist, that explain their choices of particular stories and the play that they give to them. He also explains the impact of various external pressures such as the tastes of media audiences, or the veiled and open political pressures to which media personnel are subject. His treatment of these topics is complete and systematic. Written from an insider's perspective, it rings true to life.

Gans carefully and perceptively analyzes the product that emerges from journalistic decision making. He tells us who the people are—"knowns" as well as "unknowns"—whose activities are reported in the news. He outlines the types of happenings that receive media coverage, from formal government decision making to violent protests against these decisions. Major themes of foreign affairs news are also outlined.

Some of the book's findings are presented in the form of interesting tables. Unfortunately, the television data are from 1967, making the reader wonder whether they are still valid. Figures for the news magazines are more satisfactory. Three years are recorded—1967, 1971, and 1975—so that trends can be traced. But these are minor matters in a fine book that sheds a great deal of light on the mysteries of the news profession.

Gans's book has the rare virture of being scholarly without being stuffy and exhaustive without exhausting the reader's patience. It makes fascinating reading for anyone interested in the shape that the media impose on America's thinking and the role they play in preserving the political status quo that they have helped to create.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Presidential Selection: Theory and Development *by James W. Ceaser. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 371 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $4.95.*

According to James W. Ceaser, assistant professor of government at the University of Virginia, there is an absence in political science literature of the "traditional" approach to the study of presidential selection. His book is an attempt to provide such an approach by examining the thinking of some of America's leading statesmen: the Founders, Thomas Jefferson, Martin Van Buren, and Woodrow Wilson. He argues that changes in the nominating and election processes, far from being simply tactical responses by practical politicians, were also well thought out attempts to solve certain institutional problems, especially those involving the control of political ambition, the relationship of president to

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party, and the maintenance of regime legitimacy. In sum, it is Ceaser's contention that the ideas of farsighted politicians led to overall strategies, while the subsequent "search for political advantage then provided the immediate force for its enactment" (p. 219).

One of the major virtues of this exercise in political theory is its tight organizational structure. Ceaser posits five functions for the presidential election system and then examines how each political thinker dealt with the central issues involved in each function. The schema, and Ceaser's commentary, offer a fascinating elucidation of the ideas of various thinkers. Since the work is not a history, Ceaser is able to make comparisons between different periods through a lucid essay style. The author has succeeded in demonstrating the utility of his enterprise, and political scientists interested in presidential power, regime legitimacy, and party systems will find this book exceptionally valuable—at least until they come to the last third.

For Ceaser has written almost a second book, involving his analysis of modern developments in the party system, which is tacked onto the first book in the form of two chapters and a conclusion running about 140 pages. His essays here are succinct and lucid, and involve an impressive marshaling of secondary sources and a fair summary of twentieth-century developments, but there is little here that is original. It does constitute one of the best summaries I have seen on the changes in party structure that have led to personalistic organizations and the transformation from a mixed to a plebiscitary system of elections—but it is essentially a summary of the ideas of others. The material here seems to be primarily a "review of the literature" such as one would find in a dissertation: instead of focusing in this section on the ideas of the politicians who instituted changes, there seems to be too much mention of political scientists from a well-known Eastern university and too much weight given to the opinions of political scientists who served on reform commissions and whose proposals for party change seem not to have been central to the developments in the 1970s. (In fairness, one suspects that these chapters would be extremely valuable for graduate students interested primarily in disciplinary rather than political developments.)

Perhaps the biggest problem with this section is its normative approach. The author indicates at the outset of the book that his last section will be personal and prescriptive—and it is. Ceaser wants to restore strong parties as instruments of presidential selection and weaken the primary-plebiscitary system. He admits that party organizations may respond "undemocratically," since they do not "represent every new current of opinion in exact relationship to its general electoral strength." But this, he argues, is a virtue, since "it enables them to withstand, at least temporarily, undesirable currents of opinion and extreme movements" (p. 345). So, having correctly classified political scientists into their several camps, Ceaser in the end stands with those in favor of the "mixed" system and makes his cogent critique of modern day reformers. But in making his case, he presents precious little evidence that dire consequences will occur from the present system and seems to downplay some of the difficulties with the "mixed" system. Worst of all, we never learn what an "undesirable" current of opinion is, or why the present system fosters it. Nor, come to think of it, do we discover what an "able" president is, what the "appropriate" amount of change might be, what an "effective" leader is, or any of the other buzzwords that the author uses in discussing the functions of the system. We get sentences such as, "the ambition of contenders, if not properly guided, can lead to actions

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and political appeals that are destructive of one's party or of the general good" (p. 11). General good? Properly guided? We are left with these sentences, standing alone: it seems to me that the general good would have been better served if Ceaser were properly guided in supplying us with more specific criteria and with some definitions.

At the very end Ceaser offers his own prescriptions for change (which he clearly labels a personal judgment): encourage states to repeal primary laws, place an upper limit on the number of delegates in a national convention to be chosen by primary systems, encourage selection of ex officio delegates and those chosen in advance of the election year, ban public funding in the nominating phase, and establish party rules for private campaign finance. Ceaser even argues that the parties, once "closed" again, should in their own long-range interest "want to oppose any form of discrimination against third parties," thus following the theory that third parties can take up the function of promoting transitory public sentiments (p. 353). I can just imagine most state and local party activists, all of whom I am sure are conversant with functional and systems approaches of political scientists, racing to embrace this last suggestion.

I think Ceaser has written two books. The first, a "traditional" approach to political theory, seems to me to be a brilliant treatment of various thinkers—especially Jefferson, Van Buren, and Wilson—and a work that illuminates especially well the relationship between president and party at several critical periods in American history. The prescriptive material in his second "book" seems to me to be lacking in evidence as well as in common sense. The problem with a skimpy and normative treatment of modern developments is, I am afraid, that it may involve a normative response by the reviewer. But the first two-thirds of this volume seems essential reading for anyone seriously interested in the American party system and its relationship to the presidency.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Herbert Hoover: A Public Life *by David Burner. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 433 pp. $15.95.*

"It is perhaps as difficult to write a good life as to live one," observed Lytton Strachey. Most students of American history would agree. Biography as a genre, with some notable exceptions, has been plainly deficient in innovative methodology, interpretative insight, or fresh material that contributes to our understanding of an era. Revisionism rather than explanation is standard. Waves of denigration follow those of adulation. Bunk, debunk, and rebunk is the norm. In the past decade, for example, a flurry of political biographies has presented us with the "new" William Howard Taft, the "new" Warren Harding, and the "new" Herbert Hoover—or is it the "old" Hoover, the image propagated in the 1920s of the gentle Quaker as brilliant engineer, humanitarian, and industrial statesman. That myth would have been punctured even if there had been no Great Depression; hard times demolished it, even, it seemed for many years, obliterated it to such an extent that it would never be reconstructed again. Yet it surely has been. The cold, rigid, uncaring con-

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servative is now the innovative, progressive, noncoercive internationalist and prophetic opponent of statism.

David Burner's *Herbert Hoover* epitomizes the vogue, but in a manner that elevates it considerably above other efforts at rehabilitation. It is the most complete and detailed account of Hoover's career to the start of the New Deal. Replete with new evidence garnered from sources not previously open to scholars, Burner's study adds much to our knowledge of both the man and the times he helped to create. Some sections of the book, indeed, are historical narrative at its best. In addition, Burner's analysis of his protagonist is unusually judicious. He is an admirer of Hoover, but generally a skeptical one. Although intent on arguing that the conventional view of Hoover is distorted and unjust, Burner is hardly an apologist. He aims for balance and is often right on target.

But not always. Burner's *Herbert Hoover* has its flaws as well as virtues. It is a first-rate political biography but by no means a definitive one; it is a lucid and intelligent analysis yet not altogether convincing. Crucial aspects of Hoover's career are treated too briefly and incompletely, particularly the Bonus Army, Prohibition, foreign policy, the thirty-first president's relations with Congress, and his behavior during the long interregnum. Moreover, after leaving the White House, Hoover remained a vital public figure for nearly a third of a century. Burner barely mentions, much less evaluates, his manifold activities.

Burner's account of still other episodes and issues, burdened by his determination to portray Hoover as a Progressive reformer, omits important conflicting evidence and is too quick to attribute blame to subordinates. For example, Burner gives Hoover high marks for his work for racial justice, despite voluminous criticism on this matter by the black press and civil-rights groups at the time and several recent articles and books that accentuate Hoover's indifference to the plight of blacks. Virtually every fact contrary to Burner's sympathetic portrait is ignored. The very few that are confronted—the discrimination in salaries paid to blacks on the Mississippi River flood relief project, or the segregation of Gold Star Mothers on their voyage to Europe—are done in a manner that all too charitably absolves Hoover of responsibility for the decisions. Such lapses, thankfully, are the exception in this otherwise fair and thoughtful study. The bulk of Burner's book intends to explain and question, rather than attack or defend. As such it is an exemplary part of our continuing dialogue with the past that is what history is all about.

HARVARD SITKOFF
University of New Hampshire

Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination *by Catharine A. MacKinnon. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1979. 312 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $5.95.*

In this study, MacKinnon answers the central legal question, "Is sexual harassment sex discrimination?" in the affirmative, basing her conclusion upon language of Title VII of

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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

MacKinnon, a practicing attorney and a professor of women's studies at Yale University, superbly presents complex legal arguments in a manner that a nonspecialist can comprehend. Using economic, social, psychological, and legal data, she shows that "sexual harassment of women at work is sex discrimination in employment which operates to reinforce women's traditional and inferior role in the labor force" (p. 4).

The book begins with the premise that the "structure of the work world women occupy makes them systematically vulnerable to this form of abuse" (p. 4). MacKinnon cites labor force statistics as proof of women's economic and social inequality in the work world, specifically their horizontal segregation, vertical stratification, and income inequality. She argues that sexual harassment of women occurs because women hold these inferior jobs. More critically, she argues that sexual harassment has the *effect* of continuing to keep women in these unequal positions.

MacKinnon then describes the extent of sexual harassment on the job and the various forms that it can take. The data come from lengthy oral and written interviews (ranging from five to twenty hours each) with fifteen women and a series of surveys conducted by Working Women United Institute, *Redbook* magazine, New York State Division of Human Rights, and the United Nations, as well as her own personal involvement in an extensive investigation at Yale (1976–78) in connection with *Alexander* v. *Yale* (a case involving a male professor and a female student).

Survey results indicate that sexual harassment on the job is widespread (five or seven out of every ten women report experiencing sexual harassment in some form at some time in their work life). Victimization is found to cut across lines of age, marital status, physical appearance, race, class, occupation, and pay range. But almost always, "the perpetrators tend to be men, the victims women" (p. 28). Sexual harassment can be verbal or physical, the former being the more pervasive. MacKinnon finds that it can be "quid pro quo" whereby "sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity" (p. 32), or a persistent "condition of work" effectively making the work environment unbearable. The latter, the more common, is, of course, the more difficult to prove in court.

The main thrust of the book is an analysis of the two theoretical approaches to the establishment of women as a discriminated-against group under the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The author laboriously contrasts what she calls a "differences" approach with an "inequality" approach. Citing numerous cases, she establishes the fact that "differences" arguments define the sexes as biologically and socially different from one another. She then proceeds to identify the artificial nature of certain differences between the sexes that have been established by the courts in the past. "Inequality" arguments, on the other hand, define the sexes as socially differential and, more basically, socially unequal. Inequality arguments have been used less by the courts than differences arguments. The author argues in favor of inequality arguments that, she maintains, can better account for social factors.

MacKinnon concludes that "sexual harassment of working women is treatment impermissibly based on sex under *both* approaches" (p. 6). Under the inequality approach,

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"sexual harassment is seen to disadvantage women as a gender, within the social context in which women's sexuality and material survival have been constructed and joined, to women's detriment" (ibid.). Under the differences approach, "sexual harassment is sex discrimination *per se* because the practice differentially injures one gender-defined group in a sphere—sexuality in employment—in which the treatment of women and men can be compared" (ibid.).

In general, the most forceful arguments presented through an analysis of sex discrimination cases regarding employee benefits (pregnancy disability, pensions), job requirements (height and weight standards), and working conditions (sexual harassment) are those citing parallel race discrimination case law. It is in this context that the author presents the clearest and most convincing examples of the contradictions and inconsistencies that, to date, have characterized the application of discrimination law to sex (gender). The blatant failure of the courts to draw parallels between race and sex is highlighted through numerous clear examples, although racial inequality, notes the author, is treated as a more serious problem than sex inequality throughout discrimination jurisprudence.

Overall, this book is highly recommended to persons interested in constitutional law, civil rights policy, affirmative action, and female socialization.

SUSAN A. MACMANUS
University of Houston

New York: State and City *by David Maldwyn Ellis. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1979. 256 pp. $9.95.*

New York has long commanded national attention because of the Empire State's historical singularity. During much of the nation's history, New York has usually led the nation in population, trade, finance, manufacturing, the arts, and politics. Similarly, no other American city has matched the magnitude, variety, scale, and scope of New York City's accomplishments and problems. Gargantuan and unique in so many respects, the history of New York State and its leading city has a drama and sense of significance that is truly imperial. It easily captures the fascination of natives and outlanders alike.

David Maldwyn Ellis surveys the historical development of the Empire State in this comparatively short volume. He attempts a most difficult task of knitting together an account of the remarkable diversity that constitutes upstate, downstate, and metropolitan New York without strictly adhering to chronological boundaries. Mainly emphasizing developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Ellis moves briskly backwards and forwards in time within individual chapters, interweaving New York City's history with that of the state. Chapters are devoted to such topics as the New York character, the population, the economy, art and culture, as well as the politics of the city and state, particularly during the postrevolutionary period and in the twentieth century.

Ellis offers a view of New York's history by painting with broad strokes his impression that the Empire State is as diverse as it is unique. The author keeps city and state in balance throughout as his narrative focuses on wide-ranging subjects, including the

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state's literary and artistic contributions, New York's role in national politics, and recent developments, such as the race problems of the 1960s and New York City's fiscal crisis.

While this volume is pleasant, readable, and evokes a sense of the city and state character, it has limited offerings for those with a scholarly interest in New York State; the casual reader may find the book more useful, but he will encounter some difficulties due to Ellis's organization of the material. Such a panoramic historical review ought to sift through New York's development for interesting themes that highlight the state's distinctive contributions and character. But Ellis does not often succeed in doing this, admittedly a difficult task in a book that treats city and state history simultaneously and merges time periods from page to page.

Generally, discussion of particular subjects is organized around the most nebulous of themes, such as the diversity of New York's population and industry or the state's cultural preeminence; the result is that many parts of the book break down into cascades of facts—lists of "firsts" and events that do not build up to many interesting conclusions about New York history. Even themes that seem implicit in much of what the author covers become rather blurred due to the volume's loose organization and the author's continual intermingling of state and city history. For example, New York's tremendous economic power and independence during much of its history surely shaped a good deal of what the author finds so unique about the city and state politics, cultural development, and way of doing things. But this idea is never elaborated even in the chapter on the state economy. The financial dilemmas of the city and state are discussed in various chapters, but neither the consequences nor the implications of New York's economic decline are given more than casual mention.

The last two chapters, which detail the historic upstate-downstate rivalry in New York and the ethnic politics of the city, are perhaps the best in the book. They are surely the most coherent portions of the volume and strike at significant themes, thus revealing some of the crucial political, social, and cultural forces that have made New York the distinctive place that it is.

PAUL KANTOR
Fordham University

Health and the War on Poverty: A Ten-Year Appraisal *by Karen Davis and Cathy Schoen. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978. 230 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

This is a comprehensive and incisive analysis of the national effort to meet the health care needs of the more vulnerable groups in our population: the aged, the poor, mothers, and children. The authors have mastered a wide range of source materials and provide a welcome map and compass to find one's way through the complexity of the key federal health care programs. Their views provide insight into the policy lines current within the Carter administration.

The authors undertake two tasks: to assess what has been accomplished under Medicare, Medicaid, maternal and child health, and the neighborhood health centers;

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and to chart the policy directions best calculated to extend the benefits of modern health care to those who need them most.

The first task is impressively achieved; the second less so. The book conclusively demolishes the misconceptions that have surrounded these programs, particularly Medicaid, pointing out: "Far from being a program for welfare mothers, Medicaid has been the primary vehicle by which society has helped assist those who are no longer able physically or mentally to care for themselves" (p. 62). They show that cost escalation in Medicare and Medicaid is not the result of governmental excess or bureaucratic mismanagement, but arises directly from expanded coverage, inflation in provider charges, increased nursing home costs, and the growth of the frail elderly among the Medicare-eligible population. They effectively debunk the myth—advanced by authors as different in ideology as Victor Fuchs and Ivan Illich—that medical care does not make a difference in health outcomes. They show how racial differences persist in these federal programs. They demonstrate the weakness of a categorical approach to eligibility, which excludes 8 to 10 million of the poor from Medicaid.

Less persuasive is the argument that these programs have come close to reaching the limit of their effectiveness and that only national health insurance can cure their defects. While we need such a program—the only major country without one—much could be done with the substantial public funds now committed to health care. The authors correctly point out that existing programs were not "designed to finance or encourage new forms of primary health care delivery" but rather to "sustain and support the patterns and traditions of medical care" (p. 214). That was true in 1965 but need it remain true in 1980? Public skepticism about a national program might best be countered through energetic support of health maintenance organizations, strong efforts in key places—urban and rural—to mount major reforms in the structure of health care delivery, a direct attack on reimbursement methods that encourage cost escalation and inappropriate usage, health planning with real teeth, and the mobilization of committed professionals and concerned community groups. Indeed this approach may be the best way to counter public fears, not that government cannot work on the scale that is needed, but that expanded government involvement would entrench existing patterns that underwrite private medicine even more strongly.

While the policy direction recommended in this book may not prove fruitful or effective, the analytical task accomplished is very useful and deserves a wide audience.

SUMNER M. ROSEN
Columbia University

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The Environmental Protection Hustle *by Bernard J. Frieden. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1979. 211 pp. $12.50.*

The Context of Environmental Politics: Unfinished Business for America's Third Century *by Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1978. 216 pp. $9.75.*

Since Earth Day (April 22, 1970), the quest for environmental protection has emerged as a serious subject for study by scholars, a challenge for groups interested in influencing specific regulatory decisions, and a nuisance to economic interests accustomed to unquestioned development. The two short volumes reviewed here represent contrasting views of the environmental problem and different analytical approaches to this subject. Professor Frieden is concerned about micropolitical questions of no-growth local zoning as a barrier to the American dream of owning a private home, while the Sprouts analyze macropolitical issues of long-term physical problems related to resource depletion and pollution.

The cost of housing in California is a very serious problem, and Professor Frieden has made a major contribution by drawing our attention to this issue through a series of case studies of housing projects blocked by local residents in northern California. The role of no-growth initiatives in raising housing prices, however, by his own admission late in the book, is a secondary one (p. 144). Nevertheless, this controversial book concentrates on elaborating how no-growth initiatives impose delays on construction projects. There are, of course, delays in construction due to labor strikes, materials shortages, and other problems, but these are not discussed in this book.

The increasing price of land in the United States is raising housing prices and changing mobility patterns. This is a profound political phenomenon as well as an economic one, which Professor Frieden largely overlooks. Land is costly because of speculation and the desire to obtain an increasingly scarce commodity, the single-family home. Demographic realities are catching up with us, and the market has thus come to reflect the value of land as a finite resource, taxed by an increasing population. This, and not environmentalism, makes new homes costly.

If one is concerned about providing reasonably affordable housing for the poor and the middle class, as Professor Frieden appears to be, then one ought to look for solutions, not environmentalist scapegoats. What would repeal of environmental laws mean for the home buyer? Not much, since land is so expensive. All it would mean is that developments would not be scaled down, and green belts around cities would disappear, while comfortable rental units in urban areas would also disappear to make way for luxury condominia. No-growth initiatives are aimed at questioning the distributional impacts of development and valuing land as a scarce resource that requires additional resource commitments if inhabited. Thus the delays environmentalists have imposed on construction address questions beyond the purview of this book: resource management of air, water, and energy to maintain adequate standards of living.

More residents do not simply mean crowding in California. They mean more water, dams on scenic rivers hundreds of miles away, and a string of new power plants to service pumping stations to bring the water across the state. These resource constraints are very

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serious: California has been using more than its share of the Colorado River; when Arizona assumes its share, the problem will become critical and force an even greater reliance upon overdrafting, with the concomitant risk of saltwater intrusion into freshwater aquifers of communities such as San Diego and Orange County. Furthermore, electricity rates for pumping water will be renegotiated in 1983, and the rates will skyrocket. This therefore is also the context of the no-growth initiative movement; the bottom line is that we must reconcile the need for housing with the need to manage air, water, and energy resources.

Professor Frieden argues past these points by discussing the cumbersomeness of the regulatory process that he deplores and blames for unaffordable housing. He is especially concerned about *federal* regulation in general (p. 13), and yet this is where the book's logic falters: grassroots local initiatives to limit development are not federal actions, and thus to equate the no-growth movement with the pitfalls of various federal regulatory programs does not appear to be logical. There are, of course, problems with federal regulation, but the no-growth movement cannot be legally or politically tied to the federal establishment. It is a grassroots movement based on state and local laws. Furthermore, zoning is (and has always been) a political process. Environmentalists have not converted it into a political process, but merely added their voices to a process that had been the solitary domain of developers. What has changed is the ability of local residents and environmentalists to use referenda and litigation, albeit at great personal sacrifice, to launch and sustain challenges that block projects.

Professor Frieden claims that environmentalists are motivated by personal economic gain and seeks to link them with traditional exclusionary zoning. Part of the confusion, if that is what it is, may be due to the fact that exclusionary zoning has existed for many years, but has recently used environmental rhetoric to justify itself. Many scholarly studies of the environmental movement have documented, however, that environmental groups are motivated by philanthropic concerns, and not by self-interest.

Professor Frieden does, however, accurately observe that larger scale projects can permit better land-use controls than helter-skelter small unit construction. There is merit to the argument that spot zoning undermines large-scale land-use protection. This is certainly true in the coastal zone of California, which has witnessed single-family home construction through variances, with no amenities, while planned communities have been stymied. Furthermore, Professor Frieden perceptively notes the questionable equity of federal recreational land purchases that exclude metropolitan residents from their use. Similar questions can be raised about the distributional equity of federal subsidies for cheap water for agribusinesses, or of taxing commercial property at the same rate as private residences. These are serious questions that warrant future research.

The no-growth movement is a symptom of a profound change in how Americans have come to value land. Professor Frieden has admirably called our attention to this controversy in a well-written, short book that signals a new debate in both housing and environmental policy circles.

Harold and Margaret Sprout's carefully researched essay provides a useful introductory book for political science students interested in the issues surrounding the "limits to growth," risk assessment for nuclear power, and other topical issues. While there is also

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advocacy in this book, it is soundly buttressed through solid documentation and provides an understanding of the fundamentals of environmental ideology as a factor that future policymakers will increasingly need to address. The Sprouts particularly appreciate that environmental decision making is a political process of weighing competing value preferences and meeting multiple objectives (tax revenues, corporate profits, public health and safety, jobs, recreation, clean air). They acknowledge the legitimacy of alternative preferences for economic development, but urge that the physical and biological constraints on long-term resource depletion be considered as a part of the short-term decision-making process. The basis for this concern for long-term impacts is their desire to protect the United States from energy and raw materials blackmail.

The Context of Environmental Politics carefully traces the development of intellectual concern for the problems of national and transnational pollution and resource depletion over the past twenty-five years and explains clearly the implications of ignoring biophysical damage thresholds. The Sprouts also acknowledge the financial limitations of funding pollution control and review fines, taxes, effluent fees, and other techniques for financing pollution control. Most significantly, the authors display great sensitivity and appreciation for the role of science and risk assessment in policy formulation and implementation, and identify the proclivity of politicians to procrastinate over the difficult decisions of establishing reasonable rates of economic development and resource utilization.

LAURA M. LAKE
University of California, Los Angeles

The Social Gamble: Determining Acceptable Levels of Air Quality *by Richard J. Tobin. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979. 174 pp. $17.00.*

Questions of social choice are increasingly complex and intriguing as political, economic, and social policies compete for scarce resources and public expectation of governmental action grows. Nowhere is this problem more acute than in public policy concerning air pollution control. Not only must the government assure the polity's right to clean air and promote the public health, it also must balance this goal with economic issues and the production of energy sources that threaten the environment. It is in this context that Richard J. Tobin has written *The Social Gamble*. The purpose of this book is not an analysis of these issues, as the title might suggest, but rather an exploration of the process by which "statements of preference must be translated into guidelines for action" (p. xiv). As such, the book is a study of implementation.

Richard Tobin traces the federal decision-making process of defining acceptable levels of air quality beginning with the Clean Air Act of 1963 up to the Clean Air amendments of 1977. Since this involves the research, establishment, and enforcement of criteria and standards by federal agencies, the book is also a study of regulation. Emphasis is on federal administrative decision making, especially by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but with due attention paid to legislative action. The account is primarily

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descriptive and if dry, is detailed and thorough. There is much good in this book, but it suffers from an analysis that is so broad gauged that it lacks depth. Consequently, the reader is left somewhat overwhelmed with details spanning a fifteen-year period from one of the most technical regulatory agencies, the EPA, but disappointed by an analysis that is theoretically promising but undeveloped. Thus, while the works of Pressman and Wildavsky, Bernstein, Lowi, Rourke, and Edelman are invoked and used as a basis for Tobin's analysis, the analysis falls short of satisfactorily integrating these theories.

Nonetheless, several important points are made regarding implementation and regulation of air pollution standards. The first of these is the mesh of science and politics in defining air quality. It is certainly true that decisions that are inherently political are sometimes and to obvious advantage defined as technical questions and are thereafter perceived as scientific issues. Following the work of Charles O. Jones in *Clean Air* and J. Clarence Davies III and Barbara Davies in *The Politics of Pollution*, Tobin argues that the distinctions between criteria, which are scientifically determined, and standards, which because concerned with levels of pollution that society deems acceptable, are political decisions. This distinction has often been theoretical, as Jones points out, but as conflicting goals surface and expand the policy agenda, Tobin's point is well made. In the tug between energy needs and environmental goals, standards will not equal, but will balance public health criteria with economic considerations.

Tobin's second point, however, is that the state of scientific knowledge in defining criteria is limited. He demonstrates very well the difficulties of implementing a policy that deals with problems whose consequences are uncertain and that rests on scientific data whose validity is questionable. Technical inadequacies and poor data used by federal agencies as justification for their decisions exacerbate the political difficulties of regulation. The industries to be regulated questioned the basis for federal implementation of air pollution policy on the issue of technical data and in large measure succeeded in discrediting federal regulatory and research efforts. However, the constant questioning of scientific data was not confined to industry. Congressional committees and other federal agencies also questioned EPA's scientific basis, which obviously undermined the agency and thwarted its ability to implement policy. In an arrangement reminiscent of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), EPA's implementation efforts were bound to be problematic; just like OEO, EPA's jurisdiction overlapped with other agencies whose goals were incompatible with its own.

Indeed, the book is largely a documentation of reasons why the EPA was ineffective, and Tobin identifies several additional constraints to implementation. It is therefore somewhat surprising to learn at the end of the book that improvements have been made in air quality and quite disconcerting not to learn why. Similarly, Tobin's analysis of the EPA as an aggressive and independent agency that has not been "captured" in the tradition of its economic regulatory "colleagues" (p. 13) is not borne out in his description of a few of their stances. This is not to argue that the EPA was "captured" by industry, but merely to suggest that accommodation of their interests may have occurred, which is not ruled out by Tobin's analysis.

Despite these weaknesses, Tobin's study is valuable on three points. First, Tobin describes with great detail the federal administrative decision-making process. Second, he portrays the multiattribute problem inherent to the definition of air pollution standards.

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Third, his discussion and comparison of economic and social regulation, if too brief and developmental, is sound and provocative. Tobin concludes that economic regulation relies on negotiation and is intended to maintain stability. Social regulation, on the other hand, creates instability, and agencies formulate guidelines on the basis of technical data, not through a process of negotiation and bargaining. While more data are needed on this, the discussion is a welcome contribution that raises interesting questions. For these reasons, *The Social Gamble* is a useful bet.

BONITA A. WLODKOWSKI
Columbia University

The Future of Industrial Societies: Problems-Prospects-Solutions *edited by Wolfgang Michalski. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978. 303 pp. $35.00.*

A good Mediterranean fish soup requires many and varied ingredients, but it also requires that these be well blended. This book resembles such a soup as to the variety of ingredients, but, alas, the end product is a hodgepodge rather than a unified presentation.

This volume comprises the papers presented before the Second International Symposium on New Problems of Advanced Societies organized by the Hamburg Institute for International Economics in May 1976. The eighteen papers presented were authored by experts from Germany, France, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Most of them are economists, and the economic aspects of the problems of industrial societies are hence in the center of attention, although several authors deal, more or less tangentially, with the sociological and value aspects of our current predicaments.

Though a few of the contributions are eminently worthwhile, the editor failed in giving the book an organizing framework and in pulling the various papers together. As one moves along from such papers as "The Future of the World Economic Order" and "Scope and Limits of Governmental Investment Guidance in a Market Economy" to papers dealing with the reduction of waste products in California and an "International Comparison of Anomie Index (*sic*)," one can hardly avoid a feeling of dizziness.

Although the conference in which these papers originated purposely invited participants from various countries, no attempt evidently was made to institute some orderly comparisons between these countries. Thus we have a fine paper, "Problems of the Coming Decade" in Japan, but there are no papers dealing with this topic for any other nation. In the same way, there is an interesting paper on the availability of mineral sources in the United States, but no corresponding assessment for Europe. A few papers, such as those on "Education Policies in the Modern Industrial Society" and on "Ways and Means for Future Supply with Energy," attempt a broader than national perspective, but their very scope tends to make them fairly unspecific.

If there is one overall mood that seems to be common to most contributors it is a feeling of bewilderment, uncertainty, and even alarm. While similar contributions in the sixties reflected a buoyant optimism as to the future of industrial societies, this volume reflects the jitters of the seventies. Whether it is uncertainties about future energy supplies, the

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capacity of the natural environment to absorb increasing loads of industrial waste, or the wobbly state of consensual moral values, most authors seem to look at the future with a fairly large measure of apprehension. Some of them hope for the alleviation of the present crisis through better information systems, or through perfected methods of societal guidance in what Etzioni has called an "Active Society"; others stress the need for greater citizen participation at local levels, and some form of decentralization; still others seem to hanker after some return to traditional moral standards that have been corroded by modernity. But none of these ideas is developed in sufficient detail to go much beyond the level of pious platitudes.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Study Project on Social Research and Development *by the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy of Science, 1978.* Volume I: The Federal Investment in Knowledge of Social Problems, Study Project Report. *114 pp. $7.00;* Volume 2: The Funding of Social Knowledge Production and Application: A Survey of Federal Agencies *by Mark A. Abramson. 487 pp. $17.50;* Volume 5: Knowledge and Policy: The Uncertain Connection *edited by Laurence E. Lynn. 183 pp., $8.25.*

In 1969, a blue-ribbon panel of social scientists published a quasi-official report, funded by the National Science Foundation, on the use of social science expertise by the nation's major institutions. In the heady atmosphere then prevailing, the writers proclaimed their doubt "that this country can successfully solve its challenging and diverse social problems unless it draws upon the increasing capabilities of the social science community." The upbeat title they chose for their study was *Knowledge into Action.*

Ten years later, we have another quasi-official, NSF-sponsored report by an eminent group of social scientists dealing with much the same subject. Like the earlier report, this represents, among other things, a genteel bid for more official recognition for social science. One of these volumes, however, is cautiously entitled *Knowledge and Policy: The Uncertain Connection.*

The contrast between the two titles tells much about the changed expectations of social science, and of social scientists, over the last ten years. But the generally less hortatory tone of this report by no means reflects a defensive mood. Instead these writers speak from a position much consolidated since ten years ago. The opening page of volume 1 announces: "The federal government invests nearly two billion dollars a year to acquire and use knowledge of social problems [as of 1977]. This figure is small when compared to the cost of research and development outside the social fields. . . . But it is three times larger in real terms than it was in the early 1960's." Thus we regard these three volumes as a stock-taking effort, a review of a successful conquest of a delimited but significant corner of federal policymaking turf. These studies ask, in effect, where has social science established itself in the world of federal policymaking? How are these $2 billion actually being

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spent? Who are the buyers, and what do they purchase? And—perhaps most importantly—how can social scientists' claims in these respects be enhanced?

As one might guess from these questions, these volumes are not the best place to look for general ideas. Most of the discussions stay close to the nuts and bolts of such matters as research design and policy formulation. Yet their overall effect is to imply a very particular view of the proper relation between social scientists and power holders.

The three books—three more remain to appear in the series—were commissioned by the National Science Foundation in 1974 and prepared by the National Research Council. Overall responsibility was in the hands of a panel of nine eminent social scientists headed by Donald Stokes of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School. Volume 1 is jointly authored by the members of the panel. Volume 2 appears under the authorship of Mark A. Abramson, director of the survey whose results are presented in it. Volume 5 is edited by Laurence Lynn, Jr., of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

Volume 1 gives an overview of the role of social science and social scientists in federal policymaking as of the late 1970s. The writers disaggregate federal expenditures for social science into what they term "knowledge-producing activities, including research, statistical reporting, program evaluations, and policy-formulating demonstrations that bear on social problems" (p. 9); and "knowledge-applying activities, including policy-implementing demonstrations, the development of materials, and other methods of synthesizing, disseminating, and using knowledge of social problems" (p. 9). The former, they note, claims about twice as much of the total expenditure for social science as the latter. Their interpretation of what constitutes a social science expenditure, let it be noted, is quite broad; "research, as it would generally be understood by the research community, claimed no more than 36 percent of the total obligations of $1.8 billion in fiscal 1976" (p. 32). This volume goes on to discuss political constraints affecting the federal use of social science, ambivalence among both officials and the general public as to what is expected from social science research, and a number of related subjects. It concludes with suggestions for enhancing the role of social science in federal policymaking.

Volume 2 presents the results of a survey conducted in 1976 of some 180 federal agencies' use of social science. This is an enormously detailed inventory of a heterogeneous list of activities carried out in an equally varied array of agencies. Here one can establish how much the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service spent for research in 1976 ($110,000), or how the Rural Electrification Service of the Department of Agriculture spent its $48,000 budget for social science activities during 1977 (it all went for statistics). One cannot imagine anyone reading this volume from cover to cover. But it will represent a standard resource for those seeking to sell social science to federal agencies and to future researchers studying social scientists' participation in federal activities.

Volume 5 is a series of essays on the ways in which social science succeeds and fails to be incorporated in the policy process. Most are by scholars with considerable direct experience in relating the two. Here, as in the other two volumes, detail usually prevails over generalities; most of the pieces are point-by-point accounts of how social science advice does or does not work in affecting policy, rather than arguments on behalf of a single, well-defined position. The exception is James Q. Wilson's pointed attack on social scientists' contribution of "expertise" to social problem solving. Wilson argues that what

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passes as social science advice is most often either impromptu rehearsals of untested ideas or the expressions of social scientists' personal prejudices, or both. This pugnacious stand —for which Wilson offers some strong arguments—goes against the grain of much of the other pieces.

Withal, these volumes are a workmanlike and useful collection. If they are not inspiring, inspiration was evidently never the authors' purpose. But in one way, the studies are downright disappointing. In the quest to understand how social science may make itself useful to those who hold power, other important public roles for social science are obscured. The insights of social science may be most urgently needed, after all, precisely when power holders least want to hear them. The point is frequently mentioned in these volumes that the contributions of social science are bound to be ineffective if prevailing political conditions do not make such contributions attractive to policymakers. To this, perhaps one should reply, "So much the worse for policymakers." For many of its most illustrious exponents, social science has been a way of mobilizing critical sensibilities *against* the exercise of power, rather than a way of streamlining its application. If the public role of social science entertained in these reports were all our disciplines could aspire to, we would all be impoverished indeed.

JAMES B. RULE
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 4 vols. *edited by Warren T. Reich. New York, Free Press, 1978. 1933 pp. $200.00.*

Just about everyone now knows that science and technology of all kinds produce social power and social consequences. Power and consequences, of course, in turn produce political, social, economic, and ethical problems. Another way to put this is to say that science and technology lead to social change and that social change requires a variety of political, social, economic, and value alterations and accommodations. Until quite recently, it was chiefly physical science and technology that produced power, consequences, and problems. Since World War II, biological science and technology have caught up with physical science in their consequentiality, and social science, perhaps especially economics, is coming fast along the track. In 1952, when I published my *Science and the Social Order,* a systematic and comprehensive book on the sociology of science, my discussion of "the social consequences of science" used examples only from the physical sciences and technology. How very much has happened since then: the flourishing of experimental biomedicine; effective and specific drug therapies; organ transplantation; *in vitro* fertilization; genetic engineering; and a great many other biological substances, devices, and procedures that powerfully affect our lives and our values.

As might have been expected, concern about the new power of biological science and technology has become widespread and increasing. This concern has fostered a variety of interwoven social and intellectual movements that collectively have come to be called

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"bioethics." Included under this rubric are new university curricula and specialized programs; social research; moral-philosophical analysis and casuistry; government regulation; endless conferences; media attention; popular books; free-standing research and action institutes; and a wide variety of specialized journals, newsletters, anthologies, and textbooks. Now, finally, to give an expert and comprehensive guide to this whole new specialty comes the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, an excellent and highly useful publication. (I have been informed by its publisher that it has sold 8,000 copies in its first year.) Warren T. Reich, of the Kennedy Institute for Ethics at Georgetown University, is editor in chief, and he has been assisted by eight associate editors and an editorial advisory board of sixty experts from eleven different countries and many disciplines. It would be hard to find any of the people who are knowledgeable of or have been active in the field of bioethics who are not included among these sixty-eight and among the actual contributors of articles. In short, the whole expert establishment of this new specialty has helped directly and indirectly to make these four volumes indispensable for experts and activists alike. The editor in chief stresses in his Preface that "the bibliographies are a major component of this encyclopedia."

It is, of course, impossible to be specific in a short review of an encyclopedia that has about 285 contributors and even more than that number of actual articles, since some contributors have done more than one article. I can only say that just about anything one might expect to find is here, and some interesting and unexpected articles as well. For example, "Women and Biomedicine," "Taoism," and "Obligations to Future Generations" are among the articles I was pleased, but surprised, to find.

I have only one small criticism to make, a criticism that comes out of my being a research and policy sociologist working in this field. There is not enough reference to existing empirical sociological research in the *Encyclopedia*. This is partly because there is not all that much, but even more so to the fact that there is at least a slight bias throughout the four volumes on the philosophical and theological disciplines as against the social sciences. This is a shortcoming that can easily be corrected in later editions of this valuable work.

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

Ombudsmen Compared *by Frank Stacey. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978. 256 pp. $26.00.*

The preface indicates that the purpose of this book was to compare the British parliamentary commissioner for administration with other selected ombudsmen in other countries and in Great Britain. Professor Stacey, who at the time of his death in 1977 was Francis Hill Professor of Local Government, University of Nottingham, had in his earlier study, "The British Ombudsman," touched only briefly on comparisons between the parliamentary commissioner and other ombudsmen.

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The widow of the author in a foreword states that at the time of his death the copy-editor's comments had just been received and she with the aid of some of his friends and colleagues guided the book through the final stages of publication. Revisions were made where changes had been intended.

The first four chapters deal with the Swedish parliamentary ombudsmen, the Danish ombudsman, the Norwegian ombudsman for administration, and the Norwegian ombudsman for the armed forces. Included in the latter chapter is a contribution by Stacey's colleague on the Federal Republic of Germany military ombudsman that states that only these two countries have military ombudsmen. This overlooks the Israel Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner office established in 1972 and is too sweeping in not pointing out that some ombudsmen (such as in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) also have jurisdiction over complaints concerning military personnel. In a comparison involving Scandinavian countries Finland must be included, and this major omission is acknowledged in the concluding chapter with some discussion on the Finnish ombudsman office.

The fifth chapter covers the eight Canadian provincial ombudsmen. Dr. Stacey visited Quebec, Manitoba, and New Brunswick so that special attention is given to these three offices. The result is that Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland are covered in summary fashion. More attention should have been paid to the Ontario ombudsman office because of its uniqueness—size of its staff, its policies, its budget, and the personality of its ombudsman. British Columbia, it should be noted, installed its first ombudsman in July, 1979.

The French mediateur is discussed in Chapter 6. Too little is available in the United States concerning this office and the description is, therefore, a welcome addition to ombudsman literature.

Three chapters cover the British parliamentary commissioner, the health commissioner, and the local commissioners for administration. With respect to the first office, the author sought to single out those features of the parliamentary commissioner that distinguished that office from the other ombudsmen studied, to examine the origins of the differences, and to assess the ways in which the office of parliamentary commissioner had developed in recent years.

Although the British legislation provides for separate health service commissioners for England, Wales, and Scotland, all three offices handling complaints against health authorities are held by the parliamentary commissioner for administration. But access to and the frame of reference of the two offices differ. Again, there is little writing available in the United States on the health commissioner and this chapter is particularly welcome. This is also true of the local commissioners for administration—the only national separate ombudsman system handling complaints against local government.

The concluding chapter surveys the worldwide developments of the ombudsman not covered in prior chapters and then makes comparisons resulting from the studies of the selected offices with respect to access, jurisdiction, exclusions, and exhaustion of remedies. Various strong elements of the British ombudsman systems are then discussed. Dr. Stacey, approving of the separate British offices, rejects a unified office but calls for better coordination and concludes that direct access to all British ombudsmen is a needed reform.

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A valuable select bibliography of seven pages is included. *Ombudsmen Compared* is an excellent study. It is to be regretted that Frank Stacey's death terminated the continuation of his research and writings in the field of ombudsmen.

BERNARD FRANK
International Bar Association Ombudsman Committee

Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? *by Charles E. McLure, Jr. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1979. 262 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

In the United States, the income of a corporation is taxed initially under the corporate income tax. If the after-tax income is paid out to an individual shareholder as a dividend, it is taxed a second time under the individual income tax. If the earnings are retained and increase the market value of the corporation's stock, 40 percent of the resulting capital gain is taxed under the individual income tax when the shareholder sells his stock.

The standard proposal to eliminate the double taxation of dividends is either to allow corporations to deduct them in computing corporate taxable income or to allow shareholders a credit against their individual income tax for that part of the corporate tax that is allocable to the income from which the dividend was paid. Under the shareholder credit approach, the credit would be included in the shareholder's taxable income just as if it were an additional dividend. A more ambitious program of integrating corporate and individual income taxes—full integration—would have shareholders include in taxable income not only their dividend but also their *pro rata* share of the corporation's retained earnings and would allow them a credit for their *pro rata* share of the corporate tax.

For decades, many lawyers and economists have recommended that the double taxation of corporate income be eliminated on the grounds that it is inequitable, that it discourages investment, that it biases investment away from corporations toward noncorporate businesses, that it encourages corporations to issue debt instead of equity, and that it encourages them to retain earnings instead of paying them out as dividends. All other major industrial countries have eliminated at least part of double taxation. The two chairmen of the congressional tax-writing committees, Senator Russell B. Long and Representative Al Ullman, support corporate integration, as did President Gerald Ford and candidate Jimmy Carter.

Why, then, does double taxation persist? One reason is that many of the spokesmen for the business community would prefer not to face the pressure from their shareholders for greater dividend payout that would surely result from corporate integration. A second reason is that corporate integration, being a fundamental change in an already complicated tax system, raises a host of specific issues—some technical but many substantive—that must be satisfactorily resolved before integration can be enacted.

McLure's book is an indispensable manual for anyone who wants to design a proposal for corporate integration or even just to understand the issues involved in designing one.

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These issues include: Should the corporate and individual income taxes be integrated just for dividends (dividend relief) or for retained earnings as well (full integration)? Should the various tax preferences received by corporations, such as the investment tax credit or percentage depletion, be passed through to shareholders as part of corporate integration or should the preferences be "washed out" as the corporate tax itself is washed out? Should tax-exempt shareholders or foreign shareholders be eligible for the benefits of integration even though they pay no U.S. income tax on their dividends? Should taxes paid by corporations to foreign governments give shareholders the same credit as taxes paid to the U.S. government?

Each of these issues is difficult, requiring judgments about what solutions are technically or administratively workable and what would be the economic impact of the various alternatives. McLure ably explains the alternative solutions, lists their pros and cons, and summarizes the solutions adopted in foreign tax systems. The merits of the various options were debated vigorously at the conference for which this book was written, which was held at The Brookings Institution in 1977. (The discussion at the conference is summarized in the final chapter of the book.)

The specific issues involved in designing a proposal for corporate integration require judgments about both legal and economic questions. The discussion at the Brookings conference revealed that the lawyers present had many more answers to the legal questions raised by integration than the economists had to the economic ones. Left unanswered, both by McLure and the conference, are such key economic questions as the response of corporate dividend payout policy to various kinds of integration, the response of overall saving and investment, and the response of tax-exempt or foreign shareholders to their inclusion or exclusion from the benefits of integration. It would be unfair to expect McLure to have answers to all these questions, but more emphasis on the economic questions raised by various approaches to corporate integration would have been appropriate.

In short, McLure has written a useful book that should be read by anyone seriously interested in the taxation of income from capital.

JAMES W. WETZLER
Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. Congress

Foreign State Enterprises: A Threat to American Business *by Douglas F. Lamont. New York, Basic Books, 1979. 272 pp. $11.95.*

This study focuses primarily on "the expanding role of government-owned industrial firms as competitive corporations throughout the developed world" (p. 8). The author's main thesis is that state enterprises are growing and are creating new challenges to private sector business. He pays special attention to the mounting threats to U.S. industry—the subsidiaries of such companies in this country in particular.

Lamont's book is representative of an emerging school of thought that holds that state enterprises enjoy special advantages that result in their posing "unfair" competitive threats to private companies. Such advantages include more or less explicit subsidies

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from the government, low-interest loans, preferential procurement conditions, captive domestic markets, and generally, less pressure to earn a return on capital invested. Lamont concludes that the U.S. government should adopt measures to counterbalance foreign state capitalism: "In a time of the decay of the traditional political economy, a strong state enterprise capitalism grafted to our market economy is both a greater necessity than ever before and a greater risk. The nation now requires federal government intervention in certain domestic and foreign economic problems to help American business ward off and avoid serious dangers in the coming decade" (p. 235).

This book is informative. It proceeds essentially from an analysis of fifty-nine state enterprises from the author's data bank. Unfortunately the "analytical methodology" (p. 249) is never fully explained, and it is not always easy to follow on what grounds certain statements about the behavior of state enterprises are made. The result is that certain arguments are not truly persuasive.

True, state enterprises do enjoy certain special advantages. But so do many private enterprises—for example, special loans to high-technology firms or favorable government contracts. And these companies are under pressure to pursue certain national goals that stand in the way of optimal economic performance and international expansion: they must invest in backward regions at home, contribute to the government's employment policies by retaining production at home, focus on the exploitation of often less attractive domestic natural resources, and be at the forefront of social progress. Finally, and most significantly, the decision-making process in these companies is often burdened with grave inefficiencies. They are subjected not only to a variety of administrative controls that result in a tendency to perpetuate the status quo, but also to a multiplicity of political interventions aimed at the pursuit of partisan ends that often have little to do either with microeconomic performance or macro-socioeconomic goals.

Lamont's book says little about this. And indeed his approach does not allow him to grasp all the relevant factors. In order to understand and predict the behavior of state-owned enterprises, one must analyze how they function internally—explain how decisions are taken and how actions are shaped. One must go *inside* these organizations to do this: due to their bureaucracy and the attitudes of the key persons involved (politicians in particular), they do not constitute as much of a threat as one might think by looking at them from the outside. Based on my own research on the subject, I think it is unlikely that foreign state-owned companies will "gain control" of the U.S. economy.

RENATO MAZZOLINI
Columbia University

The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition *by John H. Backer. Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1978. 212 pp. $9.95.*

Combining rich personal experience and careful archival research, as he did in writing *Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies, 1945–1948* (Duke University Press, 1971), Backer concludes that the division of Germany was "confirmed" at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in the spring of 1947, but

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shows that the decision to divide the country was the result of various actions, policies, inclinations, and perceptions. Challenging current interpretations that emphasize American or Soviet grand designs, Backer argues that division was the result of "a series of small, incremental decisions, sometimes taken at the lower levels of government and often prompted by expediency rather than by long-term considerations" (p. ix).

In tracing and describing the incremental decisions, Backer discusses a host of significant topics and analyzes their relationships: American planning for the postwar period, the historical perceptions of World War I that American planners had, reparations before and after the Potsdam conference, lend-lease to Russia and its continuation after the war, an American postwar reconstruction loan or credit to the Soviet Union, four-power control in Berlin and the problem of establishing central German administrations, the 1946 level-of-industry plan for Germany, the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith currency reform proposals, the Soviet-American dispute regarding control of the currency printing plates, Clay's stoppage of reparations shipments from the American zone of Germany, Byrnes's contribution to British and American zonal union, his policy speech in Stuttgart in September 1946, and the CFM meeting in Moscow in March and April, 1947.

The reparations issue was "the straw that eventually broke the [wartime] alliance's back" (p. 46), and it is the theme of Backer's book. He considers Russia's reparations claims to have been reasonable, and he seems to believe that American unwillingness to negotiate a settlement was the ultimate cause of Germany's division. He notes, for example, that at Potsdam an American offer of a "few billion dollars in credits directly or through Germany might have been instrumental in providing the Soviets with needed equipment, thus defusing the most explosive aspects of the reparations issue" (p. 87). Finally, after a long and interesting discussion of reparations from current production as an issue before and during the Moscow CFM, he says "that a constructive effort should have been made." He admits that "the Kremlin's aggressive posture had become a major irritant," but he finds the rationale for the U.S. position at Moscow to be unconvincing and states that "the long-range consequences of the chosen policy were not duly appraised" (p. 178).

Backer makes several noteworthy observations: The Potsdam reparations agreement was an interim agreement (p. 162). The American position on reparations changed between August 1945 and September 1946, not because of ideology but as a gradual evolution (p. 163). The Russians were the first to "go public" over the issues in Germany, beginning with Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, and continuing with Molotov's statements at the Paris CFM in July, 1946 (pp. 87, 99, 151). According to Backer, Stalin's speech was a reaction to the fact that Russia would get neither an American loan nor substantial reparations from Germany. Molotov's statements were in response to Clay's reparations stoppage and other things.

Backer regards France's resistance to central German administrations and French frustration of the Allied Control Council on other issues as a secondary issue in the division of Germany. In my opinion, he reaches that conclusion by underestimating the influence France had, especially in the Moscow CFM which he finds to be so crucial, and by reading something into the memorandum the French presented to the London CFM on September 14, 1945 (p. 135). There is nothing in that memorandum, and to my knowl-

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edge there is nothing in other French policy papers, statements, or actions, to suggest that France would "make concessions," even "as a last resort" (p. 135).

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State University

The Constitution and Chief Justice Marshall *by William F. Swindler. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1979. 414 pp. $17.95.*

Swindler's book is an outgrowth of a series of five documentary films illustrating constitutional issues of the era of John Marshall. This series was commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the United States, produced by WQED of Pittsburgh, and shown generally on public television in 1977–78. Professor Swindler served as a consultant to the Bicentennial Committee of the Justice Conference, which developed the documentary idea, and has also served as chairman of the Publications Committee of the Supreme Court Historical Society, while on the law faculty of William and Mary. Chief Justice Warren Burger contributed the Introduction of the work, as well as a portion of his Bentham Lecture on "The Doctrine of Judicial Review," delivered at London University College in 1972.

The book otherwise consists of two major sections; in Part One Swindler provides background essays to the four cases dealt with in the television series: *Marbury* v. *Madison, United States* v. *Burr* (two chapters), *McCulloch* v. *Maryland,* and *Gibbons* v. *Ogden,* plus a chapter on the contract questions focused on the *Dartmouth College Case.* Part Three contains the opinions delivered in the five cases, plus supporting documents; curiously, the arguments made by counsel in each case are not among these documents.

John Marshall has attracted much scholarly attention since the publication of Albert Beveridge's massive work and the treatise by Charles Warren, both of which Swindler relies upon. Certainly the books and articles of such scholars as Edward Corwin, Felix Frankfurter, Benjamin Wright, Edmund Cahn, Gerald Garvey, Donald Roper, and Joseph Burke provide profound and original insight into the jurisprudence of Marshall and his colleagues; and Leonard Baker's *John Marshall: A Life in Law* provides useful information about Marshall's personal character and beliefs, although it contains a less useful treatment of jurisprudence. In fact, Corwin's *John Marshall and the Constitution* (Yale: 1919) provides with great clarity and simplicity exactly the device that Chief Justice Burger seems to call for in his introduction to make the court "better understood by Americans as we celebrate 200 years of independence" (p. xiii), at least as far as a better understanding of the Marshall Court is useful to that end.

Few people in the general public will read or profit from the documents or opinions contained in Part Three of Swindler's book; nor are there any gems of wisdom or scholarship to be found in Burger's attached Appendix. The merit of the book must be sought in the background chapters done by Swindler in Part One. What is found in those chapters is a not particularly original treatment of the issues leading up to the five cases mentioned above, with heavy reliance upon Beveridge, Warren, and Baker. What is lost in this treat-

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ment, in part, is a sense of the very real goals that ran through Marshall's jurisprudence, particularly the importance Marshall attached to protecting the image of the Supreme Court as an arbiter of the federal system. Just as important, the prominence given to the five cases obscures an equally important value that Marshall cherished: primary reliance upon political restraints, with judicial review being an auxilliary precaution only. Thus, in the treatment of *Marbury*, much more is read into *Marbury* by Swindler than Marshall intended to be delivered. One is also left with the wish that Swindler had compared Marshall's hopes even in *McCulloch* or *Gibbons* with the changes effected by later courts, including the Burger Court in such cases as *Usury*. Access to even fifty pages in a published book presents a unique opportunity to contribute original scholarship and new insight into many issues of jurisprudence not fully understood. It is perhaps unfair to expect this from an outgrowth of a documentary film project, but one is nevertheless left without a reason to use this book as a vehicle for greater understanding of the Supreme Court.

DOUGLAS CAMP CHAFFEY
Chatham College

The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures *by Paul Kleppner. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1979. 424 pp. $21.00.*

This is an ambitious book and—on its own, impressive terms—successful. By extending and revising the analysis in his earlier study, *The Cross of Culture*, Paul Kleppner has now fashioned a comprehensive portrait of voting behavior in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century and of the "group subcultures" that underlay it. The book's strengths lie in its weaving of local, state, and regional patterns into the whole texture of the nation's voting culture (the United States does not just become the Midwest writ large); its effective use of qualitative evidence, particularly denominational records; and, perhaps above all, the richness of its insights into nineteenth-century politics—a quality reminiscent of Lee Benson's *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*.

Like Benson's study, however, Kleppner's new book tries to be both a handbook of how to do political history and a contribution in its own right. The first chapter offers a rationale for placing electoral behavior at the center of political history, while the last chapter stridently defends the "ethnocultural school" (which is surprisingly small, according to Kleppner's enumeration of its members) against its critics. Throughout, Kleppner remains doctrinaire about what political history ought to be and harsh toward historians who have not been sufficiently respectful of nineteenth-century political parties and elections. His language is often overblown and his claims sometimes seem too great. But Kleppner's achievement transcends these annoyances.

Those familiar with his earlier work will recognize the book's central argument: "Partisan identifications mirrored irreconcilably conflicting values emanating from divergent ethnic and religious subcultures" (p. 144). Yet Kleppner shows an admirable capacity to recast his analysis. Three modifications particularly stand out. First is his systematic at-

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tention to "contextual" variations in group behavior: historical experiences, settlement patterns, and doctrinal disagreements all modified a group's partisan preferences, so that in different contexts its members behaved differently. Kleppner's second key revision marks a special case of the first: a distinction between "evangelical pietists" and "salvationist pietists." The former (who correspond to the pietists of *The Cross of Culture*) felt a moral obligation to use politics to purge the community of sin and accordingly voted Republican; the latter (mostly Southerners) felt no such urge and voted Democratic. Finally, Kleppner's treatment of late nineteenth-century Farmer-Labor parties leads him to a serious analytical effort to specify the conditions under which economic identities—while not normally salient to partisan choice—could become temporarily significant. The "contextual" thesis, which pervades the book, allows Kleppner to acknowledge that voters might feel "cross-pressured between their ethnocultural and religious identities" (p. 193) and renders his account of voting behavior more persuasive than before. Though Kleppner does not acknowledge it, these changes significantly address the criticisms of those he castigates in his final chapter.

Granting the excellence of Kleppner's study of his chosen topic, American voting behavior from 1853 to 1892, where do the problems lie? They lie, I believe, at the boundaries of his subject: with the party systems-realignment model on which his periodization rests and with the relationship between voting and the larger political system.

Accepting Walter Dean Burnham's concept of successive party systems separated by realigning elections, Kleppner chose his starting and ending dates accordingly, but he only partly succeeds in showing the third electoral era to have differed in basic political respects from the surrounding eras. Words like "seismic" and "massive" are used to describe the realignment of the 1850s, but Kleppner shows these terms to be much less applicable to some areas than others. His research design precluded a comparable treatment of the realignment of the 1890s. More useful than a periodizing model based narrowly on voting alignments might be one based broadly on the character of political participation: the era of deference (to the 1830s); the "party period" of active partisan voting (1830s to the early 1900s); and the interest-group era (beginning in the early 1900s).

As in his earlier study, Kleppner is somewhat inconsistent about the relationship between electoral behavior and policymaking. After observing that parties did not perform the task of "integrating or articulating policies" (p. 208), Kleppner later asserts that "party oppositions structured policy" (p. 378). He devotes his final ten pages to a thoughtful discussion of the voting-policy connection, but his prescription for future research mainly comes down to looking at the correspondence between party lines in the electorate and in the legislature. Eventually Kleppner, along with the rest of us, will have to deal with the problem more broadly than that. Certainly this excellent book's chief contributions lie elsewhere.

RICHARD L. MCCORMICK
Rutgers University

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The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt *by Edmund Morris. New York, Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1979. 886 pp. $15.95.*

There is no better subject for a biography in American history than Theodore Roosevelt. The importance of his career, the versatility of his interests, the abundance of his energy, the exuberance of his personality, and the complexity of his mind made him the most fascinating man of his age; and, since a seemingly endless stream of letters, articles, and books flowed from his pen, his thoughts are well documented. Edmund Morris has thoroughly mastered these materials and has produced an engrossing volume on Roosevelt's presidential career. Morris is best in capturing his subject's overwhelming personality and in delineating the baffling contradictions of his psyche. Though his love, understanding, and knowledge of animals was genuine, no one enjoyed hunting and slaughtering animals more than Theodore Roosevelt. He "abandoned himself to complete hysteria . . . whooping and shrieking" while he danced "like an Indian war-chief" around the first buffalo he killed (p. 224).

Roosevelt drove himself to incredible lengths to be in on the kill—whether stalking a grizzly bear in the West, riding to the hounds on Long Island, or charging up Kettle and San Juan hills in Cuba. Killing brought him peace. Killing the grizzly helped him get over his first wife's death and become interested in his baby daughter Alice; and killing a Spaniard, "neatly as a jackrabbit" (p. 655), on Kettle Hill purged Roosevelt of the "bellicose poisons [that] had been breeding in him since infancy," and he became "at last, incongruously but wholeheartedly, a man of peace" (p. 661).

Since Theodore Roosevelt was the chief actor on every stage he stepped upon, his career is full of dramatic touches, and Morris makes the most of them. Morris also brilliantly summarizes phases of Roosevelt's career. Though Roosevelt, for example, lost a fortune in the Badlands, Morris enumerates the invaluable intangible assets he gained there—assets that later made him president (p. 374). Besides understanding his personality and noting his "fierce hunger for power" (p. 676), Morris recognizes that Theodore Roosevelt was a shrewd public relations man who mobilized the people behind him by giving the press good copy. Thanks to his dramatic flair, Roosevelt became popular while espousing reform, exposing corruption, and discussing issues. Though he supported the Republican party's nominees, including Blaine, Roosevelt was independent, and since he could not be controlled, Thomas C. Platt wanted to eliminate him. The only way Platt could find to get rid of New York's enormously popular governor was to make him vice-president in 1901.

Though Morris's knowledge and use of Roosevelt materials is unmatched, he is not steeped in the historical literature of the late nineteenth century. A few minor errors involving background material, such as calling Samuel Jones of Toledo a governor, illustrate the point, as does the exaggerated statement that "Presidents Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, and Harrison had all sat" in Platt's "Amen" corner "to await his decisions" (p. 519). Morris also occasionally oversimplifies complex issues and neglects important sources. He states that "the two major parties were diametrically opposed in their attitudes toward" (p. 385) the tariff in late 1887 when in fact Republicans and Democrats disagreed among themselves on the tariff, and he does not use Lee Benson's work on the 1884 election. Though sometimes devastatingly critical of Roosevelt, Morris usually puts

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the best face on his subject's actions, attitudes, and accomplishments. He demonstrates convincingly that Roosevelt's racism was tempered by his admiration of "any black or red man who could win admission to 'the fellowship of doers' " (pp. 464–65) and buries in a footnote Theodore Roosevelt's only hint of anti-Semitism—a reference to "Jew" bankers (p. 831, n. 62). Even while emphasizing Roosevelt's many virtues, Morris manages to maintain a healthy critical attitude in this balanced and superbly written biography.

ARI HOOGENBOOM
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict *edited by Michael Howard. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979. 173 pp. $16.95.*

This collection of essays by eight British scholars brings together the issues of legal restraint and strategic limitation of war. Michael Howard leads off with the assertion that war is, in principle, the purposeful and disciplined use of violence by authorized agents of organized social groups, and the acknowledgment that armed conflict always stands in danger of degenerating into random and senseless violence. The contributors to this volume are concerned with that problem of degeneration, some as students of the international legal effort to humanize war and others as strategists who deal with deterrence theory and the issue of escalation.

The late nineteenth century appears to have been the golden age of optimism about the imposition of restraints upon the conduct of war and of systematic development of legal codes and procedures to that end. That development, which several of the authors help to illuminate, was clearly related to the distinction between state and society and the limitation of the functions of government that were typical of the age. Only in such an age could soldiers be sharply distinguished from civilians and war be considered an affair of the former that should be permitted to affect the latter as little as possible. Only in such an age could international trade be regarded as entitled, because of its association with the private economic sector, to be sheltered from the impact of the state's military enterprise. Efforts to limit the effects of war in our time are inevitably complicated by social and governmental trends that diminish the plausibility of the line that was formerly drawn between the wartime activities of private persons and those of governmental agents. Geoffrey Best raises the stark question: "has the civilian, as liberal Europe used to know him, become extinct" (p. 36)?

Among the factors treated in this book as obstacles to the effective regulation of war is the doctrine of just war (in both its traditional and its twentieth-century versions), which tends to provide a rationale for rejecting inhibitions. As Howard puts it, "To submit to restraints which prejudiced ones (*sic*) chances of victory when fighting in a righteous cause, to accept the concept of *jus in bello* [law of war] when one had an unquestionable *jus ad bellum* [right to resort to war], was a paradox which few warring communities . . . found it easy to accept" (p. 5). One may recognize the danger of just wars being converted into holy wars, fought with ideological fervor that overrides all scruples and destroys all moderation, but that is not to be avoided by telling people that ideological passions

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are dangerous. People do not make calculated decisions about how much to care whether their sacred causes triumph or not. When they care very deeply, the law of war, restricting the conduct of hostilities, is unlikely to flourish. In his essay on "Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality," G. I. A. D. Draper suggests with some asperity that today's national liberation movements, while purporting to be concerned about *jus in bello*, are in fact preoccupied with their *jus ad bellum*.

Indeed, for all their concern to prevent war from getting out of hand, these essayists are not absolutely committed to the primacy of restraint over victory. They are unlikely to approve ruthless crusades to promote sacred causes, but I suspect that Howard is not alone among them in being convinced that effectiveness is a more important consideration than restraint when the survival of one's state and of the values that it nourishes is seen to be at stake. To quote him again: "Wars today can be irreversible in their consequences. There is thus little inclination to conduct them with restraint" (p. 6). John Garnett reminds us, however, that in the nuclear age restraint (in the sense of avoidance of escalation) may be essential, rather than inimical, to the survival of a society.

This book provides much food for thought about the key questions—how, why, when, and whether—pertaining to the exercise of restraint when states are at war.

Inis L. Claude, Jr.
University of Virginia

Bargaining in International Conflicts *by Charles Lockhart. New York, Columbia University Press, 1979. 205 pp. $12.50.*

This concise but valuable book attempts to carry the logic of bargaining beyond the relatively deterministic level, at which it has often been left in the analyses of economics and game theory, to the inherently fuzzier processes by which we must sort out our severe international conflicts. After beginning with clear and comprehensive surveys of the literature on formal models of bargaining and on bargaining experiments, it moves ahead to a range of interesting case illustrations of actual international crises to develop some of the subjective and dynamic nature of the bargaining that in the end settles issues of war and peace.

Lockhart's work reflects the influence of Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, and of Robert Jervis, and Alexander George, watching for the ins and outs of real bargaining strengths, and *perceived* bargaining strengths, as they shape the actions of both sides to a contest of wills. His analysis throughout is balanced and thoughtful, and his "analytical chronology" of bargaining in the final chapter is indeed interesting enough to prod a reader to try to apply it to new crises as they emerge or to other favorite examples from history (although Lockhart would characteristically be careful to avoid claiming that this amounts to an all-purpose taxonomy that would be clarifying and valuable for every case).

There are points in the book where the presentation is less clear and focused than many readers might desire, especially those familiar with the bargaining literature that evolved in the early 1960s around the alternatives of "prisoner's dilemma" and "chicken" models. Yet this might almost be necessary, as in the writings of Snyder and Diesing, to be consis-

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tent with the author's major thrust. Rather than achieving the elegant clarity of Schelling or Rapoport, the intent of this wave of analysis is to watch for the secondary points where such elegance would mislead us as to what had really caused a crisis, or had really led to the particular strategies adopted. What was so neat and clean and deterministic may always be more fun to read and watch here, and it indeed in the past captured some important parts of the total of the explanation of international conflict, converting what otherwise looked like paradox or confusion into very understandable phenomena. Yet the rest of the variance that now needs to be explained may often have to get into some messier questions, not just what numbers are in the boxes of the matrix, but how the numbers change their appearance to the players themselves as each round of play induces new perceptions or misperceptions.

One of his most striking general conclusions, which many of us will feel rings true for the historical cases with which we are personally most familiar, is that an international crisis is very often viewed entirely differently by the two sides, in terms of what the conflict is about, what constitutes a victory or defeat, what strategic choices there are. Blind men may thus not only differ about elephants, but also about their wrestling matches with each other.

Lockhart's comprehension of the prior literature on international bargaining is competent throughout. His book makes important additions to it and will be of interest to all students of the subject.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
Cornell University

Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective *by Shlomo Aronson. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 448 pp. $18.95.*

During a period of substantial strain in American-Israeli relations, the concerns and constraints underlying Israeli foreign policy merit scholarly attention. Shlomo Aronson, an Israeli political scientist, traces the relationship between his country's domestic political structures, it perceptions of the Arabs, and its receptivity to American peacemaking efforts. Unfortunately, his insightful observations and thorough research findings are conveyed in a pedantic style that lacks clear analytical focus.

Aronson asserts that in Israel, since the June 1967 war, "a very complicated domestic set-up helped create a simplistic foreign policy" (p. 107). A progressive trend toward amalgamation within the ruling Labor party coalition precluded consensus among unreconciled factions. Israeli leaders were therefore obliged to devise ad hoc responses to initiatives by other states. Meanwhile, an "active, floating public" often took matters in its own hands, as when small groups spearheaded unauthorized settlements in occupied territories. Public yearning for effective leadership and disenchantment with Labor's indecisiveness contributed to the election of Prime Minister Begin in 1977.

A reactive foreign policy also may be traced to Israel's satisfaction with its strategic situation after the 1967 war. Discussing Israel's military strategy, Aronson does not ade-

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quately explore the rationale and consequences of reprisals against Palestinian guerrilla targets in Jordan and Lebanon. However, he pays more attention than most analysts to the evolution of the Israeli nuclear option. In his view, awareness of Israel's "bomb in the basement" restrained the scope of the Arab assault in the October 1973 war.

On the regional level, an activist Israeli foreign policy was precluded by distrust of "moderate" Arab bargaining positions. The Arab-Israel conflict had always been perceived as a "zero-sum game." The asymmetry in bargaining assets was a built-in constraint for Israel, which was reluctant to make "concrete concessions for a mere signature" (p. 149). Israel feared that "agreements made with Arab dictators like Sadat or Assad might be nullified or transgressed by their successors" (p. 345). Arab solidarity was considered inherently dangerous, and the author apparently believes that Israel was wise in attempting to "drive a wedge" between Egypt and other Arab states.

The main focus of Israel's foreign policy, however, has been the United States, rather than its own neighbors. Aronson asserts that in supplying Israel with arms, "Washington . . . did not want to increase its customer's autonomy; a degree of dependence would give the United States leverage for extracting Israeli concessions to the Arabs" (p. 99). The October 1973 war disrupted the perceived community of interests between the United States and Israel, since Egypt began to evolve into a rival American client. As "step-by-step" diplomacy became the cornerstone of American peacemaking efforts, Secretary of State Kissinger advanced a "neo-functionalist theory." He argued that resolving peripheral issues in the Arab-Israel conflict would have positive spillover effects in dealing with "core" issues, such as Palestinian rights. Aronson, by contrast, suggests that Israeli concessions to achieve agreement with Egypt may generate reluctance to surrender still more bargaining chips in the West Bank and Gaza. One thing that is certain, however, is that "both parties in the Middle East conflict are looking now toward Washington." The prospects for accommodation will depend on their relative ability "to mobilize American support for their respective positions, to resist American positions or pressures, and to adopt compromise formulas" (p. 365).

NAOMI JOY WILLIAMS
Yale University

Distortion or Development? Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation *by Thomas J. Biersteker. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1978. 199 pp. $17.50.*

The objective of this book is to compare and evaluate two contending paradigms of the effects of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on development. These alternative theoretical perspectives are identified as the "critical perspective" of dependency theory and the "neoconventional perspective" of economists such as Ray Vernon and his colleagues who have participated in the Harvard Business School's MNE project. Biersteker gives a thorough taxonomic account of these perspectives, in chapters 1 and 2 respectively, and then points up their major areas of agreement and disagreement in chapter 3. Here he makes a useful distinction between matched arguments, where contending propositions can be

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contrasted, and mismatched arguments, "in which the two approaches direct their arguments past each other" (p. 49). In the remaining half of the book the author applies his theoretical analysis to a case study of multinational investment in Nigeria.

The findings of the theoretical section are neatly summarized in a series of seven tables. In each of the first two chapters are listed the main points made by proponents of each perspective, with, in chapter 3, the author's interpretation of matched and mismatched arguments about the impact of the MNE on development. The seven topics are: balance of payments effects; displacement of indigenous production; extent of technology transfer; appropriateness of the technology; patterns of consumption; local social structures; and income distribution effects. Given the emotional nature of much of the criticism of the MNE, the author is to be congratulated on his excellent analytical statement of the critical perspective and his balanced assessment of it and the contending neoconventional perspective. On methodological grounds some economists might quibble with this approach, since not all the contending propositions can be tested. Yet it is a useful contribution to have the nonaddressed arguments and mismatched propositions of the two paradigms expressed explicitly. It may help the two camps understand each other's work, instead of persisting in the common practice of ignoring it.

The empirical work of chapters 4 through 8 is based on an interesting case study of Nigeria that uses an elaborate data base (described in an appendix) with information on sixty economic and financial variables for a sample of foreign and domestic firms in the industry groups of textiles, cement, sawmilling, and sugar refining. Data for the 1963–1972 period are collected for sixty firms, giving a total of 293 cases after allowing for missing or unreliable data. There may be more of the latter than the author believes since some of the financial information on capital sourcing, remitted profits, dividends, and transfer pricing came from interviews with firm accountants and managers. The information from such interviews will probably incorporate many subjective biases and is less reliable than the data from the Central Bank and Industrial Survey Division of the government statistics office. Fortunately most data come from these official sources.

Biersteker does not find all that much evidence from his field work on Nigeria to support the critical perspective of the MNE. For example, in chapter 5 he reports that local financing predominates (as it does elsewhere), exporting is substantial, transfer pricing does not exist, and the remission of profits is not a problem. Although there is a net outflow of capital from MNEs in manufacturing, this outflow is trivial relative to Nigeria's oil revenues. Due to the abundant foreign-exchange reserves, there has been less tension in Nigeria between the MNE and nation-state than in other developing nations. Indeed, dependency theory seems less applicable to Africa, in general, than to Latin America.

I have two comments on this chapter. First, when testing the linkages hypothesis (p. 90), I think that the imports percentage should be treated as an independent variable rather than as a dependent variable, since in the present form only a couple of dummy variables are significant and size is not—a surprising result. Second, the author argues that when Biafra was blockaded during the civil war the region was able to develop indigenous production, even in the relatively sophisticated technology of petroleum refining. He says that "the Biafran case suggests that feasible alternatives to the multinational corporation exist in Nigeria" (p. 100). Yet this historical situation seems more an example of response to war conditions than a scientific experiment in alternative technology. Fur-

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ther, the author ignores the basic question of costs and fails to ask if such indigenous production is efficient. But perhaps such comments are too "neoconventional"?

ALAN M. RUGMAN
Columbia University

Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-Nation Comparison *by Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-o Kim. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 394 pp. $19.95.*

This study may well become a landmark in comparative political research, since it constitutes an exemplary fusion of careful theory building and rigorous methodology in the service of theory testing. The work builds on Verba and Nie's *Political Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) which observed that despite the lifting of legal barriers to participation, the composition of the participant population was not representative of the U.S. population-at-large. Having noted in the concluding chapters of their earlier study that a similar phenomenon characterized India and Yugoslavia but not other democracies, the authors again ask: "Why should there be this variation in the relation between status and activity? And why should three nations as different as the United States, India, and Yugoslavia appear so similar in this respect" (p. 18)?

The current volume seeks to answer this question. To do so, the authors and cooperating teams of foreign researchers collected by means of sample surveys—over a ten-year period—data on participation in seven nations where universal suffrage prevailed. The sample nations are Austria, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United States, and Yugoslavia—all of which were designated as "democracies."

The answer to the question—formulated first as a hypothesis—is that "an individual-based process of political mobilization in which citizens convert individual resources based on income and education into political activity would lead to a uniformly strong relationship between our socioeconomic resources scale and political activity across nations were it not for the differential intervening effect of group-based processes in the various nations" (p. 64).

Testing this hypothesis is what the book is all about. After a very perceptive and clearly written chapter on comparative methodology (making a valiant case for hypothesis testing under conditions of maximum difference), the authors proceed to develop the theory from which the above hypothesis is derived. They go about this in much the same way as they did in 1972, initially sketching a very general, simplified model and carefully refining it by the gradual addition of other variables. This way they come to gain a firm grip on their understanding of the ways in which individuals convert or fail to convert their own resources into political activity.

What they find is that all other things being equal, individuals with more socioeconomic resources are more active and better able to convert these resources into political ones. All other things, however, are not always equal. Political institutions, especially parties, can dilute (as well as add to) the impact of these resources. Where parties manage to at-

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tract individuals from the lower ranks of the status hierarchy and to wield them into a cohesive unit, such individuals can compensate for their lower personal resources; but where parties attract mainly those from the upper strata, the less resourceful citizens are doubly penalized. Parties, voluntary organizations, and other affiliations thus can serve as equalizers. This seems to be the case in nations where there are strong parties that differ significantly from each other in the composition of their memberships; Austria, for example, fits this model well with its strongly blue-collar-based Socialist party and its rural and business-dominated conservative party. Here workers and farmers participate more than one would anticipate on the basis of social status alone. The parties' ability to mobilize the less well endowed, however, does not cut uniformly across all modes of participation but is mainly effective in the realm of voting. Where institutions play a particularly important role, the unaffiliated tend to become "locked out" irrespective of their individual resources.

Perhaps the most interesting and ingenuous part of the stratification analysis is the documentation that within parties of this type inequalities nonetheless persist. Even in parties based on lower-strata membership, those with more socioeconomic resources tend to dominate, be it in participation or in leadership. Equalization of resources apparently goes just so far. This observation applies to parties of the Right as well as the Left and thus "both contribute equally to the dissolution of the relationship between SERL [socioeconomic resources] and voting" (p. 152).

One of the most innovative chapters concerns the impact of parties and organizations that are based on cleavages other than the customary class cleavage. The authors show that "If particular social groups are in an unambiguous cleavage position and are well institutionalized, they ought to overparticipate—that is, participate more than one would predict on the basis of individual resources or motivation of their members. They will do so because of group-specific motivation and institutional mobilization" (p. 169).

The chapter on women demonstrates that, with the exception of the United States, women have not succeeded in converting resources into participation. Could it perhaps be because they lack the "unambiguous cleavage position" that could serve as the foundation for a strong organization? The authors do not check this possibility but instead test two competing hypotheses with somewhat inconclusive results.

As with any pioneering work, *Participation and Political Equality* is not free of shortcomings and flaws. One of these surely must be the modes of participation singled out for investigation (voting, campaigning, communal activities, and particularized contacting). Here, as in their earlier volume, the authors deliberately exclude what they call activities "outside of the system," such as demonstrations, boycotts, and other forms of legal behavior that have come into increasingly wide use in the last decade or two and now are part of the standard participation repertoire. Nor have they made adequate provisions for individual and group lobbying activities on a national scale. Many of the consumer, environmental, as well as business, labor, and religious "contacting" acts cannot be accommodated under their category "community contacting." It may well be that in some nations the unaffiliated are "locked out" from voting and campaigning, but what if they channel their superior resources into attempts to affect policy decisions? Admittedly, formulating questions about such endeavors which could be utilized in seven so diverse nations might pose problems but so does ignoring alternate modes.

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Another drawback is the sample itself. True, a maximum-difference design is the most challenging. In this instance, however, it required dropping two nations (Nigeria and Yugoslavia) from many of the major analyses. This perfectly understandable strategy does raise some questions about the generalizability of the model. And even in instances where the full complement of nations is examined, some doubts remain unresolved. For example, in Yugoslavia we notice a strong relationship between SERL and participation. In that nation, however, party membership frequently is the necessary precondition for obtaining these very resources (such as education). Is it really comparable to the U.S. pattern if such resource-rich individuals predominate in party affairs? Unless we are certain that the same modes really have the same significance for participants across the nations, we can never completely dismiss the suspicion that we might be comparing the proverbial apples and oranges.

One reason why it is so difficult to make that determination has to do with the research design. Although no copy of the complete interview schedule can be found in the Appendix, the items reproduced in it suggest that most of the questions were highly structured and of the closed-ended variety. Apparently this was the most practical (if not actually the only feasible) research strategy, but it does not offer us the insight into the meaning and significance of some behaviors that a less structured format would have offered. Other shortcomings are of the type against which investigators in the field frequently are unable to protect themselves, such as the revolution in Nigeria, or inability to get access to certain regions of the country (India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia). Each can potentially detract from the findings, but the authors were probably right in deciding to keep these nations in the sample.

Far more important than the shortcomings is the contribution the authors have made with their novel way of explaining the persistence of inequality in political systems that are "in principle equalitarian" (p. 1). While it undoubtedly is not and will not be the last, definitive explanation, it has broadened our understanding of participation much as *The Civic Culture* did in its day.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
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Technology and International Relations *by John V. Granger. San Francisco, Calif., W.H. Freeman and Co., 1979. 202 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $6.50.*

The publication of John V. Granger's book could not have been more timely: important events in 1979 included a United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, which capped a three-year effort to create programs for harnessing science and technology to promote Third World development; the debate on ratification of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II); and the third intergovernmental conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which continued its efforts to secure agreement on an international code of conduct to govern technology transfer.

The purpose of Mr. Granger's book is to show how these types of international issues

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are addressed and regulated at the domestic (U.S.) and international levels, "to identify obstacles to successful policy formation . . . and to suggest ways of strengthening the capabilities of governments . . . and of international organizations in dealing with these matters" (p. ix). He seeks to explore the public policy implications of "international technological interdependence" and to provide "a cohesive approach, an organizing idea" to frame the relationship between technology and foreign affairs.

The central argument of this book is that advances in technology have created international interdependence, and that this, in turn, makes it imperative for governments to cooperate on scientific and technological ventures and problems through bilateral arrangements and international institutions. The use of these avenues has failed before, according to the author, because technology issues were not completely understood. This was because national policymakers and bureaucrats of international organizations lacked expertise. Mr. Granger urges that citizens everywhere learn about technology issues and induce their governments to solve pressing technological problems.

The book begins with a chapter on the nature of technology. A sketchy explanation of the policy process is then offered along with a discussion of the U.S. government's limited role in creating policies for the science and technology community since World War II. The bulk of the book is devoted to exploring "specific aspects of the interaction between technology and international relations" (p. 46). Granger's discussion, however, seems more a straightforward review of the political implications of a wide variety of technology issues, rather than an analysis of their interaction. The style of presentation is, for the most part, anecdotal. Many of the issues concern aspects of technology transfer: North-South and West-East transfers, the multinational corporation's role in technology transfer, and some implications of increased U.S. technology transfer. There is a chapter on energy and nuclear proliferation and one on weather modification and Landsat.

While the author has a wide-ranging knowledge of technology issues, the book is somewhat disappointing for several reasons. In one sense, Mr. Granger has tried to do too much. Most issues are compressed, often unsatisfactorily, into a few pages. Perhaps because the author has tried to include so much, the quality of the discussions is spotty. Because Mr. Granger has spread his analysis so thin, this volume at times seems to be a catalogue of all international problems that had any kind of scientific or technological component.

In another sense, the author may not have tried to do enough. At the outset, Mr. Granger promises to explore the relationship between technology and foreign affairs. He implies both that advances in technology have changed the conduct and character of foreign affairs in general and that technological problems are unique, necessitating a new type of policymaking. His treatment of these two arguments, as the treatment of many of the issues discussed in this book, was somewhat superficial and brief.

Although Mr. Granger believes that "technology has created an interdependent world" (p. 1), he does not explore the genesis of technology-created interdependence; rather, the author uses examples to show that technological advances and decisions made about technology problems in one state may have influence beyond that state's borders. The problem with Mr. Granger's argument is that he tends to gloss over the relationship between interdependence, national interests, and cooperation. The author notes that some

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states are more dependent than others and employs the familiar Keohane-Nye distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. Mr. Granger, however, does not carry through with the distinction in his analyses of technology issues; nor does he note that any asymmetries of interdependence exist among states.

What is needed, according to the author, are effective changes in policymaking among states on technology issues. Mr. Granger suggests strengthening international organizations, beefing up science and technology ministries, and, most importantly, making available perfect information to policymakers. Thus, Mr. Granger argues that through the inclusion of well-informed citizens and scientists in the policy process, we will be able to gain objective knowledge about technology issues—a scientific rationality that will lead the way to correct policy choices.

There are two problems with this argument. First, while some objective truths do exist, the scientific community is not of one mind on many technology issues. The safety of nuclear power and the possibility of converting computers designed for nonmilitary use for strategic purposes are issues that still generate debate among scientists. Scientific rationality does not always give us one answer.

Even if we assume that many objective truths exist, *and* that concerned citizens could discern them, *and* that policymakers act accordingly, it is still difficult to see how international collaboration could be effected. The second problem with Mr. Granger's argument is that in regard to many of the issues he discusses, the technological component is clearly not the controlling variable in the determination of policy. The choice of one policy over another will many times involve a choice about distributional effects. What should a scheme for controlling deep seabed mining be like? Should an international authority parcel out pieces of the seabed? According to what criteria? Or, should a free-market system be permitted to operate? Different states would prefer different alternatives—even if they had perfect knowledge about the technological choices.

Similarly, some policy choices, such as population control, involve not only technological questions but also conflicts about ideological or religious beliefs.

Finally, some of the issues Mr. Granger addresses are technological only in the sense that the word "technology" is part of the name of the issue. The commercial transfer of nonmilitary technology is one such issue. The development of rules for governing such transfers has almost nothing to do with technology, but is an international economic and legal problem centering on issues of contract, antitrust, and patent law, rather than science.

Nevertheless, Mr. Granger has written a timely book that could be used to introduce students to the political implications of technology issues.

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Liberals and Social Democrats *by Peter Clarke. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 344 pp. $26.00.*

The history of the Liberal party and liberalism in Britain—a party and an ideology at present in low public esteem—still exerts a powerful attraction for numerous scholars. Peter Clarke, who has already published a seminal historical study of *Lancashire and the New Liberalism* (1971), now turns his attention to the activities of four liberal and, later, social democratic intellectuals—Graham Wallas, L.T. Hobhouse, J.A. Hobson, and J.L. Hammond—as a way of examining the relationship between liberalism and socialism in the period from approximately 1890 to 1940. The result is an intellectual history of a high and demanding caliber, persuasively argued, and well written.

The central issue addressed in this book is the relationship between capitalism and democracy. How were the power relationships and undeniable abuses of property ownership to be reconciled with the logical and inevitable demands of an increasingly dominant working class for political power and economic justice? More reason and more democracy in politics were the shorthand answers produced by these writers for this fundamental dilemma of British society. In their voluminous writings, Clarke's principals achieved a rough but largely unconscious division of intellectual labor. Wallas, through a sociological approach, addressed the question of the workings of a democratic state; Hobhouse concerned himself with the broader philosophical issues; Hobson focused on popular psychology and, more importantly, the workings of the economy; and Hammond provided the historical perspective with its implicit moral justification for their labors. Together these intellectuals (and others who are more briefly discussed) were concerned to foster an enlightened moral revolution in British politics—as opposed to a Marxist mechanical revolution—that would, in turn, master the abuses of capitalism and thus spread its material benefits more equitably across the whole of society.

The distance from the abstractions of the study to the field of political decision and then administrative implementation was and is enormous and, while each of the individuals discussed was politically or administratively active to varying degrees, none was in a position to initiate action on his own. There had to be a vehicle to translate thought into action or, at the very least, to begin to change attitudes. While the pen was a persuasive and, at times, powerful weapon, the intellectuals, in the end, had to convince the politicians and the political parties not only of the correctness of their views but, more importantly, of the need to act on those views. Until 1914 the chosen political vehicle was the Liberal party; the 1914–18 war, however, destroyed the Liberals and Lloyd George, the one Liberal who had provided the political leadership necessary to achieve progressive objectives. Despite their pronounced social democratic sympathies, these Edwardian intellectuals and their successors never really found an altogether comfortable home in the mass-based Labour party of the interwar years. What Clarke has perceptively described as "the false consciousness of the radical bourgeoisie" (p. 4) made a wholehearted relationship with Labour impossible.

But what was achieved? By 1945, argues Clarke, "the views which they had spent a lifetime propagating had found an unprecedently widespread acceptance" (p. 283). Empire was receding, the United Nations had arrived, higher living standards had been achieved for the working classes, full employment would be assured by Keynesian tech-

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niques of a managed economy, Hobsonian economic redistribution was in place through progressive direct taxation, and social welfare through comprehensive social insurance was enshrined in the Beveridge Report (ibid.). These are enormous achievements and surely open to further qualification than Clarke seems to allow for. Such a quibble, however, does not detract from the importance of this challenging study. "Wallas spoke for all of them when he said he wished to be remembered by his books" (p. 1). Clarke has ensured that we shall not only remember but also take full account of Wallas and his friends.

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From Guns to Butter: Technology Organizations and Reduced Military Spending in Western Europe *by Bernard Udis. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978. 368 pp. $20.00.*

As inflationary pressures and unemployment continue to climb in many Western economies, public attention is increasingly directed toward limiting taxation, government budgets, and deficit spending. Few federal and state spending sectors are sacrosanct from critical review any more; military spending is not unique in this regard.

Military spending has come under closest scrutiny of late in Western Europe where inflation and labor shortages have become at times acute. With rising costs of military manpower squeezing defense budgets from below, and spending limits pressing from above, national spending for military research, development, and procurement of equipment has either steadied or decreased in recent years. This has become most noticeable among European industries that are looking with necessary interest at diversification and civilian applications.

Bernard Udis, professor of economics at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has presented a thoughtful and interesting study of the interface between civil and military economies in seven West European countries (Britain, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, and France). Based upon 119 interviews with elites, most conducted by the author during late 1972, the book examines the broad and difficult issue of developing alternative markets to compensate for declining military work while simultaneously maintaining an adequate base in high-technology research and development. Such efforts at market diversification are not easy or simple ones to realize, given the potentially conflicting objectives of Western economies: minimal unemployment, fast technological pace, utilization of existing facilities in laboratories and factories, and a positive balance of payments.

The author conducted 80 percent of the interviews (semistructured, based upon a short, qualitative questionnaire included in appendix B) with European representatives of industry and government ministries; the remaining interviewees were journalists, academics, or private individuals. This research technique always presents a challenge to the interviewer in compiling the qualitative data into a coherent aggregate. Udis has done an admirable job, on the whole, in analyzing what must have been reams of interview notes and yards of taped discussions. All interviewees remain anonymous, but a list of represented companies and agencies is included in appendix A.

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The study begins with a discussion of the differences between the military and civilian markets, including risk assessment, cost estimation and overrun, and cyclical production runs; it is concluded that "significant differences do exist, yet many relate more to the monopsonistic nature of the military market rather than to "a 'pure' military-civil dichotomy" (p. 12). In discussing the major buyer of military products—the federal government—many interviewees interestingly noted the lack of any governmental policy in encouraging shifts of production from military to civil work or the limited effectiveness of any existing program to encourage innovation. At the same time, they acknowledged that "European governments play a more important role with respect to industry promotion and development than does government in the United States" (p. 51).

These same military industrialists also perceived federal government regulations as easily side-stepped. For example, the German Foreign Ministry restricts arms exports, particularly outside the NATO area; one interviewee related the case, however, of how Germany builds and exports submarine parts separately to England "where Vickers assembles them and sells them to Latin American countries" (p. 53).

Not surprisingly, most interviewees perceived the United States as the major competitor in the international market for weaponry and related commercial products, having the special advantages of government support for research and development (R & D) and lengthy production runs relative to the Europeans. As aerospace executives pointed out, "the risk is staggering on the commercial side when you compete with giant firms in the United States who can be assured of a huge internal market" (p. 136). Executives found U.S. competitiveness, particularly in the civilian aviation markets, at times exclusionary; for example, when Boeing sought to sell its 727 model aircraft to the Spanish airline, Iberia, it agreed to purchase all older Iberia aircraft in return and sold them as second-hand planes. "How can anyone in Europe compete with such a deal" (p. 96)?

Regarding research and development, Udis found that there was "little military sponsorship of basic research with possible exceptions in the fields of electronics and aerospace" in most of the European countries (p. 20). This point is especially interesting in view of the comparatively large U.S. sponsorship of military R&D—over $5 billion for pre-engineering research and development for fiscal year 1980. He concludes, along the lines of a 1967 Brookings study (Nelson et al., *Technology, Economic Growth and Public Policy)*, that creation of a federally funded "National Institute of Technology" would greatly benefit technological innovation and civilian spinoffs in Europe (p. 337).

This book offers much information for those interested in the political and economic areas of civil-military relations, arms exports, NATO standardization, military conversion and economic adjustment, technology transfer, and arms control and disarmament. Due to its interview-based data, the study offers numerous practical examples and pertinent anecdotes in what might otherwise be very dry material. Perhaps most apparent in the interview material is the widespread disagreement among officials on almost every subject, indicating the need for further such research and analysis in the important issues of guns and butter.

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Japan as Number One: Lessons for America *by Ezra F. Vogel. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979. 272 pp. $12.50.*

This is a clear, well-written book that can be profitably read by everyone from Japanese expert to casual reader. The sections describing the interaction between bureaucrats, politicians, and businessmen at national and local levels are excellent. Vogel admirably conveys the flavor of bureaucratic influence over business without neglecting the subtle political balancing among various interests. He emphasizes Japan's competitive, pluralistic, democratic, market-oriented society where firms act independently and consensus builds from bargaining among groups. His description achieves the same balance between detail and impressions and between specifics and generality as the Japanese government in formulating policies and in using control and exhortation to implement them.

Vogel introduces the "Japanese Challenge" in Part I, and in Part II, "Japanese Successes," he addresses aspects of Japan's postwar institutional development where he feels they have solved problems the United States has found more intractable. These cover the pursuit of knowledge and consensus decision making, state guidance and private initiative, politics, the large company, basic education, welfare, and crime control. Part III, "The American Response," tries to draw lessons for American policy.

Each chapter is worthwhile for the information contained and the evenhanded exposition. This is no anti-American diatribe but indicates where we could do better. Still, Vogel compellingly describes the institutions underpinning Japan's economic success and serves notice that relative to the United States this is likely to continue unless we alter some current policies. He foresees little change in Japan's successful institutions and policies.

A consistent theme emerges concerning Japan's more successful handling of modern society's complex problems. Whether it is the need to lower crime rates, establish uniform quality education, reduce pollution, raise living standards, or decrease social friction, Japan has succeeded because it has balanced interests to solve recognized problems within an overall spirit of cooperation. Japanese recognize that a healthily functioning but diverse society cannot have absolute winners or losers. The "fair" and sensible approach is to assure the bargaining-decision process includes everyone and the result is not totally unfair to anyone. Then decisions become accepted and groups work to achieve agreed goals with little subsequent friction or litigation. This seems common sense, a practical approach to social problem solving and policy implementation. In this way, Vogel explains Japan's successes and what America has to learn.

But like many books examining Japan, the author finds difficulty transferring their approaches into U.S. policy prescriptions. He does not really show how America might accomplish similar results given different institutions. Vogel's assessment that Japan's diversity in 1869 is analogous is unconvincing. Japan's small size and long common history had developed a basically homogeneous people amenable to unifying policies. America conversely is a large rather young country with a racially and culturally heterogeneous population.

Similarly, the probable unacceptability of his concept of a super-government elite unchanging with administrations to assure policy continuity indicates the futility of trying to graft directly on Japanese institutions. Rather, now seeing certain problems are solu-

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able, one should adapt Japanese achievements to U.S. institutions and values. If we need cooperation between business and government, we should encourage interaction without fearing conflicts of interest. If economic policies are shortsighted and underemphasize supply, savings, and investment, let us rethink our theories so that personality changes will not alter applied policy.

With this approach, America can match Japanese achievements and compete successfully. But it should avoid trying to superimpose Japan's format. However, this perhaps represents another book, which if as well done will be excellent indeed.

WILLIAM V. RAPP
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The People of Asia *by Gordon T. Bowles. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. 414 pp. $14.95.*

Ethnic Plurality in India *by R. A. Schermerhorn. Tucson, Ariz., University of Arizona Press, 1978. 369 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $6.45.*

Generations of scholars have tried to make sense of the complex lines that demarcate different groups of people in Asia. What they found as a result of their investigations heavily depended on the perspectives they used in their studies. The search still goes on. The intellectual output of the two volumes under review can be appreciated in a better light if one takes into account what the authors were actually looking for. This is important because scholarly labels used for naming groups of people may be more important for defined intellectual purposes than for a general understanding of how people define themselves or how such definitions are related to social and political action. At the same time, the scholarly analysis of categoric boundaries may serve a useful clarificatory role for understanding practical action and prospective changes.

Gordon Bowles has used mature expertise to weave together an ambitious study, which spans a vast range of time and space, of the most populous continent of the world. Given the immense importance of Asia, it is proper that a synoptic accounting be attempted to decipher the lives that distinguish the complex variety of the people coexisting in this continent. Though separate accounts of regional population have been continuously added to the literature on Asia, this work stands out as one of the few modern attempts to comprehensively consider the comparative traits of the Asian people as a whole. If a mechanical accounting of the mutual distance among groups of Asian people does not prove to be satisfying to those who do not have a taste for statistical clusters, it may still provide an incentive to produce more work clarifying the Asian mosaic.

Looking from the vantage point of a human biologist, the author relies on an anthropological description and interpretation of the history of the Asian people. Though he seeks to confine his study to nonpsychic biolgical phenomena with special reference to significant indicators of large groups, so far as historical evidence permits him to exercise scholarly choice, his study covers a broader range. The book begins with an investigation of methods of racial classification and a study of Asia's ecological regions. The regions are identified in ethnoecological terms and the bulk of this work is then devoted to an

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analysis of the formative processes of the populations of the northern, southern, western, and eastern quadrants of the continent.

In the process of reconstructing the formative processes and for the purpose of analyzing the proximity and mutual distance among Asian population groups, the author has utilized an extensive literature derived from a variety of disciplines. Political scientists will profit from the seasoned scanning of this literature as much as from its interpretation of the nature and prospects of human groups identified by the author. They will find this painstaking account quite useful for discerning what helps these groups to value a life of their own and how such valuation changes due to a variety of demographic, ecological, and other forces. On the other hand, it may be noted here that the author's accounting of changes over time of the identifying lines of Asian people could have benefited from a greater appreciation of politically induced forces. When, for example, Bowles discusses the relative strength of the bond of common language in south Asia (p. 149), he does not sufficiently clarify the political forces that use ethnic bonds for a variety of social objectives and effects.

Due to his chosen scale and purpose of coverage, it was evidently not possible for Bowles to examine the organizational settings of ethnic group-action for the maintenance or expansion of group life. Schermerhorn's study of ethnic plurality in an Indian setting presents an intensive examination of selected major ethnic groups. His previous studies of ethnicity are well known for their sensitivity to the analytical ordering of complex ethnic relations. His present study should be welcomed by those who specialize on Indian studies as well as by more general scholars of comparative ethnic problems.

Schermerhorn's study is devoted to analyzing ten minority groups and their relations with the rest of the Indian society as a whole. The groups studied are scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, Jains, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians, Jews, Parsis, and Chinese. A major purpose of this work is to examine the extent to which these groups are integrated into the national life. He uses a concept of integration that implies a cooperative compliance of these minority groups with activities and objectives of the dominant group in the society. What constitutes the dominant group in India? The author tells us that it "is an elite rather than a majority" drawn from a "pool" of caste Hindus (p. 18). It is not an ethnic group, but it has its own consciousness of kind. Apparently, this is the "pool" that supplies the strategic leadership in society, polity, and economy, and this process can be "expected for generations to come" (p. 19). Yet, the author does not fail to recognize the internal divisions that fragment this dominant group. Here he simplifies these divisions by using characteristic sociological labels such as "parochial neo-traditionals" and the "conditionally westernized." One may reasonably doubt the enlightening value of this type of enterprise, but then the peers in the author's profession may have other uses for it.

In fact, the painstaking schematics employed in this study to organize analytically the evidence on ethnic relations bearing upon the process of integration are likely to be useful mostly to those readers who believe in a compliance-oriented theory of integration. Comparative analysis, even in political science, has frequently pursued this type of analysis, though I am not sure of its productive yield. The guiding concern pervading such analysis appears to be too exclusively tied to national peace than anything else. If, however, other goals are taken into account, less emphasis would be warranted on the assimilationist

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ideologies implied in most concerns and theories regarding national integration. For example, if national economic transformation with a distributive orientation is emphasized as a goal of national development, one may have less reason to be enthused about a theory of integration tied to a notion of compliance. Intergroup conflict and cooperation will then bring out more clearly the dimensions of ethnic movements that are closely tied to the common cause of multiple ethnic groups for economic and political objectives.

A dynamic understanding of the prospective cooperation and conflict among ethnic groups—these would include many more than Schermerhorn has chosen to analyze—would have to consider more complex economic and political aspects of ethnic action in the Indian social space than the ones that normally interest the conventional sociology of minority relations. When the author notes how ethnic groups are disregarded between elections, he is probably missing a strategic fact of continuous use of large masses of people in forms that cannot be adequately analyzed in ethnic terms alone. How these lines mesh and cross in the daily political, economic, and social life of the country would probably tell us more about the future of the "disadvantaged" masses than the studies of "disregarded" people. When the author discovers that minority groups get better attention under "special or emergency conditions" (p. 346), the reader may feel that the author was either misled by surface phenomena or his chosen concern for a particular kind of regard for minorities misled his insight.

None of these comments bears a negative implication concerning the value of Schermerhorn's work, which definitely displays the quality of a mature product of a leading scholar in the field. This book contains an impressively organized study of the most complicated ethnic relations in a setting that would test the organizing ability and intellectual sensitivity of any scholar. Even if one disagrees with the author's perspective, he will find here a valuable treatment of Indian ethnic relations informed by a rare comparative sensitivity. The very complexity of the subject needed an experienced analytical endeavor to produce a comprehensive work. The author has delivered it.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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